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Abstract
This	  project	  examines	  the	  restrictive	  and	  onerous	  responsibilities	  Biomedical	  Language	  places	  on	  the	  
subject	  in	  pain.	  Pain	  is	  subjective	  and	  immersive.	  	  Biomedicine	  insists	  that	  this	  subjectivity	  be	  
categorised	  in	  terms	  of	  ill-­‐fitting	  	  and	  ideologically	  constructed	  binaries	  such	  as	  ‘healthy’	  and	  ‘sick’,	  
‘normal’	  and	  ‘abject’.	  Subjects	  in	  pain	  must	  make	  sense	  within	  these	  binaries,	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  their	  
inability	  to	  perform	  as	  expected,	  or	  face	  scrutiny	  and	  isolation.	  
Relying	  heavily	  on	  Foucault’s	  Birth	  of	  the	  Clinic,	  the	  Biomedical	  rhetoric	  of	  scientific	  impartiality	  is	  
dismantled	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  partisan	  concerns	  which	  it	  disguises.	  	  Communally	  and	  
unconsciously,	  society	  weaves	  these	  assumptions,	  judgements	  and	  impositions	  through	  every	  layer	  
of	  representation.	  Due	  to	  the	  inherently	  invisible	  nature	  of	  pain,	  subjects	  must	  perform	  their	  
conditions	  in	  order	  to	  translate	  within	  this	  matrix.	  Voyeurism	  and	  performance	  of	  pain	  in	  
Enlightenment	  society	  is	  compared	  to	  the	  work	  of	  contemporary	  body	  artists	  to	  examine	  how,	  if	  at	  
all,	  this	  dynamic	  has	  shifted.	  
As	  a	  sufferer	  of	  Celiac	  Disease	  and	  Chronic	  Pain,	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  using	  a	  representational	  language	  
that	  is	  founded	  on	  partiality	  and	  ambiguity	  rather	  than	  direct	  disclosure,	  or	  performance.	  With	  
reference	  to	  avant	  garde	  20th	  century	  artists	  who	  have	  championed	  this	  position,	  I	  examine	  
potentials	  for	  operating	  within	  an	  ideologically	  laced	  representational	  framework	  with	  self-­‐
preservation.	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Introduction: Renegotiating the Visual Expression of Pain	  
	  
How	  does	  one	  become	  part	  of	  the	  world?	  Relationships	  with	  others	  create	  meaning.	  Without	  them	  
there	   is	   just	   the	  self,	   relating	  nothing	  to	  no	  one.	  Relationships	  rely	  on	  common	   language,	  not	  only	  
linguistic	  but	  also	  pictorial	  and	  gestural.	  One	  submits	  to	  language	  to	  become	  part	  of	  the	  world.	  But	  
what	  if	  the	  self	  is	  consumed	  by	  an	  experience	  that	  is	  untranslatable?	  	  
Physical	   pain	   is	   so	   entirely	   subjective	   that	   it	   cannot	   be	   forced	   into	   words	   which	   rely	   on	   the	  
commonality	   of	   the	   experiences	   to	   which	   they	   refer.	   The	   world	   is	   uncomfortable	   with	   the	  
inexpressible,	  that	  which	  is	  cast	  in	  darkness,	  the	  abject.	  It	  finds	  ways	  to	  translate	  the	  untranslatable.	  
Ill-­‐fitting	  concepts,	  words,	  images	  attempt	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  that	  which	  resists	  language.	  
This	  thesis	  explores	  the	  relationship	  between	  sickness	  and	  language,	  particularly	  visual	   language	  in	  
terms	   of	   three	   filters:	   experience,	   theory	   and	   representation.	   Though	   remaining	   distinct,	   these	  
categories	  will	  emerge	  as	  interdependent,	  intricately	  interwoven.	  My	  research	  has	  been	  guided	  and	  
translated	   through	  my	  own	  personal	  experience.	  The	   representational	  work,	  which	   is	   the	  practical	  
component	  of	  this	  written	  work,	  is	  a	  visual	  reflection	  of	  this	  interplay	  between	  theory	  and	  life.	  
I	  suffer	  from	  Celiac	  Disease	  and	  associated	  Chronic	  Pain	  Disorder.	  It	  took	  years	  of	  doctors’	  visits	  and	  
painful	   invasive	   procedures	   before	   reaching	   these	   diagnoses.	   Medical	   practitioners	   tried	  
unsuccessfully	   for	   years,	   to	   gain	   visual	   access	   to	   my	   conditions	   through	   various	   medical	   imaging	  
techniques	   including	   X-­‐rays,	   scopes	   and	   sonograms.	   Countless	   consultations	   failed	   to	   draw	   my	  
ailments	   to	   the	   surface.	   My	   symptoms	   refused	   to	   conform	   to	   any	   tangible	   measurable	   form	   or	  
traditional	  medical	  imagery.	  They	  are	  in	  most	  ways,	  ‘invisible’	  diseases.	  
This	  is	  a	  problem	  in	  a	  system	  that	  champions	  the	  visual.	  As	  time	  passes,	  representations	  of	  the	  body	  
continue	   to	   gain	   credence	   as	   more	   incredible	   inventions	   gain	   access	   to	   deeper	   recesses	   of	   the	  
mysteries	   of	   the	   body.	   The	   scientific	   advances	   of	   the	   Enlightenment	   period,	   specifically	   the	   19th	  
century,	  meant	   that	  medical	  professionals	   could	   ‘see’	   the	  body	  more	  entirely,	   close	  up,	   in	  greater	  
detail	   than	   ever	   before.	   Since	   then,	   images	   have	   become	   exponentially	   foundational	   in	   medical	  
diagnosis.	  The	  patient	  is	  expected	  to	  report	  to	  their	  own	  surface	  more	  than	  ever.	  	  Here	  they	  engage	  
in	  an	  inherently	  unequal	  power	  dynamic	  with	  a	  doctor.	  	  This	  individual	  is	  allowed	  depth	  in	  the	  form	  




of	  extensive	  knowledge	  and	  interpretive	  capacities;	   in	  other	  words	  the	  ability	  to	   ‘see’	   in	  a	  way	  the	  
patient	  cannot.	  
Visual	  demarcation	  of	   the	  bodily	  abnormal	   is	  simultaneously	  a	  demarcation	  of	   the	  abject.	  Medical	  
imagery	  attempts	  to	  pin	  down	  and	  contain	  the	  subject.	  It	  creates	  uniformity	  through	  proliferation.	  If	  
translation	   into	   the	  visual	   is	   impossible,	   the	  subject	   is	  expected	   to	  construct	  a	  visual	  dimension	   to	  
their	  experience	  through	  performance.	  One	  is	  expected	  to	  perform	  as	  being	  sick.	  	  
It	   is	  impossible	  to	  translate	  oneself	  as	  an	  active	  member	  of	  the	  world	  without	  these	  diagnoses	  and	  
related	   visuals	   and	  performances.	   I	   have	   heard	  many	  people	  who	   suffer	   from	  bodily	   ailments	   say	  
that	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  labelled	  by	  their	  sickness.	  My	  experience	  was	  the	  opposite.	  Being	  sick,	  
being	  unable	   to	  perform	  as	  expected	  without	  an	  explanatory	   label	   for	  one’s	   condition,	  places	  one	  
outside	  the	  conversable	  dynamic	  in	  which	  people	  relate.	  It	  places	  oneself	  outside	  language.	  	  
My	   artistic	  work	   explores	   the	   idea	  of	   the	   ‘surface’;	   of	   the	  body,	   of	   subjectivity,	   of	   an	   artwork,	   on	  
which	   language	   imprints	   itself.	   In	   the	  medical	   conception,	   the	   surface	   is	  an	   imagined	  plane	  where	  
the	  body	  is	  presented,	  in	  its	  entirety,	  all	  ailments	  and	  abnormalities	  determinable,	  visually	  coinciding	  
with	   a	   learnt	   inventory	   of	   maladies.	   Foucault	   refers	   to	   this	   as	   the	   ‘flat	   surface	   of	   perpetual	  
simultaneity’.	   ‘Disease	   is	   perceived	   fundamentally	   in	   a	   space	   of	   projection	   without	   depth,	   of	  
coincidence	   without	   development.	   There	   is	   only	   one	   plane	   and	   one	  moment.	   The	   form	   in	   which	  
truth	  is	  originally	  shown	  is	  the	  surface	  in	  which	  relief	  is	  both	  manifested	  and	  abolished…’	  (1973:5).	  	  
For	   this	   reason	   the	   surface	   can	   also	   be	   an	   arena	   of	   psychological	   violence	   to	   the	   patient	   who	   is	  
forced	   to	   inhabit	   this	   flat	   space,	   the	  medically	   knowable,	   see-­‐able	   body,	   when	  within	   the	   doctor	  
patient	  relationship.	   ‘Depth’	  metaphorically,	  psychologically	   is	  denied	  the	  sick	  subject	  who	  quickly,	  
arguably	  becomes	  the	  sick	  object.	  	  
My	  work	  explores	  the	  creative	  potential	  of	  inhabiting	  a	  space	  just	  below	  the	  ‘surface’.	  I	  refer	  to	  this	  	  
as	  the	  ‘half-­‐light’.	   In	  this	  space	  a	  visuality	  that	  does	  not	  offer	  direct	  explanation	  may	  materialise.	   It	  
complicates	  the	  act	  of	  looking	  by	  alluding	  to,	  but	  never	  fully	  presenting	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  body	  in	  pain.	  
Works	  from	  the	  half-­‐light	  talk	  in	  voices	  that	  hope	  to	  be	  heard	  but	  not	  ‘understood’.	  	  
My	   artworks	   draw	   on	   images	   created	   during	   art	   therapy.	   The	   bizarre,	   unsettling	   scenarios	   and	  
characters	   that	   covered	   my	   pages,	   increasingly	   strange	   and	   remote,	   expressed	   something	   of	   my	  
subjective	   experience	   of	   physical	   pain	   which	   has	   as	   yet	   found	   no	   combination	   of	   words	   to	  
satisfactorily	  match	   them.	  Even	   if	   a	  doctor	  had	  presented	  me	  with	  a	   shiny	  black	  and	  white	   image	  




showing	   a	   bump,	   or	   a	   lesion,	   I	   am	   sure	   that	   this	   would	   not	   have	   satisfactorily	   reflected	   	   my	  
experience	  of	  the	  ‘way	  it	  is’.	  	  
The	  work	  attempts	  to	  re-­‐visualise	  or	  perhaps	  even,	  de-­‐visualise	  pain.	  The	  visuality	  referred	  to	  here	  is	  
that	  which	  supports	  the	  fallacy	  that	  how	  something	  looks	  and	  how	  it	  is	  are	  one	  and	  the	  same	  thing.	  
It	  conflates	  the	  idea	  of	  seeing	  with	  understanding.	  It	  seems	  to	  insist,	  ‘look,	  you	  can	  see	  it,	  this	  is	  how	  
it	  is’.	  	  	  
Through	   the	   following	   experiential	   account	   of	   my	   relationship	   with	   these	   diseases,	   the	   medical	  
arena	  and	  public	   interactions,	  certain	   themes	  emerge	  that	  will	  be	  unpacked	   in	  chapter	  one.	  These	  
are;	  the	  emphasis	  on	  visuality	  as	  a	  form	  of	  legitimacy	  in	  illness,	  the	  construction	  of	  ‘normality’	  and	  
how	   illness	  threatens	  this;	   the	  confused	  subject/object	  status	  of	   the	   ‘patient’,	  and	  the	  expectation	  
that	  the	  patient	  ‘perform’	  his	  or	  her	  condition.	  
	   	  





My	  Story	  with	  Celiac	  Disease	  and	  Chronic	  Pelvic	  Pain	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  science	  of	  the	  individual,	  and	  medicine	  suffers	  from	  a	  fundamental	  contradiction;	  
its	   practice	   deals	   with	   the	   individual,	   while	   its	   theory	   grasps	   universals	   only.”(Boudreau,	  
Cassell,	  2010:	  379)	  
	  
Both	  Celiac	  Disease	  and	  Chronic	  Pelvic	  Pain	   include,	  but	  are	  not	   limited	  to	  constant	   fluctuations	   in	  
pain.	  Pain	  poses	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  tenets	  of	  biomedicine,	  particularly	  by	  eluding	  medical	   imaging.	  
The	  various	  types	  of	  pain	  related	  to	  each	  condition	  are	  entirely	  distinct	  from	  each	  other.	  It	  was	  many	  
years	   before	   I	   began	   to	   refer	   to	   the	   various	   sensations	   I	   had	   become	   used	   to,	   as	   ‘pain’.	   It	   is	  
extraordinary	  to	  me	  that	  such	  a	  variety	  of	  feeling	  can	  be	  referred	  to	  by	  this	  word	  and	  yet,	  as	  I	  have	  
alluded	   to	   before,	   I	   was	   grateful	   for	   the	   label,	   endorsed	   by	   a	   specialist,	   which	   translated	   my	  
experience	  into	  something	  that	  others	  could	  make	  sense	  of.	  
Around	  the	  time	  I	  began	  to	  feel	  ill,	  I	  started	  attending	  art	  therapy	  sessions.	  I	  initially	  tended	  to	  draw	  
myself	  looking	  unhappy,	  in	  bed,	  with	  a	  swollen	  stomach	  surrounded	  by	  the	  outlines	  of	  my	  bedroom.	  
Eventually	   the	   images	   become	   expressions	   of	   an	   entirely	   personal	   lexicon	   of	   symbols.	   Without	  
consciously	   deciding	   what	   I	   was	   going	   to	   draw,	   characters	   and	   scenarios	   from	   my	   psychological	  
mythology	  would	  play	  out	  over	  the	  page.	  Not	  only	  this,	  but	  I	  began	  to	  draw	  in	  a	  bodily	  way.	  Scratchy	  
pen	  marks	  were	   like	   itchy	   skin,	   hastily	   applied	   overly	  wet	   paint	   could	   reflect	   an	   uneasy	   digestive	  
system.	  
In	   this	   process,	  my	   sickness	  was	   indecipherable	   from	   other	   elements	   of	  my	   life.	   Illness,	   elements	  
directly	   affected	   by	   illness,	   elements	   more	   subtly	   affected	   and	   elements	   (arguably)	   entirely	  
independent	  were	  all	  democratically	  negotiated	  within	  the	  same	  pictorial	  scenario.	  	  
This	   sense	   of	   integration	   conflicted	   completely	  with	  my	   interactions	  with	   doctors	   and	   hospitals.	   I	  
always	  felt	  that	  part	  of	  the	  process	  seemed	  to	  be	  to	  separate	  out	  the	  ‘me’	  from	  my	  body,	  as	  if	  the	  
two	   operated	   independently.	  Medical	   investigations	   seemed	   to	   imply	   that	  my	   body	  was	   simply	   a	  
faulty	  machine	   in	  which	   I	  was	  riding	  around.	  This	  comprehensive	  medical	  gaze	  paradoxically	  aligns	  
with	  an	  increasingly	  fractured	  bodily	  identity.	  A	  sense	  of	  bodily	  unity	  is	  undermined	  by	  the	  medical	  




tendency	   to	  split	  off	   the	  offending	   limb	  or	  organ	   from	  the	  patient’s	   subjectivity.	  There	   is	  a	  certain	  
subtle	  violence	   that	   this	  approach	  does	   to	   the	   sick	   subject,	   to	   the	  person	  who	   is	   so	  particularly	   in	  
their	  body,	  to	  be	  split	  into	  parts.	  	  
These	  tendencies	  interest	  me	  as	  a	  sufferer	  of	  a	  generally	  ‘unseeable	  diseases’.	  	  Celiac	  Disease	  is	  an	  
autoimmune	  disease	  that	  attacks	  the	  digestive	  system.	  It	   is	  characterised	  by	  an	  extreme	  sensitivity	  
to	  gluten.	  It	  is	  also	  often	  accompanied	  by	  intolerances	  to	  dairy,	  sugar,	  carbohydrates,	  sulphur,	  spicy	  
foods	  and	  citrus.	  The	  condition	  exists	  in	  degrees.	  Extreme	  cases	  may	  be	  picked	  up	  on	  blood	  tests	  and	  
colonoscopies,	   though	   often	   only	   in	   the	   duodenum,	   which	   is	   not	   penetrated	   by	   routine	  
colonoscopies.	  However,	   these	   tests	  are	  only	  effective	   if	   the	  patient	   is	   still	  eating	  gluten	  and	  even	  
then	  are	  inconclusive,	  (Celiac	  Disease	  Foundation,	  2015).	  	  
	  While	  mainly	  an	  affliction	  of	   the	  gut,	   the	  effects	  of	  Celiac	  Disease	  express	   themselves	   throughout	  
the	  body	   and	  often	  more	   severely	   through	   attendant	   conditions.	  While	   the	   sufferer	  will	   generally	  
experience	   painful	   digestive	   disturbances,	   extreme	  weight	   loss,	   hair	   loss,	   anxiety	   and	   depression,	  
once	  gluten	  has	  been	  completely	  removed	  from	  the	  diet	  and	  the	  right	  medication	  and	  lifestyle	  are	  
introduced,	  the	  condition	   is	  manageable.	  While	  the	  gut	  may	  work	  almost	  normally,	  the	  associative	  
conditions,	   such	  as	   chronic	   fatigue,	  over	   sensitive	  allergies,	   ineffective	   immune	   resistance,	   anxiety	  
disorders	   and	   pain	   conditions,	   including	   chronic	   pelvic	   pain,	   may	   continue	   in	   full	   force,	   (Celiac	  
Disease	   Foundation,	   2015).	   Neighbouring	   digestive	   organs,	   particularly	   the	   stomach,	   oesophagus	  
and	  bladder,	  may	  continue	  to	  function	  abnormally.	  The	  process	  of	  balancing	  various	  medicines	  may	  
be	  as	  onerous	  as	  controlling	  the	  primary	  bodily	  disturbances.	  So	  while	  Celiac	  is	  a	  disease	  of	  the	  gut,	  
it	  is	  often	  ‘seen’	  elsewhere.	  
Pelvic	  Pain	  Syndrome	  is	  often	  a	  spin	  off	  condition	  of	  gut	  disturbances.	  Pressure	  on	  the	  bladder	  can	  
lead	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  ulcers	  on	  its	  interior	  walls.	  This	  is	  known	  as	  ‘Interstitial	  Cystitis’.	   I	  suffered	  
this	  condition	  for	  a	  few	  years	  but	  the	  ulcers	  have	  recovered	  significantly.	  However,	   like	  with	  many	  
chronic	  pain	  conditions,	  my	  brain	  has	  continued	  to	  code	  for	  pain	  in	  the	  area.	  The	  muscles	  on	  the	  left	  
side	  of	  my	  pelvic	  area	  have	  become	  unnaturally	  tightened	  in	  response	  to	  this	  coding.	  This	  is	  treated	  
through	   physiotherapy	   and	   the	   practice	   of	   special	   stretches	   and	   exercises.	   The	   condition	   is	  
aggravated	  by	  digestive	  disturbances	  caused	  by	  eating	  the	  wrong	  foods.	  	  
A	   celiac	   or	   chronic	   pain	   sufferer	   may	   look	   and	   act	   entirely	   normally.	   Many	   ‘normal’	   activities,	  
however,	  become	  complicated	  to	  manage.	  The	  slightest	  trace	  of	  gluten	  in	  food	  can	  lead	  to	  days	  of	  
sickness.	  My	  mistrust	   of	   restaurants	   and	   other	   people’s	   cooking,	   the	   awkwardness	   caused	   by	  my	  




dietary	   requirements,	   the	   sensation	   of	   being	   ‘zoned	   out’	   due	   to	   various	   pain	   medications	   and	  
volatile	  shifts	  in	  energy	  with	  friends	  and	  family	  has	  led	  to	  increasing	  isolation.	  The	  daily	  occurrence	  
of	   this	   condition	   often	  means	   explaining	   unusual	   behaviours	   to	   others	  which	   can	   be	   irksome	   and	  
repetitive.	   I	   so	  often	  felt	   like	   I	  needed	  to	  either	   ‘act	  normal’	  or	   ‘perform’	  my	  sickness	  to	   legitimise	  
absences.	  If	  you	  are	  unwilling	  to	  perform,	  isolation	  is	  often	  the	  only	  alternative.	  	  
Both	   Celiac	   Disease	   and	   Pelvic	   Pain	   Syndrome	   are	   associated	   with	   anxiety	   disorders.	   There	   is	   a	  
correlation	   in	   the	  experience	  of	  worsened	   symptoms	  and	  bad	  bouts	  of	   anxiety.	   It	   is	  often	  unclear	  
what	  the	  instigator	  is,	  causes	  can	  run	  both	  ways	  and	  often	  interlace.	  Similarly,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  say	  
whether	  a	  generally	  anxious	  personality	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  an	  underlying	  medical	  condition	  or	  the	  other	  
way	  around.	  	  This	  alone	  is	  a	  serious	  challenge	  to	  the	  medically	  dualistic	  approach.	  
The	   possibility	   that	   my	   symptoms	   seem	   to	   intensify	   at	   periods	   of	   major	   change	   in	   my	   life	   has	  
occurred	  to	  me.	  For	  instance,	  this	  year	  I	  started	  working	  after	  many	  years	  of	  studying.	  This	  frightens	  
me	  for	  many	  reasons	  including	  the	  concern	  that	  my	  conditions	  may	  flare	  up	  unexpectedly	  and	  affect	  
my	  performance	  or	  humiliate	  me.	   In	  my	   fantasies	   co-­‐workers	  whisper	   that	   I	   am	   ‘melodramatic’,	   a	  
prima	  donna’,	  that	  I	  should	  not	  be	  ‘indulged’.	  	  
This	   shift	  will	   also	   require	  driving,	  which	   I	  have	  managed	   to	  avoid	  up	   till	   now.	   If	   I	   accidentally	  eat	  
food	   contaminated	  by	   traces	  of	   gluten,	   I	   become	  very	  disoriented,	  dizzy	   and	   sleepy.	   This	   can	  also	  
happen	   in	   reaction	   to	   sulphur,	   inhaling	   strong	   chemicals	   and	   sometimes	   in	   reaction	   to	   my	   pain	  
medication.	  I	  am	  terrified	  that	  I	  may	  become	  hazy	  and	  confused	  while	  driving	  and	  cause	  an	  accident.	  
Have	   my	   conditions	   made	   me	   fear	   fully	   engaging	   with	   a	   grown	   up	   life	   because	   I	   know,	   from	  
childhood,	  my	  body’s	  tendency	  to	  be	  unpredictable?	  Or,	  what	  if	  the	  conditions	  materialise	  as	  a	  way	  
to	  avoid	  the	  responsibility	  of	  adulthood?	  	  These	  contrasting	  positions	  reflect	  the	  traditional	  western	  
dualistic	   distinction	   between	   mind	   and	   body.	   The	   answer	   is	   probably	   a	   complex	   interrelation	  
between	  the	  two.	  One	  position	  does	  not	  invalidate	  the	  other.	  While	  most	  chronic	  conditions	  have	  a	  
psychological	  dimension,	  it	  is	  a	  mistake	  to	  dismiss	  them	  as	  purely	  psychological.	  The	  examples	  above	  
show	  how	  entangled	  bodily	   symptoms	  and	  psychological	   states	  are.	  Bodily	   irregularities	  become	  a	  
structural,	   integral	  part	  of	   the	  experience	  of	   life.	   	   Increasingly,	  progressive	  healthcare	  attempts	   to	  
integrate	  the	  studies	  of	  psychology	  and	  medicine.	  This	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘bio-­‐psychological	  model’	  
in	  opposition	  to	  the	  ‘biomedical	  model’.	  
Through	   my	   self-­‐imposed	   isolation	   and	   my	   struggle	   with	   doctors	   to	   uncover	   my	   diagnosis	   whilst	  
attempting	   to	   maintain	   my	   subjectivity,	   I	   feel	   I	   have	   been	   rendered	   ‘unseen’.	   Paradoxically,	   in	   a	  




literal	  sense,	  I	  have	  been	  more	  intimately	  and	  thoroughly	  seen	  as	  a	  result	  of	  my	  conditions,	  in	  terms	  
of	  the	  powers	  of	  medical	  imaging.	  	  
	   	  








The	   First	   chapter	   concerns	   itself	   with	   the	   visual	   nature	   of	   how	   sickness	   is	   demarcated	   from	   the	  
‘normal’,	   into	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  abject.	  Much	  of	  this	  relates	  to	  the	  semiotic	  structures	  which	  inform	  
representation,	   including	  medical	  discourse	   itself.	  For	  this	  reason	  my	  interrogations	  rely	  heavily	  on	  
Foucault’s	  Birth	  of	  the	  Clinic	  particularly	  in	  the	  initial	  chapter,	  but	  also	  throughout	  my	  argument.	  	  
Foucault’s	  work,	   characteristically,	   explores	   the	   hidden	   power	   dynamics,	   which	   exist	  within	   every	  
discourse.	  His	  work	  characteristically	  explores	  how	  these	  narratives	  function	  and	  whom	  they	  serve.	  
From	   discourses	   on	   particular	   subjects,	   to	   the	   very	   words	   we	   string	   together	   in	   order	   to	   inform	  
discussion,	  the	  language	  we	  use	  is	  subtly	  encoded	  to	  support	  certain	  hierarchies.	  	  
Foucault	   outlines	   how	   medical	   discourses	   fundamentally	   changed	   during	   the	   19th	   century.	   The	  
developments	  in	  medical	  technology	  meant	  that	  doctors	  and	  physicians	  could	  ‘see’	  more	  deeply	  into	  
the	   body	   than	   ever	   before,	   through	   devices	   such	   as	   the	   X-­‐ray	   and	   the	   microscope.	   Previously	  
medicine	   had	   been	   considered	   an	   art,	   19th	   century	   practitioners	   insisted	   that	   it	  was	   a	   science.	   A	  
scientific	  discourse	  relies	  on	  empiricism,	  over	  and	  above	  the	  subjective	  account	  of	  the	  patient.	  The	  
power	   dynamic	   in	   the	   doctor	   patient	   relationship	   was	   shifted	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   doctor	   who,	   as	  
possessor	  of	  the	  supposedly	  objective	  ‘medical	  gaze’,	  could	  see	  and	  understand	  the	  patient’s	  body	  in	  
a	  way	  that	  they	  could	  not	  themselves.	  	  
Medical	   language	   denies	   that,	   like	   any	   discourse,	   it	   is	   laced	   with	   metaphor,	   myth,	   ideology	   and	  
inherited	  power	  dynamics.	  Imagery	  relating	  to	  medicine	  often	  contains	  subtle	  illusions	  to	  ideologies	  
that	   privilege	   certain	   peoples’	   rights	   to	   their	   own	   bodies	   over	   others,	   a	   distaste	   for	   ‘otherness’,	  
notions	  of	  sickness	  as	  punishment	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  sickness	  is	  ‘bad’	  because	  it	  undermines	  a	  stable	  
work	  force.	  	  
Body	  Criticism:	  Imagining	  the	  Unseen	  in	  Enlightenment	  Art	  and	  Medicine,	  by	  Barbara	  Maria	  Stafford	  
focuses	  on	   the	  Enlightenment	  era	  as	   the	  point	   in	  history	  when	  we	  moved	   from	  a	   	   text	  based	   to	  a	  
visually	  dominant	  culture,	  (1993,	  xviii).	  The	  book	  is	  broken	  up	  into	  chapters	  reflecting	  various	  body/	  




medical	   metaphors,	   such	   as	   ‘dissection’,	   ‘conception’,	   ‘wound’	   and	   so	   on,	   in	   relation	   to	  
Enlightenment	  society,	  particularly	  within	  the	  realms	  of	  art	  and	  medicine.	  
This	   period	   is	   of	   particular	   interest	   to	   my	   first	   chapter	   as	   the	   age	   in	   which,	   both	   in	   art	   and	   in	  
medicine,	   there	   was	   a	  marked	   emphasis	   on	   uncovering	   the	   unknown.	   In	   leaving	   behind	   religious	  
explanations	   for	   being	   and	  meaning,	   scientists	   and	   artists	   sought	   empirical	   visual	   proofs	   to	   show	  
how	   the	   world	   functions,	   (1993:	   xvi).	   The	   intellectuals	   of	   the	   Enlightenment	   yearned	   for	  
uncontaminated	  direct	  evidence	  of	  the	  workings	  of	  man	  and	  the	  universe,	  (1993:	  1).	  These	  desires,	  
in	  terms	  of	  medical	  imaging,	  were	  to	  be	  realised	  in	  the	  advances	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  (1993:	  26).	  This	  
thinking	  is	  the	  historical	  predecessor	  for	  medical	  inventions	  such	  as	  the	  Computerized	  Tomography,	  
(CT),	  Positron	  Emission	  Tomography	  (PET),	  and	  Magnetic	  Resonance	  Imaging,	  (MRI),	  scanners	  which	  
‘see’	  the	  innermost	  secrets	  of	  the	  body	  and	  brain,	  (1993:	  xviii).	  
The	   book	   is	   helpful	   to	   my	   research	   particularly	   because	   of	   the	   presentation	   of	   this	   tension,	   the	  
popular	   and	   medical	   avowal	   of	   the	   visual	   in	   spite	   of	   the	   critical	   acceptance	   of	   the	   tenuous	  
relationship	  of	  what	  is	  knowable.	  
If	   Foucault’s	  work	   is	   about	   the	   formation	   and	  maintenance	   of	   dominant	   or	   official	   narratives	   and	  
ideologies	  then	  Lenore	  Manderson’s	  Surface	  Tensions,	  Surgery,	  Bodily	  Boundaries	  and	  the	  Social	  Self	  
is	  about	  the	  transformative	  power	  of	  the	  personal	  narrative.	  It	  includes	  various	  narratives	  of	  people	  
with	  severe	  bodily	  limitations	  in	  order	  to	  study	  how	  people	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  bodies	  under	  these	  
new	  conditions.	  People	  engage	  dominant	  and	  resistant	  narratives	  in	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  their	  sick	  
bodies.	   Narrative	   practices	   allow	   processes	   of	   selection,	   inclusion	   and	   exclusion	   of	   factors,	   and	  
reconstructions	   which	   allow	   for	   a	   sense	   of	   intellectual	   or	   spiritual	   meaning.	   Narration	   imposes	  
coherence	  and	  sense	  of	  trajectory	  on	  the	  formless	  confusion	  which	  is	  sickness,	  (2011:	  38).	  
This	  emphasis	  on	  narrative	  healing	   is	   interesting	   to	  my	  study	   in	   terms	  of	  how	   it	   can	  be	   translated	  
into	  visual	  practices.	  The	  first	  two	  chapters	  outline	  visual	  practices	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  dominant	  
narratives	   of	   sickness/	   otherness/	   abjection.	   Chapter	   3	   explores	   the	   potential	   power	   of	   artistic	  
creations	  as	  subversive	  storytelling	  which	  reintroduces	  a	  sense	  of	  meaning	  and	  subjectivity	  into	  the	  
experience	  of	  pain.	  
The	  book	  also	  deals	  with	  how	  the	  notion	  of	  Dualism	  intersects	  in	  various	  ways	  with	  the	  experience	  
of	  sickness.	  Though	  Cartesian	  dualism	  is	  now	  generally	  dismissed,	  people	  are	  still	  prone	  to	  see	  the	  
mind	  and	  body	  as	  separate	  entities,	  particularly	  sick	  people.	  Otherwise,	   if	  one	  is	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  
mind	  and	  body	  are	  intermeshed,	  how	  do	  severe	  negative	  bodily	  changes	  affect	  one’s	  sense	  of	  self?	  




(2011:	   24).	   Dualism	   allows	   the	   sensation	   of	   an	   un-­‐eroded	   self	   to	   the	   sick	   subject,	   (2011:30).	  	  
Conversely	   however,	   the	   body	   in	   this	   sense	   can	   present	   itself	   as	   a	   ‘thematic	   object’	   or	   ‘alien	  
presence’,	  a	  problem	  needing	  solving,	  (2011:	  30).	  
The	  question	  of	  dualism	  emerges	  constantly	  throughout	  my	  argument,	  in	  relation	  to	  how	  the	  body	  
relates	  to	  identity	  during	  periods	  of	  illness.	  
Pulse,	   Healing	   and	   Transformation	   discusses	   the	  works	   of	   various	   artists	  who	   are	   concerned	  with	  
ideas	  around	  the	  body,	  particularly	  the	  sick	  body.	  The	  book	  explores	  the	  roles	  of	  ritual,	  narrative	  and	  
metaphor	  in	  the	  advance	  of	  healing.	  	  
Lygia	  Clark	  and	  Joseph	  Beuys	  are	  used	  as	  points	  of	  inspiration	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  destabilised	  the	  
position	  of	   the	  visible	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  creation	  of	  experimental	  spaces,	   ‘…ephemeral	   in	  substance,	  
radically	  infinite	  in	  proposition’(Bender,	  Bruguera,	  Clark,	  Hohenbüchler,	  2003).	  	  
Lygia	  Clark’s	  work	   features	  prominently	   in	  my	  third	  chapter	   in	   relation	  to	  her	  alternative	  model	  of	  
dealing	  with	  the	  body	  in	  art,	  which	  does	  not	  respond	  to	  dominant	  narratives	  about	  the	  body,	  illness	  
and	   healing	   encoded	   through	   imagery.	   In	   her	   manifesto	   of	   1983,	   Clark	   declares,	   ‘We	   reject	   the	  
representative	   space	   and	   the	   work	   of	   passive	   contemplation…’	   (Bender,	   Bruguera,	   Clark,	  
Hohenbüchler,	  2003:17).	  The	  purely	  visual	  in	  art	  is	  perceived	  as	  ‘cold’	  and	  ‘overly	  analytical’	  whereas	  
the	  more	   intuitive	   responses	   to	   the	  other	   senses	  engage	   the	   subconscious	  more	  directly	   and	  may	  
even	  awaken	  a	  preverbal	  form	  of	  experience,	  (Bender,	  Bruguera,	  Clark,	  Hohenbüchler,	  2003:16).	  
This	  work	  has	  been	  significant	  to	  me	  both	  in	  the	  destabilisation	  of	  the	  traditional	  role	  of	  the	  visual	  
and	   the	   way	   in	   which	   it	   expresses	   ‘healing’	   as	   a	   process	   of	   integration	   between	   self,	   image	   and	  
narrative.	  
Beuys	  and	  Clark	  address	  notions	  of	  ‘health’	   in	  both	  its	  specific	  and	  broader	  metaphorical	  senses	  as	  
the	  ideological	  foundation	  of	  the	  exhibition.	  They	  shared	  the	  belief	  in	  the	  ‘transformative	  effects	  of	  
art’,	   particularly	   in	   using	   the	   body	   as	   a	   medium	   of	   expression,	   (Bender,	   Bruguera,	   Clark,	  
Hohenbüchler,	  2003:12,	  13).	  Their	  unique	  bodily	  experiments	  have	  been	  described	  as	  ‘ritual	  without	  
myth’,	   (Bender,	   Bruguera,	   Clark,	   Hohenbüchler,	   2003:12).	   ‘Myth’	   here	   corresponds	   to	   dominant	  
narratives.	  The	  limits	  of	  what	  the	  body	  can	  mean,	  outside	  of	  the	  restrictions	  of	  the	  official,	  accepted,	  
historical	  account	  of	  itself,	  are	  limitless.	  
The	  artist	  functions	  as	  a	  ‘mediator’	  rather	  than	  creator	  of	  the	  artistic	  experience,	  (Bender,	  Bruguera,	  
Clark,	  Hohenbüchler,	  2003:12).	   	  Their	  art	  was	  not	  articulated	  as	  an	  end	  product,	   the	  accumulative	  




final	   stage	   of	   an	   artist’s	   vision,	   but	   rather	   a	   spring	   board	   for	   the	   viewer’s	   personal	   psychological	  
response	  to	   the	  work.	  For	   this	   reason	  both	  oeuvres	  seem	  to	  place	  emphasis	  on	   incompleteness	   in	  
their	  works.	  It	  is	  up	  to	  the	  viewer	  to	  ‘complete’	  or	  activate	  the	  work	  through	  engagement,	  (Bender,	  
Bruguera,	   Clark,	  Hohenbüchler,	   2003:17,	   18).	   It	   is	   in	   this	   gap,	   left	   open	   by	   the	   artist,	   that	   healing	  
interactions	  occur,	  unique	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  each	  participant.	  
The	  thirteen	  artists	  referenced	  in	  this	  book	  are	  selected	  in	  response	  to	  these	   ideas.	  They	  hail	   from	  
different	  times	  and	  environments,	  and	  yet	  their	  concerns	  are	  fundamentally	  the	  same.	  Emphasising	  
the	   participatory	   and	   psychological	   and	   moving	   away	   from	   an	   emphasis	   on	   the	   visual,	   these	   art	  
works	  offer	  up	  opportunities	  for	  ‘healing’	  by	  setting	  up	  spaces	  that	  encourage	  conversation	  with	  the	  
body,	  (Bender,	  Bruguera,	  Clark,	  Hohenbüchler,	  2003:	  19).	  
While	  both	  my	  medium	  and	  approach	   is	   fundamentally	  distinct	   from	  every	  artist	  discussed	   in	   this	  
book,	   the	   emphasis	   on	   the	   healing	   aspect	   of	   art,	   as	   an	   accumulation	   of	   ritual	   rather	   than	  
representational	  object,	  has	  been	  foundationally	  influential	  to	  my	  work.	  
I	  have	  also	   looked	  at	   the	  work	  of	  William	  Burroughs	  as	  an	  example	  of	   creating	  outside	   traditional	  
meaning-­‐making.	   While	   Clark	   used	   performative	   interactions,	   Burroughs	   used	   language	   to	  
destabilise	  dominant	  discourses	  around	  the	  body.	  
In	  the	  chapter,	  ‘Two	  Sounds	  of	  the	  Virus:	  William	  Burroughs’s	  Pure	  Meat	  Method’,	  in	  Noise,	  Water,	  
Meat:	  A	  History	  of	  Sound	  in	  the	  Arts,	  Douglas	  Kahn	  discusses	  William	  Burroughs’	  conceptions	  of	  his	  
own	   particular	   notion	   of	   ‘the	   virus’	   in	   reference	   to	   language.	   In	   this	   theory	   the	   body	   is	   an	  
undifferentiated	  gelatinous	  protoplasm	  informed	  by	  Burroughs’	  own	  experience	  as	  a	  heroin	  junkie,	  
(2011:	  294).	  This	  body	  is	  driven	  by	  pure	  need,	  hunger	  for	  bodily	  pleasures.	  In	  Naked	  Lunch	  1959,	  the	  
experience	  of	  drugs	  and	  that	  of	  reality	  are	  totally	  undistinguishable.	  In	  a	  moment	  of	  pure	  need,	  the	  
main	   character	   absorbs	   another	   completely.	   The	   irreverent	   use	   of	   traditional	  meaning	  making,	   in	  
defiance	  of	  complete	  communication	  in	  favour	  of	  partiality	  and	  ambiguity,	  is	  what	  interested	  me	  in	  
Burrough’s	  work.	  
Alain	   de	   Botton	   and	   John	   Armstrong’s	  Art	   as	   Therapy	   served	   as	   one	   of	   the	   significant	   departure	  
points	  in	  my	  initial	  thoughts	  around	  my	  topic	  for	  this	  thesis.	  This	  is	  particularly	  due	  to	  the	  emphasis	  
on	  art’s	  potential	  to	  heal.	  It	  insists	  that	  art	  can	  function	  as	  a	  therapeutic	  medium	  that	  can	  help	  guide,	  
exhort	  and	  console	  its	  viewers,	  enabling	  them	  to	  become	  better	  versions	  of	  themselves,	  (de	  Botton,	  
Armstrong,	  2013:	  5).	  ‘Art	  invites	  us	  to	  a	  culture	  that	  anticipates	  suffering	  and	  decay,	  which	  our	  own	  
culture	  denies.	  The	  galleries	  of	   the	   future	  will	   take	   it	   seriously,	  and	  make	  an	  adequate,	  public	  and	  




consoling	  home	  for	  our	   fleeting,	  middle-­‐of-­‐the-­‐night	  apprehensions’,	   (de	  Botton,	  Armstrong,	  2013:	  
149).	  In	  short,	  art	  can	  teach	  us	  how	  to	  feel.	  	  
A	  tool	  is	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  body	  that	  allows	  a	  wish	  to	  be	  carried	  out,	  and	  that	  is	  required	  
because	   of	   a	   drawback	   in	   our	   physical	   make	   up.	   A	   knife	   is	   a	   response	   to	   our	   need,	   yet	  
inability	  to	  cut.	  A	  bottle	   is	  a	  response	  to	  our	  need,	  yet	   inability	  to	  carry	  water.	  To	  discover	  
the	   purpose	   of	   art,	   we	  must	   ask	   what	   kind	   of	   things	   we	   need	   to	   do	  with	   our	  minds	   and	  
emotions,	  but	  have	  trouble	  with.	  What	  psychological	  frailties	  might	  art	  help	  with?	  (2013:	  5)	  
To	  define	  a	  mission	  for	  art,	  then,	  one	  of	  its	  tasks	  is	  to	  teach	  us	  to	  be	  good	  lovers:	  lovers	  of	  
rivers	  and	  lovers	  of	  skies,	  lovers	  of	  motor	  ways	  and	  lovers	  of	  stones.	  And	  –very	  importantly-­‐	  
somewhere	  along	  the	  way,	  lovers	  of	  people,	  (2013:	  103)	  
This	  has	  been	  a	  guiding	  concept	  in	  my	  approach	  to	  my	  practical	  component.	  Gestural	  marks	  do	  not	  
need	   to	  outline	   the	   thing	   that	   is	   being	   represented,	   shade	   and	  model	   it	   into	  place.	   They	   can	   also	  
release	  that	  thing	  into	  non-­‐representation,	  leaving	  only	  traces	  and,	  most	  importantly,	  feeling	  behind.	  
This	   is	   not	   only	   expressive	   but	   also	   acts	   as	   a	   structural	   device	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   personalised	  
healing	  narratives	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  final	  chapter.	  	  	  
In	  Art	   as	   Therapy,	   Alain	   de	   Botton	   and	   John	   Armstrong	   reimagine	   the	   traditional	   art	  museum	   as	  
divided	   up	   depending	   on	   the	   emotive	   properties	   of	   work	   rather	   than	   their	   historic	   or	   topical	  
classification.	   There	   may	   be	   a	   ‘gallery	   of	   suffering’,	   a	   ‘gallery	   of	   compassion,	   ‘gallery	   of	   self-­‐	  
knowledge’	  and	  so	  on,	  each	  on	  a	  different	  floor.	  Art	  itself	  would	  not	  need	  to	  change	  but	  rather	  how	  
its	  presentation	  sets	  up	  relationships	  between	  work	  and	  viewer.	  (de	  Botton,	  Armstrong,	  2013	  90)	  
For	   instance,	   the	   ‘gallery	   of	   sorrow’	   would	   contain	   works	   that	   encourage	   a	   quiet	   dignified	  
contemplation	   on	   what	   it	   means	   to	   be	   sad.	   	   Richard	   Serra	   Fernando	   Pessoa,	   2007-­‐8	   is	   a	   vast	  
undifferentiated	   steel	   rectangle,	   somewhat	   taller	   than	   a	   human,	   which	   stands	   alone	   in	   a	   gallery	  
setting.	   	   According	   to	   de	   Botton,	   this	   work	   is	   a	   ‘profound	   engagement	   with	   sorrow’,	   presenting	  
sadness	  with	  dignity	  as	  a	   ‘grand	  and	  ubiquitous	  emotion’,	   (de	  Botton,	  Armstrong,	  2013	  26).	   In	  this	  
conception	  of	  the	  gallery	  space,	  this	  work	  could	  be	  exhibited	  alongside	  Caspar	  David’s	  Rocky	  Reef	  on	  
the	  Sea	  Shore,	  c.	  1825.	  This	  moody	  romantic	  image	  ‘makes	  us	  aware	  of	  our	  insignificance,	  exciting	  a	  
pleasing	  terror	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  how	  petty	  man’s	  disasters	  are	  in	  comparison	  with	  eternity,	  leaving	  	  us	  
a	   little	   readier	   to	   bow	   to	   the	   incomprehensible	   tragedies	   that	   every	   life	   entails,	   (de	   Botton,	  
Armstrong,	  2013	  30).	  




This	   idea	   not	   only	   reorganises	   the	   gallery	   space	   but	   also	   how	   art	   should	   be	   qualified	   in	   terms	   of	  
value.	   This	  model	   implies	   that	   art	   is	   ‘good’	   if	   it	   can	   teach	   and	   aid	   feeling,	   (de	  Botton,	   Armstrong,	  
2013:)	  
While	  I	  have	  not	  made	  use	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  ‘galleries	  of	  the	  future’,	  the	  emotional	  premise	  of	  the	  
idea	  has	  been	  very	  influential	  in	  my	  writing.	  Art	  as	  Therapy	  inverts	  the	  shift	  in	  medicine,	  from	  an	  art	  
to	   a	   science	  which	   occurred	   during	   the	   19th	   century,	   outlined	   in	   the	   first	   chapter.	   ‘Healing’	   is	   re-­‐
understood	   in	   terms	   of	   potentials	   of	   a	   subject’s	   relationship	   with	   artworks.	   The	   language	   of	  
objective	  diagnosis	  is	  emphatically	  absent	  here.	  Healing	  is	  personally	  specific	  and	  mediated.	  It	  is	  also	  
a	  process	  which	  can	  be	  as	  romantically	  beautiful	  and	  mysterious	  as	  the	  artworks	  that	  guide	  it.	  
  







A	   Post	   Structural	   approach	   has	   guided	   the	   gathering	   of	   sources	   and	   the	   construction	   of	   my	  
argument.	   Post	   structuralism	   acknowledges	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   systems	   we	   take	   for	   granted,	  
regarded	  as	  natural	  or	  beyond	  dispute.	  It	  rejects	  the	  idea	  of	  objective	  truth,	  unhinging	  the	  notion	  of	  
what	  is	  known	  in	  exchange	  for	  the	  promise	  that	  nothing	  can	  be	  thoroughly	  known.	  Not	  only	  this,	  but	  
also	  that	  what	  we	  think	  we	  know	  belongs	  to	  a	  complicated	  set	  of	  systems	  which	  operate	  to	  keep	  us	  
in	  our	  place.	  	  
In	   terms	   of	   medicine,	   what	   is	   ‘given’	   is	   the	   idea	   that	   medicine	   is	   an	   objective	   science.	  Medicine	  
operates	   largely	   on	   a	   system	   of	   observing	   and	   naming	   which	   precedes	   ‘fixing’.	   Fluency	   in	   any	   of	  
these	   processes	   is	   necessarily	   the	   result	   of	   a	   long	   period	   of	   study,	   through	  which	   a	   standardised	  
body	   of	   knowledge	   is	   imparted	   supposedly	   reflecting	   an	   objective	   truth.	   Post	   structuralism	  
reorganises	   this	   assumption	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   hierarchical	   framework	   that	   supports	   the	   smooth	  
functioning	  of	  a	  Capitalist	  Society.	  
My	   approach	   is	   also	   largely	   informed	   by	   Art	   Therapy,	   which	   sets	   itself	   apart	   from	   traditional	  
therapy’s	  inherently	  unequal	  power	  dynamic	  between	  therapist	  and	  patient,	  emphasizing	  the	  belief	  
in	  the	  healing	  powers	  of	  art	  making,	  beyond	  its	  traditional	  function	  as	  a	  diagnostic	  tool.	  
It	  will	   become	   increasingly	   evident,	   that	   I	   have	   steered	   clear	   of	   a	   feminist	   reading	   of	   the	  medical	  
encounter	   and	   the	   role	   of	   the	   visual.	   	   As	   an	   upper	  middle	   class	  white	  woman,	   I	   neatly	   fitted	   the	  
stereotype	  for	  anorexia	  that	  stood	   in	  the	  way	  of	  a	   true	  diagnosis	   for	  many	  years.	  My	  female	  body	  
added	  another	  layer	  of	  bias	  to	  the	  power	  dynamic	  implicit	  between	  doctor	  and	  patient.	  Through	  the	  
medical	   gaze,	   I	   am	   doubly	   encoded	   as	   inert	   and	   submissive.	   It	   may	   seem	   strange	   to	   discuss	  
performativity	  without	  reference	  to	  Butler	  and	  the	  construction	  of	  femininity	  or	  to	  steer	  away	  from	  
a	  discussion	  of	  the	  medical	  practice	  as	  yet	  another	  manifestation	  of	  oppressive	  patriarchy.	  I	  certainly	  
appreciate	   the	   gravity	   of	   these	   considerations	   but	   have	   specifically	   avoided	   a	   feminist	   approach	  
because	   this	   so	   often	   swallows	   up	   an	   argument.	   I	   don’t	   want	   feminist	   theory	   to	   overwhelm	   the	  
emphasis	   on	   how	   the	   visual	   functions	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   sick	   body	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   collective	  
containment	   in	   classification,	   stereotype	  and	  abjection.	   I	   simply	  wish	   to	  write	  about	   the	   sick	  body	  




rather	   than	   specifically	   the	   female	   sick	   body,	   for	   this	   reason	   I	   have	   strategically	   arranged	   my	  
argument	  so	  as	  not	  to	  intersect	  with	  feminist	  theory,	  despite	  its	  relevance	  in	  this	  subject.	  
  









The	   first	   two	   chapters	   outline	   the	   relationship	   between	   sickness	   and	   representation	   which	   my	  
practical	  works	  seeks	  to	  renegotiate,	  as	  discussed	  in	  chapter	  3.	  	  
This	   chapter	   examines	   the	   emphasis	   of	   the	   visual	   in	   medical	   notions	   of	   healing,	   from	   the	  
Enlightenment	  era	  till	  today.	  Particularly,	  it	  explores	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  historical	  conflation	  between	  
seeing	  and	  knowing.	  	  
Part	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  representation	  is	  to	  demarcate	  sickness	  as	  something	  outside	  ‘normality’,	  to	  
mark	   it	  out	  as	  abject.	  Either	  the	  abnormality	  may	  be	  corrected,	   in	  which	  the	  patient	   is	  restored	  to	  
‘normality’	  or	   it	  may	  not,	  and	   the	  patient	  will	  be	   re-­‐categorised	  as	   ‘abject’.	   Either	  way,	   the	  binary	  
and	  its	  boundaries	  are	  maintained.	  
The	   notion	   of	   ‘normality’	   is	   unpacked,	   examined	   as	   a	   discursive	   construct	   rather	   than	   a	   simple	  
description	   of	   what	   is	   most	   common.	   This	   construction	   functions	   through	   written	   and	   visual	  
language	  that	  shame	  bodily	  otherness	  and	  affirm	  functionalism.	  	  
Abjection	   is	   the	   dark	   space	   beyond	   society,	   language	   and	   safety.	   A	   sense	   of	   abjection	   emerges	  
during	  the	  mirror	  phase	  when	  the	  child	  simultaneously	  recognises	  itself	  as	  a	  thing	  with	  a	  boundary	  
while	  seeing	  how	  it	  will	  be	  seen	  by	  others.	  It	  continues	  to	  haunt	  the	  edges	  of	  consciousness,	  keeping	  
one	  on	  the	  right	  side	  of	  the	  dividing	  line.	  
This	   ‘line’	   is	  maintained	   by	   the	   idea	   that	   abnormality	   is	   ‘seeable’.	   If	   you	   keep	   your	   abnormalities	  
hidden	   to	   the	   outside	   world,	   you	   may	   pass	   as	   ‘normal’.	   This	   idea	   developed	   during	   the	  
enlightenment	  when	  medical	   imaging	  overtook	   conversational	   doctor	   patient	   consultations	   as	   the	  
leading	  form	  of	  diagnostics.	  Despite	  the	  incredible	  success	  of	  such	  imaging,	  the	  pretence	  of	  science	  
objectivity	  disguises	  its	  position	  as	  a	  discourse,	  specifically	  a	  discourse	  that	  maintains	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  
distinctly	  ‘abject’.	  




Pain	   is	  entirely	   subjective	  and	  can	   therefore	  not	  be	  visually	   represented.	   Sufferers	  of	  pain	   impose	  
various	   visual	   devices	   into	   their	   unseeable	   experiences,	   simply	   to	   be	   part	   of	   the	   conversation,	   to	  
make	   sense	  within	   the	   binary.	   In	   this	   way,	   they	   are	   doubly	   encoded	   as	   abject,	   firstly	   for	   existing	  
outside	  the	  confines	  of	  language	  and	  secondly	  by	  their	  own	  self-­‐imposed	  inscription	  of	  otherness.	  
The	  sufferer	  of	  pain	   is	   in	  constant	  negotiation	  and	  renegotiation	   in	  how	  to	  meaningfully	  represent	  
him	  or	  herself	  to	  the	  world.	  	  
	   	  






This	  chapter	  focuses	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘performance’	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  as	  a	  means	  to	  
impose	  visuality	  on	  pain.	  Pain	   legitimises	   itself	   through	  performance	  while	  simultaneously	  marking	  
the	  sufferer	  out	  as	  abject.	  
	  I	  have	  examined	  this	  dynamic	  by	  borrowing	  Butler’s	  notion	  of	  ‘performativity’,	  repurposing	  it	  from	  
the	  female	  body	  to	  the	  body	  in	  pain.	  In	  the	  same	  way,	  the	  reiterative	  daily	  performances,	  which	  seek	  
affirmation	  from	  the	  world	  outside,	  structure	  our	  ideas	  of	  ourselves.	  
Foucault’s	   conception	   of	   the	   ‘Panopticon’	   reflects	   this	   position.	   The	   famous	   prison,	   designed	   by	  
Jeremy	  Bentham,	  was	  a	  circular	  structure	  lit	  on	  the	  outskirts	  but	  cast	  in	  darkness	  at	  the	  centre.	  The	  
prisoners	  were	  to	  be	  placed	  around	  the	  edge.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	  warden	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  watching	  
them	   from	   the	  darkened	   centre	  was	   intended	   to	   encourage	   the	   prisoners	   to	   ‘self	   –regulate’	   their	  
behaviour.	  This	  self-­‐regulation	  is,	  however,	  maintained	  through	  the	  threat	  of	  punishment.	  
Similarly	  the	  sick	  body	  is	  ‘illuminated’	  by	  real	  and	  imagined	  public	  scrutiny.	  Punishment	  in	  this	  sense	  
means	  being	  judged	  as	  lazy	  or	  duplicitous,	  being	  abandoned	  by	  loved	  ones,	  being	  unable	  to	  support	  
oneself	   financially.	   The	   performance	   is	   necessary	   to	   keep	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  world	   engaged,	   to	   keep	  
oneself	   relevant.	   The	   reiterative	   nature	   of	   performance	  makes	   the	   subjective	   bodily	   sensation	   of	  
pain	  indistinguishable	  from	  its	  public	  enactment.	  
The	   sick	   body	   is	   socially	   inscribed	  with	   the	   responsibility	   to	   perform	   itself.	   This	   claim	   is	   explored	  
through	  examples	  from	  the	  Enlightenment	  period	  until	  the	  present,	  seen	  within	  popular	  culture	  and	  
high	  art.	  
	   	  






This	   chapter	   introduces	   alternative	   models	   for	   the	   expression	   of	   pain	   which	   are	   defiantly	   non-­‐
performative.	  	  
Art	  Therapy	  encourages	  the	  process	  of	  symbolic	  story	  telling.	  	  This	  can	  redirect	  the	  person	  in	  pain	  to	  
his	   or	   her	   subjective	   experience,	   acknowledging	   but	   not	   indulging	   the	   sense	   of	   a	   social	   audience.	  
Personally	   generated	   symbols	   step	   in	   where	   traditional	   language	   fails.	   However,	   unlike	   language,	  
visual	  and	  written,	   their	  meanings	  are	  not	   fixed	  but	  change	  according	  to	   the	  needs	  of	   the	  patient.	  
Language	  can	  therefore	  become	  an	  imaginatively	  generative	  play	  thing	  rather	  than	  an	  instrument	  of	  
social	  control.	  Two	  artists	  who	  display	  an	  affinity	  with	  this	  approach	  are	  discussed	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  
ability	  to	  sidestep	  the	  restrictions	  of	  traditional	  representational	  language.	  
This	  provides	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  for	  a	  discussion	  of	  my	  practical	  work.	  I	  have	  described	  this	  
work	  as	  issuing	  from	  a	  place	  of	  ‘half-­‐light’.	  This	  responds	  to	  a	  metaphorical	  quandary	  of	  wishing	  to	  
be	   seen,	   to	   have	   light	   cast	   upon	   one,	   without	   being	   ‘illuminated’,	   forced	   to	   perform	   in	   fear	   of	  
punishment.	   It	   refers	  to	  a	  communication	  which	   is	  partial,	  playful	  and	  visceral	   rather	  than	  fixed	  or	  
literal.	   These	   images	   tell	   experiential	   stories	  without	   strict	   reference	   to	   narration.	   They	   express	   a	  
desire	  to	  re-­‐enchant	  my	  relationship	  to	  the	  unpredictability	  of	  my	  body,	  demonised	  by	  biomedicine.	  
Vague	  symbolic	  scenarios,	  neurotically	  scratchy	  pen	  lines,	  a	  sense	  of	  gurgling	  bodily	  play,	  are	  pooled	  
together	   in	  an	  attempt	   to	  share	  my	  experience,	  without	  being	  willing	   to	  step	  out	  entirely	   into	   the	  
‘light’.	  
	   	  






Chapter 1: Discourse disguised as science:	  The creation 
and maintenance of the normality/ abjection binary 	  
	  
Now	  out	  of	  the	  ground	  the	  Lord	  God	  had	  formed	  every	  beast	  of	  the	  field	  and	  every	  bird	  of	  
the	  heavens	  and	  brought	  them	  to	  the	  man	  to	  see	  what	  he	  would	  call	   them.	  And	  whatever	  
the	  man	  called	  every	  living	  creature,	  that	  was	  its	  name,	  (Genesis	  2:19).	  
The	  word	   ‘image’	   is	   linked	   by	   its	   very	   etymology	   to	   the	   body	   and	   its	  mortality:	   the	   Latin	  
imago	  referred	  to	  the	  wax	  mask	  the	  Romans	  made	  to	  preserve	  the	  likeness	  of	  the	  recently	  
deceased.	  Pliny	  the	  Elder	  warned	  about	  trafficking	  in	  these	  images,	  which	  he	  called	  luxuria	  -­‐	  
a	  negative	  term	  which	  can	  be	  translated	  as	  ‘lust’	  and	  referred	  to	  a	  taste	  for	  all	  things	  foreign,	  
indulgent	  and	  opulent.	  The	  world	  is	  more	  saturated	  with	  images	  now	  than	  ever	  before:	  we	  
live	  in	  a	  society	  that	  revels,	  lustfully,	  in	  a	  lavish	  surfeit	  of	  images,	  (Gioni,	  2013:	  25).	  
...If	  you	  are	  not	   like	  everybody	  else,	  then	  you	  are	  abnormal,	   if	  you	  are	  abnormal,	  then	  you	  
are	  sick.	  These	  three	  categories,	  not	  being	  like	  everybody	  else,	  not	  being	  normal	  and	  being	  
sick	  are	   in	  fact	  very	  different	  but	  have	  been	  reduced	  to	  the	  same	  thing,	  Foucault	   in	   (Droit,	  	  
2004:	  95).	  
	  
Foucault	  argues	   that	  abnormality	   is	  not	   simply	  a	  deviation	   from	  normality;	   rather	   it	   is	  a	   structural	  
element	  in	  knowing	  what	  the	  normal	  is.	  While	  the	  particulars	  of	  abnormality	  may	  change	  depending	  
on	  time	  and	  place,	  its	  function	  stays	  constant.	  This	  function	  is	  to	  define	  and	  mark	  out	  the	  abject	  for	  
the	  sake	  of	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  non-­‐abject,	  (MacLachlan,	  2004:	  7).	  	  
To	   name	   something	   is	   to	   assert	   power	   over	   it.	   Adam	   was	   given	   power	   over	   beasts	   through	   the	  
practice	  of	  naming	  them.	  There	  is	  a	  visual	  dimension	  to	  naming,	  and	  there	  is	  a	  linguistic	  implication	  
in	   every	   recognisable	   visual.	   The	   label	   and	   the	   responding	   labelled	   spring	   into	   significance	   at	   the	  
same	   time.	   They	   are	   inseparable.	   Is	   the	   power	   of	   the	   label	   all	   the	  more	   powerful	  when	   instantly	  
accompanied	   in	   the	   mind	   by	   an	   image	   rather	   than	   a	   hazy	   abstract	   concept?	   Is	   the	   ‘lust’	   Pliny	  
describes	   in	   relation	   to	   images,	   the	   lust	   for	   the	   sense	   of	   explanation	   or	   lucidity	   that	   the	   visual	  




provides?	   Do	   we	   not	   sometimes	   assign	   visuals	   to	   ideas	   even	   when	   the	   two	   are	   not	   necessarily	  
compatible?	  Is	  the	  failure	  to	  name	  experience	  seen	  as	  an	  insult	  to	  human	  prowess	  and	  language?	  	  Is	  
the	  abject,	  as	  an	  uncomfortable,	  even	  terrifying	  idea,	  all	  the	  more	  requiring	  of	  visuals	  to	  pin	  it	  to	  the	  
relatable,	  the	  knowable,	  specifically	  because	  it	  is	  not	  these	  things?	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  the	  visual	  side	  
of	  language	  which	  simultaneously	  creates	  and	  then	  attempts	  to	  contain	  the	  abject	  within	  image.	  	  
This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  sick	  body	  through	  various	  ‘lenses’,	  each	  forming	  a	  subsection.	  
Each	  lens	  deals	  with	  a	  separate	  aspect	  of	  representing	  the	  sick	  body.	  Other	  themes	  run	  parallel	  along	  
these	   subsections.	   Such	   themes	   are;	   the	   tenants	   of	   the	   Biomedical	   model;	   the	   legacy	   of	  
enlightenment	  thinking	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  medical	  system	  on	  a	  patient’s	  subjectivity.	  
The	  Biomedical	  model	  of	  medicine	  is	  the	  most	  commonly	  practised	  system	  in	  the	  West.	  It	  is	  defined	  
by	   a	   tendency	   towards	   ‘biological	   reductionism’,	   (Kleinman,	   1962:	   6).	   Medical	   attention	   often	  
focuses	   solely	   on	   the	   science	   of	   suffering,	   arguably	   only	   addressing	   a	   fraction	   of	   the	   problem,	  
(Kleinman,	  1962:	  4-­‐6).	  
	  The	  influence	  of	  Enlightenment	  scientific	  enquiry,	  specifically	  that	  of	  the	  19th	  century,	  on	  modern	  
day	  medical	   thinking	   is	  relevant	  to	  several	  key	  concepts	  that	  shape	  the	  representation	  of	  sickness,	  
especially	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  sick	  subject	  and	  its	  body.	  
What	  happens	  to	  the	  patient’s	  subjectivity	  during	  the	  process	  of	  medical	  labelling?	  The	  medical	  gaze	  
denies	   its	  own	   subjectivity	  by	  drawing	  on	   the	  apparent	  objectivity	  of	   scientific	   language	  and	   in	   so	  
doing,	  the	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  patient	  is	  also	  denied.	  Medical	  labels	  jostle	  against	  other	  labels	  relating	  
to	   the	   self	   until	   they	   occupy	   prime	   position.	   What	   is	   relevant	   is	   what	   can	   be	   sliced,	   X-­‐rayed,	  
regulated,	  reconstructed,	  in	  other	  words,	  in	  some	  sense,	  ‘seen’.	  ‘To	  know	  nature	  is	  to	  see	  it:	  in	  the	  
body,	  in	  the	  test	  tube,	  under	  the	  microscope’,	  (Good,	  Good,	  Brodwin,	  Kleinman,	  1994:	  9).	  	  
What	  is	  not	  seen,	  character,	  belief,	  dreams,	  	  is	  unimportant	  in	  the	  process	  of	  diagnosis	  and	  ‘cure’.	  To	  
be	   ‘cured’,	   according	   to	   this	   model,	   means	   that	   one’s	   bodily	   organs	   and	   systems	   are	   made	   to	  
resemble	   the	   general	   mean	   of	   what	   most	   people	   display.	   To	   be	   cured	   is	   to	   look	   and	   function	  
‘normally’.	  
	   	  





The	  socio-­‐cultural	  Construction	  of	  ‘normality’.	  
	  
‘…	  the	  magic	  of	  the	  word	  ‘normal’	  is	  that	  it	  can	  be	  used	  at	  one	  and	  the	  same	  time	  to	  say	  how	  
things	  are,	  but	  also	  how	  they	  ought	  to	  be.	  The	  seemingly	   innocent	  and	  objective	  notion	  of	  
the	   norm	   ‘lays	   claim	   to	   power’,	   providing	   a	   foundation	   and	   legitimation	   for	   diverse	  
techniques	  of	  institutional	  intervention	  and	  correction	  (Tyler,	  2008:	  114).	  
Notions	  of	  normality	  and	  health	  are	  not	  natural	  standards	  from	  which	  sickness	  is	  a	  deviation.	  They	  
are	   ideological	   linguistic	   inventions.	   ‘Normality’,	   as	   a	   discursive	   construction,	   is	  moulded	   by	   every	  
particular	  society	  and	  culture,	  as	  a	  means	  to	  maintain	  social	  order.	  ‘The	  body	  is	  a	  social	  construction,	  
vulnerable	   to	   ideological	  shifts,	  discursive	  processes	  and	  power	  struggles’,	   (Lupton,	  1994:	  20).	  This	  
does	  not	  mean	  that	  bodies	  hold	  no	  physical	  reality	  but	  rather	  that	  they	  are	  a	  ‘mixture	  of	  discourse	  
and	  matter,	  one	  whose	  inseparability	  is	  a	  critical,	  though	  complex	  attribute’,	  (Lupton,	  1994:	  22).	  
If	  it	  is	  not	  an	  objective	  standard,	  then	  what	  is	  ‘normality’?	  Common	  sense	  would	  insist	  that	  is	  means	  
the	   state	  of	   being	   that	   is	  most	   common.	  However,	  while	  most	  people	   suffer	   bouts	  of	   depression,	  
stomach	   upsets,	   unsightly	   skin	   and	   so	   on,	   none	   of	   these	   conditions	   are	   considered	   ‘normal’.	  
‘Normality’	   is	   a	   quest	  which	   cannot	   be	   completed.	   The	   very	   abundance	   of	   products	   promising	   to	  
return	  us	  to	  normality	  begs	  the	  question,	  what	  is	  the	  punishment	  if	  we	  fail	  to	  do	  so?	  
One	  answer	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  we	  will	  become	  abhorrent	  or	  distasteful	  to	  other	  people,	  will	  be	  cast	  
out,	  socially	  unacceptable.	  	  
This	  is	  subtly	  alluded	  to	  through	  the	  cult	  of	  ‘health’.	  The	  idea	  and	  image	  of	  wellness	  is	  all	  pervasive,	  it	  
is	   so	   familiar	   yet	   none	   can	   claim	   to	   embody	   it	   entirely.	   Our	   ever	   more	   powerful	   and	   expansive	  
commodity	  culture	  emphasises	  youth	  and	  vitality	  while	  banishing	  age	  and	   illness	   from	  commercial	  
spaces,	   (Morgan,	   2003:19).	   It	   exerts	   itself	   on	   the	   body	   through	   the	   invasive	   emphasis	   on	   ‘health’	  
which	  permeates	  every	  avenue	  of	  visual	  culture,	  very	  often	  with	  airbrushed	  and	  half-­‐starved	  models	  
as	  its	  brand	  ambassadors.	  ‘Ugliness’	  is	  punished	  by	  being	  made	  into	  a	  spectacle	  or	  simply	  rendered	  
invisible.	  
The	   fixation	   with	   the	   publically	   immaculate	   body	   was	   well	   established	   by	   the	   19th	   century.	   The	  
emphasis	  on	  makeup	  exemplifies	  this.	   It	  was	  not	  only	  an	  expression	  of	  vanity	  but	  a	   ‘social	  duty’,	  a	  




gesture	  of	  politeness,	  (Stafford,	  1993:	  288).	  	  Stafford	  describes	  it	  as	  a	  ‘…	  foreign	  remedy	  pasted	  over	  
material	   poverty,	   whitewashing	   disfigurement	   and	   miraculously	   restoring	   a	   ravaged	   corporeality,	  
(Stafford,	  1993:	  289).	  
In	  Enlightenment	  imagery,	  pain	  is	  often	  represented	  as	  synonymous	  with	  ugliness.	  Pain	  was	  seen	  as	  
a	  symptom	  of	  being	  too	  much	  in	  one’s	  body,	  not	  engaged	  with	  higher	  ideals	  of	  thought	  and	  reason.	  
Gotthold	   Ephraim	   Lessing	  was	   a	   prominent	   eighteenth	   century	   Enlightenment	   thinker,	   expounder	  
and	  advocate	  for	  Neo-­‐Classical	  thinking.	  For	  Lessing,	  overt	  expressions	  of	  pain	  or	  illness	  in	  art	  were	  
tantamount	  to	  both	  physical	  and	  moral	  ugliness.	  ‘Ugliness	  offends	  our	  eyes,	  contradicts	  the	  taste	  we	  
have	  for	  order	  and	  harmony	  and	  awakens	  aversion	  irrespective	  of	  the	  actual	  existence	  of	  the	  object	  
in	  which	  we	  perceive	  it’,	   (Stafford,	  1993:	  180).	   In	  this	  way,	  ugliness	   in	  the	  form	  of	  pain,	  has	   lasting	  
detrimental	  effects	  on	  the	  viewer	  long	  after	  the	  moment	  of	  contemplation	  has	  passed.	  The	  Laocoon	  
is	  used	  as	  a	  paragon	  of	  this	  position.	  Though	  facing	  attack	  and	  impending	  death	  from	  a	  sea	  monster,	  
the	   figures	   remain	   heroically	   athletic,	   their	   faces,	   though	   somewhat	   contorted,	   do	   not	   cross	   over	  
into	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  ugly.	  Decorum	  is	  maintained,	  (Stafford,	  1993:	  179).	  
	   	  





In	  Christian	  Ludwig	  von	  Hagedorn’s	  work	  pain,	  physical	  or	  emotional,	  was	  expressed	  by	  an	  ugliness	  
close	   to	   monstrosity.	   He	   describes	   Hessiod’s	   goddess	   of	   Sorrow	   as	   ‘awash	   in	   tears,	   grinding	   her	  
teeth,	  pale,	  dishevelled,	  desiccated,	  knobbly	  kneed,	  with	  bloody	  cheeks,	  talon	  nails,	  dusty	  shoulders,	  
and	  nostrils	  filled	  with	  phlegm,	  (Stafford,	  2003:	  183).	  The	  human	  in	  overt	  pain	   is	  then	  degraded	  to	  
the	  space	  between	  humanity	  and	  animalism.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  1,	  Hagedorn,	  Grotesque	  Head,	  (18th	  century)	  
	  
The	   ban	   on	   the	   hideous	   effectively	   filtered	   artistic	   representations	   of	   the	   ill	   into	   the	   domain	   of	  
caricature.	   This	   medium	   inevitably	   highlighted	   the	   ridiculous,	   embarrassing	   elements	   of	   illness,	  
tending	  to	  hyperbolise	  any	  visual	  markings,	  (Stafford,	  2003:	  179).	  	  
	   	  





In	  George	  Cruikshank’s	   Indigestion,	  1825,	   the	  characters	  are	  beset	  on	  by	  small	  devilish	  characters.	  
These	  demons	  enact	   and	  employ	   the	  effects	  of	   the	   affliction,	  winding	   rope	   tightly	   around	  a	  waist	  
and	   shoving	   sausages	   into	   an	   unwilling	   mouth,	   while	   the	   central	   subject	   sits	   powerless	   and	  
unengaged	  by	  anything	  other	  than	  his	  pain.	  He	  is	  both	  pitiable	  and	  laughable.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2,	  Cruikshank,	  G.	  	  	  Indigestion,	  (1825)	  
The	   contemporary	   continuation	   of	   the	   Enlightenment’s	   anathema	   for	   the	   ‘ugly’	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  
constructed	  notion	  of	  the	  ‘normative	  body’,	  in	  many	  ways	  reflects	  Plato’s	  idea	  of	  the	  perfect	  original	  
to	  which	  all	  nature	  is	  at	  best	  an	  imperfect	  copy.	  This	  idea	  gets	  revitalised	  throughout	  history	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  ‘Neoplatonism’,	  (Stafford,	  1993:	  252).	  A	  permanent	  essence	  was	  thought	  to	  exist	  in	  all	  things	  
in	  the	  universe,	  the	  alterations	  and	  deformations	  of	  which	  only	  existed	  in	  the	  empirical	  world.	  This	  
idea	  is	  remarkably	  similar	  to	  the	  unattainable	  notion	  of	  ‘normality’.	  
We	   simultaneously	   realise	   this	   ideal	   is	   impossible	   while	  maintaining	   a	   culture	   of	   self	   and	  mutual	  
chastisement	  in	  being	  unable	  to	  fulfil	  it.	  The	  idea	  of	  ‘fault’	  is	  absolutely	  essential	  to	  the	  maintenance	  




of	   this	   bizarre,	   contradictory	   reality.	   You	  would	  have	   a	  more	  pleasing	  physique,	   better	   skin,	  more	  
energy,	   digest	   your	   food	   more	   efficiently,	   feel	   generally	   happier,	   if	   you	   did	   not	   smoke,	   if	   you	  
exercised	  more,	  if	  you	  ate	  less	  unhealthy	  foods,	  if	  you	  used/	  applied/	  ingested	  a	  particular	  product	  
and	  so	  on.	  Your	  inability	  to	  achieve	  the	  ideal	  is	  your	  own	  fault.	  
Similarly,	   contemporary	   culture	   places	   pressure	   on	   individuals	   to	   maintain	   ‘healthy	   bodies’	   by	  
associating	  so-­‐called	   ‘lifestyle	  diseases’	  with	  deviant	  personal	  behaviour,	   (Lupton,	  1994:	  31).	  These	  
illnesses	   exists	   further	   down	   the	   same	   continuum	   line	   of	   ‘fault’	   as	   that	   of	   being	   incapable	   of	  
attaining	  bodily	  perfection.	  Platonism	  insists	  that	  the	  external	  physical	  body	  emanates,	  in	  some	  way,	  
from	   a	   person’s	   character.	   Deviations	   from	   the	   perfect	   original	   were	   caused	   by	   sparks	   of	   human	  
passion,	  giving	  rise	  to	  distortions,	  ugliness	  and	  disease,	  (Stafford,	  1993:	  251).	  	  Historically,	  illness	  has	  
been	   narrated	   alongside	   ideas	   of	   guilt	   and	   punishment.	   From	   ancient	   beliefs	   in	   holy	   vengeance	  
through	  pestilence	  and	  plagues,	  to	  pre-­‐Enlightenment	  ideas	  of	  sickness	  as	  inseparable	  from	  dirt	  and	  
dirtiness	   to	  more	  contemporary	  notions	  of	   illness	  as	  a	  direct	   result	  of	  unhealthy	   lifestyles,	   such	  as	  
consuming	  ‘bad’	  foods	  and	  the	  various	  conditions	  that	  it	  may	  cause,	  the	  idea	  of	  punitive	  sickness	  is	  
constant.	  
The	  need	  for	  punishment	  arises	  from	  the	  civic	  need	  for	  a	  stable	  work	  force.	  If	  sickness	  prevents	  one	  
from	   working,	   one’s	   body	   ceases	   to	   perform	   a	   civic	   duty.	   This	   is	   yet	   another	   threat	   to	   the	  
maintenance	   of	   ‘normality’.	   You	   will	   cease	   to	   make	   sense	   within	   society,	   will	   have	   no	   function,	  
become	  a	  floating	  signifier.	  
	  ‘Functionalism’	   is	   a	   dominant	   theoretical	   perspective	   on	   the	   role	   of	   medicine	   in	   society.	  
Functionalism	  views	  the	  medical	  realm	  as	  an	  essential	  cog	  in	  a	  consensual	  society	  in	  which	  sickness	  
is	  constructed	  as	  a	  social	  digressive.	  Sickness	  prevents	  the	  subject	  from	  engaging	  meaningfully	  with	  
the	  expectations	  of	  society	  and	  must	  therefore	  be	  alleviated	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  Examples	  such	  as	  
Stephen	  Hawking	  and	  Helen	  Keller	  are	  arguably	  the	  ‘exceptions	  that	  prove	  the	  rule’.	  
A	  simple	  Google	  Image	  search	  of	  ‘indigestion’	  is	  a	  testament	  to	  this.	  The	  images	  below	  represent	  an	  
overview	  of	  the	  most	  frequent	  types	  of	  images.	  
	  
	  	  





Figure	  3	  Indigestion	  Diagram	  1,	  (n.d.)	  
	  
Figure	  4	  Indigestion	  Diagram	  2,	  (n.d.)	  





Figure	  5,	  Indigestion	  Diagram	  3,	  (n.d.)	  
Figure	  3	  represents	  the	  popular	  sanitised	  bodily	  diagram	  which	  so	  eloquently	  expresses	  distaste	  for	  
the	   abject	   it	   is	   forced	   to	   represent.	   These	   post-­‐bodily	   images	   are	   perhaps	   the	   most	   bizarre	  
representations	  here.	  There	  is	  nothing	  human,	  let	  alone	  painful	  left	  in	  these	  images.	  
Figure	  4	  presents	  the	  standardised	  visualising	  cliché	  for	  indigestion,	  the	  metaphor	  of	  having	  a	  fire	  in	  
one’s	   stomach.	  More	   interestingly,	   figures	   4	   and	  5	   both	  portray	   remarkably	   young,	   evidently	  well	  
maintained	   bodies,	   hardly	   prime	   candidates	   for	   frequent	   indigestion.	   Even	   within	   the	   sphere	   for	  
representing	  bodily	  disturbances,	  ableism	  dominates.	  
In	   Figures	   6,	   7	   and	   8,	   a	   business	   man,	   indicated	   by	   the	   ‘work	   shirt’	   and	   tie,	   is	   represented	   in	  
gastronomic	  distress.	  The	   subtext	   in	   these	   images	   is	   that	   the	  greater	  evil	   is	   that	   indigestion	  keeps	  
one	  from	  work,	  not	  that	  it	  causes	  bodily,	  psychological	  pain.	  Medicine	  steps	  in	  to	  curb	  social	  deviant	  
position	  of	  being	  able	  to	  function.	  	  





Figure	  6,	  Business	  Man	  1,	  (n.d.)	  
	  
Figure	  7,	  Business	  Man	  2,	  (n.d.)	  





Figure	  8,	  Business	  Man	  3,	  (n.d.)	  
No	   one	   person	   or	   groups	   sustains	   these	   ideas.	   They	   are	   subconscious,	   learned	   and	   communally	  
maintained.	  The	  body	  acts	  as	  an	  ultimate	  medium	  for	  civic	  control.	  This	  filters	  through	  into	  popular	  
culture	   in	  all	   forms	  of	   representations.	  The	  hyper	  visibility	  of	  aggressive	  ableism	  effectively	  denies	  
the	  voices	  of	  the	  ugly,	  fat,	  old,	  disabled	  and	  the	  ill,	  with	  few	  exceptions.	  	  
Finally	   ‘normality’,	   paradoxically	   seems	   to	   align	   itself	   with	   an	   invisibility	   of	   bodily	   functions,	  
(Manderson,	   2011:	   27).	   Often	   the	   lack	   of	   particular	   internal	   corporeal	   perception	   is	   a	   sign	   of	  
healthiness,	  (Manderson,	  2011:	  26).	  	  The	  body	  is	  ‘taken	  for	  granted’	  in	  the	  healthy.	  The	  healthy	  are	  
not	  aware	  of	  their	  eye	  balls	  seeing,	  they	  simply	  see.	  They	  do	  not	  feel	  their	  internal	  organs.	  They	  are	  
not	   generally	   aware	   of	   the	   intricacies	   of	   their	   digestive	   system,	   (Manderson:	   2011:	   24,	   25,	   26).	  
Awareness	   of	   the	   body	   is	   heightened	  when	   it	   is	   dysfunctional,	   when	   it	   is	   not	   behaving	   normally.	  
Then	   the	   surface,	   organ	   or	   system	   jumps	   into	   sharp	   relief	   and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   body	   ‘slips	   into	  
disregard’,	  (Manderson,	  2011:	  26).	  	  
Perhaps	   this	   is	   the	   greatest	   threat	   posed	   by	   the	   ‘abnormal	   body’;	   its	   ability	   to	   subsume	   the	   self.	  
When	  one	  is	  overwhelmed	  by	  internal	  processes	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  for	  granted,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  start	  
thinking	   of	   one’s	   body/self	   as	   simply	   defective	   organic	  matter	  without	   any	   purpose	  outside	   itself.
	   	  





The	  Sick	  Body	  as	  the	  Abject	  body	  
	  
During	  a	  period	  of	  intense	  physical	  illness,	  Francis	  Goya	  produced	  a	  private,	  un-­‐commissioned	  series	  
known	   as	   the	   ‘black	   paintings’.	   These	   dark	   shadowy	   scenes	   are	   inhabited	   by	   hollow	   eyed,	   pale	  
women	   and	  men,	   desperate,	  menacing	   or	   entirely	  wild.	  Goya’s	   terrifying	  monstrous	   post	   humans	  
represent	   the	  shadow	  side	   in	   the	  construction	  of	  normality.	   In	  order	   to	  define	  something,	  borders	  
need	   to	   be	   drawn	  between	  what	   it	   is	   and	  what	   it	   is	   not.	   Abjection	   occupies	   the	   space	  which	   the	  
‘normal’	  and	  the	  ‘healthy’	  have	  vacated.	  	  
	  
Figure	  9,	  Goya,	  F.	  Yard	  with	  Lunatics,	  (1794)	  
The	  concept	  of	  abjection	  in	  any	  given	  subject	  may	  arise	  during	  the	  ‘mirror	  phase’.	  This	  is	  a	  Lacanian	  
concept	  which	  accounts	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  ‘body	  image’.	  When	  a	  child	  is	  very	  young,	  they	  have	  
no	  sense	  of	  a	  distinction	  between	   themselves,	   their	  mother	  and	   the	  world	  around	   them.	  At	   some	  
point,	  around	  the	  age	  of	  two,	  the	  child	  sees	  themselves	  in	  the	  mirror,	  realises	  that	  he	  or	  she	  has	  a	  
bodily	  outline	  that	  divides	  them	  from	  everything	  else.	   ‘That	  which	  is	   lost	  or	  resists	   incorporation	  is	  
also	   precisely	   what	   makes	   the	   coherent	   body	   image	   possible	   because	   it	   marks	   the	   boundary	  
between	   the	   body	   image	   and	   what	   it	   is	   not’,	   (Benthall,	   Polhemus,	   1975).	   From	   then	   on,	   a	  
subconscious	   fear	  exists	   that	   the	  boundary	  will	   dissolve,	   and	   the	   self	  will	   be	   submerged,	   lost.	   The	  




‘abject’	   is	   this	   threatening	   outside	   that	   both	   outlines	   the	   limit	   of	   the	   self	   while	   threatening	   to	  
destroy	  it.	  
Elizabeth	  Grosz	  describes	   the	  abject	  as	  an	  abyss	   that	   is	  always	  beckoning	  and	  enticing	   the	  subject	  
closer	  to	  the	  edge,	  (Benthall,	  Polhemus,	  1975).	  This	  idea	  has	  held	  particular	  symbolic	  traction	  for	  me	  
since	  the	  first	  time	  I	  came	  across	  it	  and	  has	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  helping	  me	  understand	  my	  own	  
practice.	   The	   ‘abyss’	   is	   the	   dark	   space	   that	   exists	   in	   every	   subjectivity	   that	   language	   and	  
representation	   have	   been	   unable	   to	   make	   sense	   of.	   It	   is	   the	   indigestible	   stuff	   left	   over	   on	   the	  
margins	  of	  our	  socially	  acceptable	  selves.	  	  
For	  Julia	  Kristeva,	  the	  abject	  is…	  
An	  extremely	  strong	  feeling	  which	  is	  at	  once	  somatic	  and	  symbolic,	  and	  which	  is	  above	  all	  a	  
revolt	  of	  the	  person	  against	  an	  external	  menace	  from	  which	  one	  wants	  to	  keep	  oneself	  at	  a	  
distance,	  but	  of	  which	  one	  has	  the	  impression	  that	  it	  is	  not	  only	  an	  external	  menace	  but	  that	  
it	  may	  menace	  us	  from	  the	  inside,	  (Benthall,	  Polhemus,	  1975).	  
The	  abject	  haunts	  the	  ego	   in	  a	  continual	  disruption	  of	  the	  body’s	  boundaries	   in	  the	  form	  of	  blood,	  
spit,	  mucus,	  faeces,	  urine,	  pus	  and	  vomit,	  (Benthall,	  Polhemus,	  1975).	  Illness	  is	  a	  literal	  example	  of	  a	  
threat	  to	  psychological	  order	  that	  threatens	  us	  from	  the	  inside.	  For	  the	  sick	  subject,	  the	  disruptions	  
of	  bodily	  boundaries	  are	  generally	  more	  frequent,	  the	  threat	  on	  their	  boundaries	  more	  pervasive.	  	  
Certain	   tropes	   exist	  within	   the	   tradition	   of	   representing	   illness	   and	   the	   ill	   that	  mark	   them	   out	   as	  
abject.	  These	  are	  recyclable	  rather	  than	  tailor	  made	  for	  particular	  disorders.	  
Icons	  of	  disease	  appear	  to	  have	  an	  existence	  independent	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  any	  given	  disease.	  
This	   "free-­‐floating"	   iconography	   of	   disease	   attaches	   itself	   to	   various	   illnesses	   (real	   or	  
imagined)	   in	   different	   societies	   and	   at	   different	   moments	   in	   history.	   Disease	   is	   thus	  
restricted	  to	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  images,	  thereby	  forming	  a	  visual	  boundary,	  a	  limit	  to	  the	  idea	  
(or	  fear)	  of	  disease…	  For	  instance,	  by	  the	  sixteenth	  century,	  leprosy	  was	  no	  longer	  endemic	  
in	  Western	  Europe,	  its	  iconography	  remained	  as	  part	  of	  the	  popular	  storehouse	  of	  images	  of	  
disease	   and	   pollution	   and	   was	   immediately	   attached	   to	   the	   new	   disease	   of	   syphilis’,	  
(Gillman,	  1987:88,	  95)	  
Stereotypes	  assist	   in	   fleshing	  out	  an	   illness’	   ‘look’;	  an	  AIDS	  patient	   is	  black	  and	  or	  homosexual,	  an	  
anorexic	  is	  white,	  female	  and	  upper	  class.	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  certain	  communal	  comfort	  in	  being	  
able	   to	  neatly	  designate	   the	  behaviour	  and	   image	  of	   illness.	  The	  abject	  must	  be	  carefully	  defined,	  




delineated,	  to	  ensure	  that	  non-­‐normativity	  is	  not	  allowed	  to	  seep	  into	  the	  realms	  of	  the	  healthy.	  This	  
systematic	   response	   and	   social	   psychological	   containment	  of	   illness	   is	   disturbed	  when	   the	   subject	  
does	  not	  act	  or	  appear	   sick.	  This	   is	  evident	   in	   the	  collective	  panic	  about	  STDS,	  anyone	  could	  have	  
them	  and	  spread	  them,	  and	  there	  is	  often	  no	  way	  of	  knowing/	  seeing	  who.	  	  
Similarly,	   if	   one	   does	   appear	   ill,	   but	   does	   not	   offer	   up	   a	   neatly	   contained	   explanation	   of	   their	  
appearance,	   society,	   and	   often	   medicine,	   is	   quick	   to	   offer	   up	   one.	   Before	   being	   diagnosed	   as	   a	  
Celiac,	   I	   was	   repeatedly	   told	   by	   people	   I	   knew,	   people	   I	   did	   not,	   and	   various	   doctors,	   that	   I	   was	  
starving	   myself.	   I	   come	   from	   a	   wealthy	   family,	   am	   young	   and	   obviously	   concerned	   with	   my	  
appearance.	  I	  fit	  the	  stereotype.	  My	  overly	  skinny,	  abject	  body	  became	  public	  property,	  repurposed	  
to	   the	   socially	   imperative	   task	   of	   explaining	   itself	   away.	   Labels	   such	   as	   ‘anorexic’	   attached	  
themselves,	  ill	  fittingly,	  to	  me,	  up	  to	  the	  point	  when	  I	  almost	  convinced	  myself	  that	  I	  was	  somehow	  
not	  allowing	  myself	  to	  absorb	  the	  food	  I	  knew	  I	  ate.	  	  
Labels	  respond	  to	  the	  same	  ‘seeing	  is	  believing/	  understanding/	  knowing’	  impulse	  that	  is	  a	  structural	  
element	  of	  how	  both	  modern	  medicine	  and	  popular	  culture	  perceive	  the	  sick	  subject.	  The	  notion	  of	  
abjection	   is	   maintained	   communally.	   Stepping	   too	   close	   to	   the	   boundary	   line	   may	   mean	   social	  
ridicule	  or	  exclusion.	  In	  order	  for	  society	  to	  govern	  these	  boundaries	  abjection	  must	  be	  identifiable,	  
(Gillman,	  1987:	  103).	  Representation	  serves	  this	  purpose.	  
	  
	   	  





Sickness	  as	  ‘See-­‐able’	  
	  
The	   idea	   that	   sickness	   is	   ‘seeable’	   is	   a	   pervasive	   one.	   The	   stereotype	   of	   the	   mottled	   bed	   bound	  
skeleton	  has	   survived	   for	  centuries	  with	   little	  deviation.	  The	   image	   is	   clearer	  and	  more	  ubiquitous	  
from	  the	  proliferation	  of	  bodily	  representations	  from	  the	  enlightenment	  period	  on.	  	  
In	  2015,	   the	  Oscars	   for	  best	  male	  and	   female	   lead	  went	   to	  depictions	  of	   incurable	  diseases.	  Eddie	  
Redmayne	   portrayed	   Stephan	   Hawking’s	   struggle	   with	   Motor	   Neuron	   Disease	   in	   The	   Theory	   of	  
Everything	   and	   Julianne	   Moore	   played	   an	   early-­‐onset	   Alzheimer’s	   patient	   in	   Still	   Alice.	   In	   2014	  
Matthew	  McConaughey	   and	   Jared	   Leto	  were	   celebrated	   as	   Best	   Actor	   and	   Best	   Supporting	   Actor	  
respectively,	   for	   their	   roles	   as	   AIDS	   sufferers	   in	   Dallas	   Buyers’	   Club.	   Both	   actors	   lost	   significant	  
percentages	  of	  their	  total	  body	  weights	  for	  the	  parts.	  
	  
Figure	  10,	  The	  Theory	  of	  Everything,	  behind	  the	  scenes,	  (2014)	  





Figure	  11,	  Still	  Alice,	  (2014.)	  
	  
Figure	  12,	  Matthew	  McConaughey	  weight	  loss,	  	  (2013)	  





Figure	  13,	  Jared	  Leto	  weight	  loss,	  (2013)	  
Behind	  the	  pretence	  of	  celebration	  of	  these	  characters’	  heroism	  given	  their	  conditions,	  it	  is	  perhaps	  
voyeurism	   that	   accounts	   for	  much	   of	   the	   appeal	   of	   these	   stories.	   The	  morally	   beautific	   premises	  
make	  space	  and	  excuse	  the	  desire	  to	  see	  what	  these	  diseases	  ‘look	  like’.	  There	  is	  something	  guiltily	  
thrilling	   in	   seeing	   Matthew	   McConaughey’s	   usually	   muscular	   bronzed	   body	   reduced	   to	   skin	   and	  
bones.	  	  
These	   examples	   reflect	   Pliny’s	   concerns	   over	   desire	   for	   image.	   They	   also	   represent	   the	   popular	  
notion	   that	   illness	   can	   be	   directly	   translated	   into	   the	   visual.	  With	  make-­‐up,	   props,	  weight	   gain	   or	  
loss,	   the	   illness	   can	   be	   visually	   assimilated.	   In	   other	   cases	   it	   can	   be	   drawn,	   photographed	   or	  
modelled.	  The	  voyeuristic	  pleasure	  in	  watching	  McConaughey’s	  body	  may	  not	  just	  be	  derived	  from	  
the	  thrill	  of	  recognising	  the	  abject	  as	  something	  completely	  and	  fascinatingly	  distinct	  from	  oneself.	  It	  
may	  also	  derive	  from	  the	  simple	  fictitious	  reassurance	  that	  the	  sick	  look	  sick	  and	  the	  healthy	  do	  not.	  	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  imply	  that	  a	  strong	  causal	  link	  does	  not	  exist	  between	  an	  illness	  and	  appearance.	  Illness	  
may	   express	   itself	   on	   the	  bodily	   surfaces,	   easily	   detectable	   by	  doctors,	   and	   to	   a	   lesser	   extent	   the	  
public,	  depending	  on	  the	  severity	  and	  placement	  of	  the	   irregularity.	  Medical	  advances	  have	  meant	  
that	  modern	  doctors	  may	  see	  deeper	  and	  more	  profoundly	  into	  the	  interior	  of	  the	  body,	  even	  to	  a	  
microscopic	  level.	  	  ‘Seeing’	  may	  mean	  the	  visual	  evidence	  of	  a	  non-­‐uniformity	  in	  an	  X-­‐ray,	  a	  fissure	  or	  
bump	   detected	   by	   a	   scope,	   positive	   results	   from	   a	   blood	   test.	   If	   the	   affected	   area	   can	   be	   fully	  
visualised,	  the	  problem	  will	  be	  detectable.	  




A	  reliance	  on	  imagery	  gained	  momentum	  in	  the	  medical	  understanding	  of	  illness	  since	  the	  scientific	  
advancements	   of	   enlightenment	   inquiry.	   	   In	   the	   eighteenth	   century	   a	   visit	   to	   a	   doctor	   commonly	  
opened	  with	  the	  phrase,	  ‘what	  is	  the	  matter	  with	  you?’	  Now	  the	  clichéd	  line	  is	  ‘Where	  does	  it	  hurt?’	  
Foucault	   argues	   that	   this	  marks	   the	   shift	   in	   how	  medical	   discourse	  operated	  before	   and	   after	   the	  
advent	  of	  the	  clinic	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  It	  entirely	  re-­‐engages	  the	  idea	  of	  signifier	  and	  signified	  
in	   terms	  of	   bodily	   symptom.	   The	   visible	   signifier	   is	   now	   thought	   to	   correlate	   directly	   to	   a	   specific	  
condition,	  signified,	  (Foucault,	  1973:	  xxii).	  The	  former	  question	  also	  notably	  places	  more	  importance	  
on	   the	   voice	   and	   interpretive	   abilities	   of	   the	   patient.	   One	   acknowledges	   subjectivity,	   the	   other	  
imposes	  an	  objectivity.	  
Pre-­‐Enlightenment	  medicine	   generally	   relied	  on	   the	  belief	   of	   bodily	   ‘humours’.	   These	  were	  blood,	  
black	  bile,	  yellow	  bile	  and	  phlegm.	  An	  excess	  or	  deficiency	  of	  a	  humour	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  at	  the	  root	  
of	  all	  diseases,	  (Barnett,	  2014:21).	  The	  study	  and	  treatment	  of	  these	  irregularities	  was	  considered	  an	  
art,	   as	   much	   intuition	   as	   anything	   else.	   During	   the	   Enlightenment	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   body	   as	   a	  
medium	   of	   semi-­‐mysterious,	   half	   known	   humours	   was	   replaced	   by	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   body	   as	   a	  
machine.	  Disease	  was	  now	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  wear	  and	  tear,	  (Barnett,	  2014:	  24,25).	  The	  access	  to	  
various	  manifestations	  of	  visual	  material	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  body,	  especially	  during	  the	  19th	  century,	  
allowed	  for	  a	  sense	  of	  objective	  empiricism.	  Medicine	  was	  reconceptualised	  as	  a	  science,	   (Barnett,	  
2014:	  22).	  	  
This	   shift	   is	   accompanied	   by	   an	   inversion	   in	   the	   power	   dynamic	   between	   doctor	   and	   patient.	  
Traditionally,	  more	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  on	  the	  patient’s	  account	  of	  his	  or	  her	  ills.	  Medical	  students	  
in	   19th	   century	   urban	   hospitals	   could	   ‘diagnose	   and	   dissect	   on	   a	   near	   industrial	   level’,	   (Barnett,	  
2014:26).	   Catalogues	   created	   through	   observations	   of	   dead	   bodies	   provided	   visual	   correlations	   to	  
living	  bodies.	  New	  devices	  such	  as	  the	  stethoscope,	  meant	  that	  diseases	  could	  be	   identified	  within	  
the	  patient’s	  body	  without	  any	  recourse	  to	  the	  patient’s	  voice,	  (Barnett,	  2014:26).	  	  	  
The	  doctor	  acquires	  a	  thorough	  and	  complete	  knowledge	  of	  the	  body,	  gained	  through	  a	  long	  period	  
of	  study.	  Doctors	  possess	  the	  ‘medical	  gaze’,	  he	  or	  she	  can	  ‘see’	  the	  body	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  patient	  
simply	  cannot.	  Where	  the	  patient	  sees	  a	  strange	  lump,	  the	  doctor	  understands	  its	  cause,	  its	  nature	  
and	  how	  it	  should	  be	  treated.	  	  In	  this	  dynamic,	  the	  patient	  is	  only	  the	  ignoramus	  in	  possession	  of	  the	  
raw	  material	  of	   the	  defective	  body,	  which	  will	  make	   sense	  only	  when	  exposed	   to	   the	   illuminating	  
clinical	  gaze	  of	  the	  doctor,	  who	  alone	  can	  ‘unlock	  the	  secrets	  of	  the	  disordered	  body’,	  Susan	  Bordo,	  
1993	  in	  (Benthall,	  Polhemus,	  1975)	  .	  




This	   conception	   of	   the	  medical	   gaze	   is	   perhaps	   more	   pervasive	   today	   than	   ever,	   inspired	   by	   the	  
miracles	  of	  modern	  medical	   technology.	  Doctors	   still	   ask	  patients	   how	   they	   are	   'feeling',	   however	  
their	  answers	  are	  more	  thoroughly	  gleaned	  through	  inert	  replicas	  of	  the	  patient’s	   insides,	  with	  the	  
help	  of	  the	  CT	  scan,	  the	  biopsy	  and	  the	  X-­‐rayed	  image.	  The	  supposed	  objectivity	  of	  these	  resources	  
together	   with	   the	   doctor’s	   capacity	   for	   translation,	   has	   led	   to	   medicine	   being	   described	   as	   an	  
‘aristocratic	   discourse’,	   the	   resulting	   authority	   becoming	   ‘monologic,	   monoglossic,	   univocal,	   and	  
sacred’,	  (Naryvey,	  2002:	  133).	  
The	   emphasis	   and	   access	   to	   sophisticated	   imagery	   in	   medicine	   have	   been	   accompanied	   by	  
unprecedented	  success.	  Cancerous	  lumps	  can	  be	  detected	  and	  removed.	  Diseases	  can	  be	  identified	  
through	   the	   testing	   of	   bodily	   fluids	   and	   accordingly	   treated.	   Access	   to	   the	   historically	   sacrosanct	  
realms	  of	  the	  brain	  and	  the	  womb	  can	  mean	  the	  early	  detection	  of	  potential	  problems.	  	  
However,	   through	   these	   triumphs,	   by	   annexing	   itself	   to	   notions	   of	   complete	   scientific	   objectivity,	  
medicine	  denies	  its	  status	  as	  a	  discourse.	  In	  so	  doing	  it	  disguises	  the	  attendant	  myths,	  presumptions	  
and	  most	   importantly,	  agendas	  that	  accompany	  every	  discourse.	   In	  terms	  of	  medicine,	   this	  hidden	  
agenda	  can	  be	  described	  as	   regulating	  and	  maintaining	  a	  workforce	  by	  encouraging	  a	  mentality	  of	  
productivity,	  self-­‐reliance	  and	  self-­‐care,	  (Lupton,	  1994:	  31).	  The	  body	  is	  the	  ‘ultimate	  site	  of	  political	  
and	   ideological	   control,	   surveillance	   and	   regulation’,	   (Lupton,	   1994:	   23).	   Through	   medicine,	  
psychiatry,	   the	   educational	   system,	   the	   media	   and	   the	   state,	   bodies	   are	   subtly	   punished	   for	  
deviating	  into	  the	  realms	  of	  sickness,	  (Lupton,	  1994:	  23).	  
In	   The	   Birth	   of	   the	   Clinic,	   Foucault	   argues	   against	   the	   popular	   idea	   that	   nineteenth	   century	  
Enlightenment	  marked	   the	   point	   in	   history	  when	  medicine	  moved	   away	   from	   vague	   superstitious	  
hypotheses	  to	  a	  basis	  in	  empirically	  provable	  fact.	  Instead,	  he	  argues	  that	  this	  notion	  was	  absorbed	  
into	  a	  new	  discourse	  of	  benevolent	  medical	  objectivity,	  which	  justified	   increased	  intrusion	  into	  the	  
privacy	  of	  its	  subjects.	  
	  Modern	  medicine	  has	  fixed	  its	  own	  date	  of	  birth	  as	  being	  in	  the	  last	  years	  of	  the	  eighteenth	  
century.	  Reflecting	  on	  its	  situation,	  it	  identifies	  the	  origin	  of	  its	  positivity	  with	  a	  return—over	  
and	   above	   all	   theory—to	   the	   modest	   but	   effecting	   level	   of	   the	   perceived.	   In	   fact,	   this	  
supposed	  empiricism	  is	  not	  based	  on	  a	  rediscovery	  of	  the	  absolute	  values	  of	  the	  visible,	  nor	  
on	  the	  pre-­‐determined	  rejection	  of	  systems	  and	  all	  their	  chimeras,	  but	  on	  a	  reorganization	  
of	  that	  manifest	  and	  secret	  space	  that	  opened	  up	  when	  a	  millennial	  gaze	  paused	  over	  men's	  
sufferings,	  (Foucault,	  1973:	  xiii,	  xiv)	  




‘At	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   doctors	   described	   what	   for	   centuries	   had	  
remained	  below	  the	  threshold	  of	  the	  visible	  and	  the	  expressible,	  but	  this	  did	  not	  mean	  that,	  
after	   over-­‐indulging	   in	   speculation,	   they	   had	   begun	   to	   perceive	   once	   again,	   or	   that	   they	  
listened	  to	  reason	  rather	  than	  to	  imagination;	  it	  meant	  that	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  visible	  
and	   invisible—which	   is	   necessary	   to	   all	   concrete	   knowledge—	   changed	   its	   structure,	  
revealing	   through	   gaze	   and	   language	   what	   had	   previously	   been	   below	   and	   beyond	   their	  
domain’,	  (Foucault,	  1973:	  xiv).	  
In	  these	  quotations,	  Foucault	  emphasises	  how	  visibility	  became	  interchangeable	  with	  understanding	  
through	   a	   scientific	   language	   that	   emphasised	   the	   observable.	   From	   the	   nineteenth	   century	  
onwards,	   the	   idea	   of	   ‘truth’,	   in	   medical	   terms,	   seems	   to	   align	   itself	   with	   how	   closely	   a	   case	   is	  
observed,	   or	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   it	   can	   be	   observable,	   (Foucault,	   1973:	   xv).	   Foucault	   argues	   that	  
rather	   than	   removing	   the	   bias	   and	   superstition	   of	   previous	   discourses,	   these	   elements	   are	   simply	  
differently	  materialised.	   ‘Far	   from	   being	   broken,	   the	   fantasy	   link	   between	   knowledge	   and	   pain	   is	  
reinforced	   by	   a	  more	   complex	  means	   than	   the	  mere	   permeability	   of	   the	   imagination’,	   (Foucault,	  
1973:	  xii).	  So	  while	  the	  modern	  medical	  language	  may	  masquerade	  as	  a	  transparent	  means	  through	  
which	   objective	   truth	   is	   relayed,	   it	   is	   still	   a	   language.	   The	   character	   and	   manifestations	   of	   the	  
prejudices	  it	  contains	  are	  simply	  better	  camouflaged	  to	  those	  who	  engage	  with	  it.	  A	  principle	  player	  
in	  the	  efficacy	  of	  this	  camouflage	   is	   the	   idea	  of	  the	   infallible	  medical	  gaze.	   ‘The	  figures	  of	  pain	  are	  
not	  conjured	  away	  by	  means	  of	  a	  body	  of	  neutralized	  know-­‐ledge;	  they	  have	  been	  redistributed	  in	  
the	  space	  in	  which	  bodies	  and	  eyes	  meet’,	  (Foucault,	  1973:	  xii).	  
Foucault’s	   argument	   is	   not	   to	   discredit	   modern	   medicine	   or	   suggest	   the	   superiority	   of	   previous	  
systems,	  but	   simply	   to	  draw	  attention	   towards	   the	   fact	   that,	   the	  successes	  or	   failures	  of	  pre-­‐clinic	  
and	  post	  clinic	  medical	  language	  notwithstanding,	  both	  are	  discourses,	  (Foucault,	  1973:	  xxiii).	  
The	  idea	  of	  seeing	  and	  recognising	  a	  discordant	  element	  also	  implies	  that	  discordant	  elements	  of	  a	  
particular	   type,	   will	   always	   resemble	   each	   other.	   Medical	   classification	   depends	   on	   this.	   It	   is	   a	  
semiotic	  principle	  that	  sufficient	  similitude	  be	  evident	  in	  bestowing	  a	  single	  name	  on	  a	  multitude	  of	  
objects	   or	   occurrences.	   In	   Birth	   of	   the	   Clinic,	   Foucault	   states,	   ‘the	   first	   structure	   provided	   by	  
classificatory	  medicine	   is	   the	   flat	   surface	  of	   perpetual	   simultaneity,	   (1973:	   5).	  And	   later,	   ‘in	   a	   flat,	  
homogeneous,	   non-­‐measurable	   world,	   there	   is	   essential	   disease	   where	   there	   is	   a	   plethora	   of	  
similarities’,	  (1973:6).	  




The	  premise	  of	  similitude	  allows	  for	  the	  potential	  of	  verisimilitude,	  as	  in	  the	  examples	  of	  the	  actors	  
taking	  on	  the	  appearance	  of	  sickness.	  What	  is	  fascinating	  is	  that	  these	  actors’	  bodies	  satisfy	  a	  
voyeurism	  to	  see	  what	  these	  conditions	  look	  like,	  despite	  the	  audience	  being	  perfectly	  aware	  that	  
each	  actor	  is	  depicting	  a	  condition	  which	  he	  or	  she	  does	  not	  suffer	  from.	  Is	  it	  possible	  that	  the	  
biomedical	  model	  has	  set	  up	  a	  dynamic	  in	  which	  the	  representation	  of	  the	  sick	  body	  is	  more	  
significant	  than	  the	  sick	  body	  itself?	   	  





Pain:	  a	  semiotic	  impossibility?	  
	  
English,	  which	  can	  express	  the	  thought	  of	  Hamlet	  and	  the	  tragedy	  of	  Lear,	  has	  no	  words	  for	  
the	  shiver	  and	  the	  headache.	  The	  merest	  schoolgirl,	  when	  she	  falls	  in	  love,	  has	  Shakespeare	  
and	  Keats	  to	  speak	  her	  mind	  for	  her;	  but	  let	  a	  sufferer	  try	  to	  describe	  a	  pain	  in	  his	  head	  to	  a	  
doctor	  and	  language	  at	  once	  runs	  dry.	  There	  is	  nothing	  made	  ready	  for	  him.	  He	  is	  forced	  to	  
coin	  words	  himself,	  and,	  taking	  his	  pain	  in	  one	  hand,	  and	  a	  lump	  of	  pure	  sound	  in	  the	  other	  
(as	  perhaps	  the	  people	  of	  Babel	  did	   in	  the	  beginning),	  so	  as	  to	  crush	  them	  together	  that	  a	  
brand	  new	  word	  in	  the	  end	  drops	  out.	  	  Virginia	  Woolf,	  1930	  in	  (Lupton,	  1994:55).	  
Perhaps	   Woolf	   is	   hasty	   in	   declaring	   there	   is	   little	   creative	   literature	   on	   the	   theme	   of	   illness.	  
Canonical	   giants	   such	   as	   Camus,	   Ibsen,	   Dumas	   and	   Joyce	   have	   all	   tackled	   the	   subject,	   (Lupton,	  
1994:51).	  Perhaps	  illness	  does	  not	  maintain	  the	  same	  social	  taboo	  that	  it	  did	  in	  the	  1930s.	  However	  
there	   is	   something	   in	  Woolf’s	  description	   that	   rings	  undeniably	   true.	  Pain	   resists	   language,	   (Good,	  
1994:	  30).	  When	  faced	  with	  explaining	  pain	  to	  a	  doctor	  one	  is	  restricted	  to	  reductive	  phrases	  like	  ‘it	  
hurts’,	   ‘it’s	   sore’,	   its	   ‘painful’,	   perhaps	   with	   unsatisfactory	   modifiers	   such	   as	   ‘very’	   or	   ‘really’.	  
Otherwise	  one	  resorts	  to	  time	  worn	  metaphors	  such	  as	   ‘splitting’,	   ‘pounding’	  or	   ‘throbbing’.	  These	  
terms	  have	  been	  so	  continuously	  overused	  that	  the	  visceral	  quality	  of	  what	  it	  would	  really	  be	  like	  for	  
a	  head	  to	  be	  ‘splitting’	  is	  long	  lost.	  	  	  
Elaine	  Scarry	  proclaimed	  that	  pain,	   ‘…is	  expressed	   in	  cries	  and	  shrieks,	   in	  a	  pre-­‐symbolic	   language,	  
resisting	  entry	  into	  the	  world	  of	  meaning.	  It	  ‘shatters’	  language	  ‘,	  (Good,	  Good,	  Brodwin,	  Kleinman,	  
1994:29).	  ‘The	  objectlessness,	  the	  complete	  absence	  of	  referential	  content,	  almost	  prevents	  it	  from	  
being	  rendered	  in	  language;	  objectless,	  it	  cannot	  easily	  be	  objectified	  in	  any	  form,	  material	  or	  verbal,	  
(Scarry,	  1987:162).	  If	  pain	  defies	  language,	  how	  is	  the	  subject	  in	  pain	  supposed	  to	  communicate	  their	  
experience	  to	  those	  around	  them?	  A	  sharing	  of	  subjectivity	  is	  near	  impossible.	  
Pain	   holds	   a	   tenuous	   position	   in	   both	   the	   popular	   imagination	   and	   in	  medical	   science	   because	   it	  
cannot	  be	  measured,	  monitored	  or	  conceptualised.	  Pain	  cannot	  be	  seen.	  The	  notion	  is	  accompanied	  
with	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  lack.	  It	  is	  uncontainable	  by	  language	  because	  it	  upsets	  the	  semiotic	  structure	  
on	  which	   language	  relies.	  A	  semiotic	  system,	  be	   it	  expressed	  through	  the	  written	  word	  or	   through	  
visual	   culture,	   ensures	   that	  meaning	   can	  be	   shared.	   Pain,	   so	   inherently	   subjective,	   untranslatable,	  




challenges	  this	  coherence,	  (Good,	  Good,	  Brodwin,	  Kleinman,	  1994:	  5).	  The	  signifier	  ‘pain’	  whether	  it	  
be	  written	  or	  spoken	  does	  not	  lead	  directly	  to	  a	  signified	  conception	  of	  what	  pain	  is.	  	  
Classification,	  an	  essential	  element	  of	  language,	  depends	  on	  similitude.	  Two	  objects	  or	  ideas	  must	  be	  
significantly	  similar	  when	  they	  share	  a	  word	  that	  references	  them.	  The	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  
objects/ideas	  fall	  away	  while	  their	  similarities	  are	  contained	  by	  language	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  particular	  
word.	  The	  idea	  of	  a	  ‘disease’	  implies	  a	  definable	  set	  of	  symptoms	  and	  conditions,	  a	  knowable	  enemy.	  
In	   fact,	   many	   diseases	   are	   really	   a	   series	   of	   relatively	   unpredictable	   biological	   processes	   (Sontag	  
1978:	   67).	   HIV/AIDS,	   particularly,	   is	   better	   described	   as	   a	   condition	   rather	   than	   a	   disease.	   	   By	   its	  
nature,	   it	   is	   comprised	   of	   a	   spectrum	   of	   various	   illnesses.	   Despite	   this,	   it	   is	   common	   to	   talk	   of	  
HIV/AIDS	   or	   Cancer	   or	   Diabetes	   as	   a	   single	   finite	   ailment	   regardless	   of	   the	   variety	   of	   their	  
permutations.	  
	  How	  then	  can	  pain	  be	  classified,	  given	  a	  containing	  word,	  if	   it	  cannot	  be	  seen,	  if	  two	  subjects	  may	  
use	  contradicting	  descriptions	  in	  reference	  to	  the	  same	  sensation,	  resulting	  from	  different	  cultural	  or	  
psychological	  backgrounds?	  Conversely,	  patients	  may	  use	  the	  same	  language,	  for	  example,	  ‘my	  head	  
is	  splitting’,	  to	  describe	  two	  entirely	  different	  experiences,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  sensation	  and	  extremity,	  
given	   the	   limited	   expressions	   available	   to	   them.	   In	   this	   way	   pain	   challenges	   the	   tenants	   of	   the	  
biomedical	  system,	  the	  limits	  of	  visuality	  and	  classification,	  (Good,	  Good,	  Brodwin,	  Kleinman,	  1994:	  
7).	  
The	   focus	   here	   is	   not	   ‘acute	   pain’	  which	   relates	   to	   a	   specific	   bodily	   trauma	   and	   fits	   neatly	   into	   a	  
narrative	  of	  a	  period	  of	   illness	   followed	  by	  a	   return	   to	  health,	   incapacitation	  or	  death.	  This	  pain	   is	  
somehow	  made	  visual	  through	  attendant	  rituals,	  such	  as	  the	  appropriate	  dress	  and	  behaviour	  of	  the	  
patient,	  confinement	  to	  bed	  for	  example.	  The	  finite	  time	  frame	  of	  acute	  pain	  also	  provides	  a	  sense	  of	  
containment	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   pain	   to	   patient,	   family,	   friends	   and	   doctors.	   ‘Chronic	   pain’	  
defies	   visualisation.	   The	   patient	   most	   often	   does	   not	   wear	   the	   associated	   garb	   of	   illness,	   is	   not	  
confined	  to	  bed,	  moves	  around	  and	  interacts	  as	  ‘normal’.	  The	  pain	  is	  not	  contained	  by	  the	  space	  of	  
the	  hospital	  or	  bedroom	  or	  by	  a	  neat	  time	  frame	  of	  illness.	  Instead	  it	  seeps	  through	  every	  part	  of	  the	  
patient’s	   life,	  becoming	  an	  active	  element	  of	  their	  personality	  and	  the	   lives	  of	  those	  around	  them,	  
(Good,	  Good,	  Brodwin,	  Kleinman,	  1994:	  13).	  
The	  lack	  of	  meaningful	  language	  for	  pain,	  and	  the	  uneasiness	  this	  causes,	  often	  results	  in	  the	  patient	  
attempting	  to	  make	  his	  or	  her	  condition	  relatable	  by	  other	  means.	  This	  may	  be	  achieved	  in	  various	  
ways.	  One	  way	   is	  for	  the	  patient	  to	   ‘perform’	  their	   illness	   in	  order	  to	  draw	  it	   into	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  




visual.	   Performance	   allows	   pain	   to	   be	   communicated,	   for	   needs	   to	   be	   expressed.	   This	   will	   be	  
discussed	  in	  more	  depth	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  chapter	  2.	  
The	   simple	   naming	   of	   the	   set	   of	   symptoms	   in	   medical	   terms	   allows	   a	   sense	   of	   legitimacy	   and	  
containment.	  For	  this	  reason,	  it	  is	  common	  for	  sufferers	  of	  chronic	  illnesses	  to	  regularly	  refer	  to	  the	  
medical	  label	  of	  their	  condition,	  almost	  ritualistically,	  soothingly.	  
Otherwise,	  sufferers	  attempt	  to	  share	  their	  experiences	  through	  the	  visual	   language	  of	  metaphors,	  
(Good,	   Good,	   Brodwin,	   Kleinman,	   1994:77).	   References	   to	   sensory	   adjectives	   such	   as,	   ‘splitting,	  
pounding,	  and	  throbbing’	  provides	  a	  visual	  dimension	  to	  a	  condition	  that,	  by	  its	  nature,	  denies	  it.	  In	  
medicine,	  sickness	  is	  usually	  described	  in	  terms	  of	  various	  acts	  of	  warfare,	  the	  body	  is	  ‘under	  attack’	  
and	   it’s	   ‘besieged’.	   There	   is	   no	   literal	   connection	   between	   warfare	   and	   a	   sick	   body	   but	   when	   a	  
patient	  uses	  this	  imagery,	  he	  or	  she	  is	  engaged	  in	  the	  act	  of	  communal	  meaning-­‐making,	  (Brodwin,	  
1994:	  78).	  
‘Biomilitarism’	   refers	   to	   the	  medical	   language	   of	   disease	   that	  makes	   use	   of	  military	   imagery.	   It	   is	  
common	  to	  describe	  war	  as	  a	  ‘sickness’	  of	  society	  and	  illness	  as	  a	  ‘war’	  on	  the	  body.	  War	  and	  illness	  
have	   been	   interchangeable	   concepts	   since	   classical	   thought,	   the	   god	   Apollo	   presiding	   over	   both	  
threats	   in	   the	  maintenance	   of	   order	   in	   civilisation.	   Biblically,	  war	   and	   pestilence	   are	   holy	   allies	   in	  
punishing	  the	  wicked.	  Half	  way	  through	  the	  19th	  century,	  the	  medical	  scientist	  Pasteur	  was	  studying	  
the	  nature	  of	  germs.	  Due	  to	  advances	  in	  medical	  technology,	  particularly	  	  in	  the	  microscopic,	  for	  the	  
first	   time	   scientists	   could	   observe	   germs	   entering	   the	   body.	   Illness	   became	   understood	   as	   an	  
‘invasion’	  of	  innumerable	  ‘hostile’	  microscopic	  agents	  that	  could,	  at	  last,	  be	  observed	  and	  classified,	  
(Sontag,	  1978:	  95).	  	  
Pain	  metaphors	  are	  time	  and	  culture	  specific.	  They	  reflect	  the	  particular	  ideological	  concerns	  of	  their	  
subject’s	   context.	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	  middle	  ages,	   sickness	  metaphors	  described	   illness	  as	  nature	  
entering	   the	  body.	  Bodies	  were	  often	  described	  as	  houses	  or	   fortresses,	  bastions	  of	   civilisation.	   In	  
the	   17th	   century,	   biblical	   imagery	   dominated.	   The	   sinner	   was	   said	   to	   be	   ill,	   or	   made	   well	   by	  
repentance,	   (Lupton,	   1994:	   56).	   The	   industrial	   revolution	   ushered	   in	   a	   tide	   of	   body-­‐as-­‐machine	  
metaphors.	  We	  still	  commonly	  refer	  to	  being	  ‘wound	  up’,	  ‘blowing	  a	  fuse’,	  needing	  to	  ‘recharge	  our	  
batteries’,	   (Lupton,	   1994:	   59).	   In	   the	   late	   twentieth	   and	   early	   twenty	   first	   centuries,	   this	   has	  
translated	   into	   computer	   imagery.	   We	   refer	   to	   the	   brain	   as	   ‘storing	   information’,	   computers	   as	  
having	  ‘memory’,(Lupton,	  1994:60).	  




These	  examples	  show	  how	  culture	  and	   ideology	  are	   inscribed	  onto	  the	  personal	  experience	  of	   the	  
body	   in	   pain.	   	   The	   metaphor	   actively	   creates	   and	   reconfigures	   reality	   rather	   than	   reflecting	   it.	  
Metaphor	  creates	  similarities,	  drawing	  together	  two	  unrelated	  ideas	  and	  forcing	  them	  into	  a	  shared	  
significance,	   (Cresswell,	   1997:	   332,	   333).	   These	  metaphors	   are	   drawn	   into	   our	   experiences	   of	   our	  
bodies,	   (Brodwin,	  1994:93).	  Absorbing	   the	  medical	   terminology	  of	  warfare	  can	   lead	   to	   the	  patient	  
feeling	  ‘at	  war’	  with	  their	  own	  body.	  The	  subject	  is	  violently	  split	  in	  two	  and	  set	  at	  odds	  with	  his	  or	  
herself.	  Chapter	  3	  deals	  with	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  a	  set	  of	  personal	  metaphors	  that	  are	  uniquely	  
applicable	  to	  my	  experience.	  This	  has	  served	  to	  actively	  re-­‐engage	  and	  reintegrate	  my	  sense	  of	  self	  
with	  that	  of	  my	  body,	  to	  end	  the	  war.	  
	   	  
	   	  





Scientific	  Language	  as	  Discourse	  
	  
Despite	  the	  semiotic	  conundrum	  discussed	  above,	  medicine	  determinably	  draws	  the	  vagaries	  of	  pain	  
conditions	   into	   the	   realm	   of	   language	   through	   medical	   labels.	   The	   authoritative	   sounding	   terms,	  
‘Celiac	   Disease’	   and	   ‘Chronic	   Pelvic	   Pain’,	   seem	   to	   imply	   a	   full	   understanding	   of	   the	  mechanisms,	  
causes	  and	  treatments.	  This	  is	  not	  true	  in	  either	  case.	  They	  do	  however	  translate	  the	  mysterious	  and	  
subjective	  into	  something	  which	  can	  make	  sense	  within	  a	  grander	  narrative.	  
Biomedicine,	  for	  Kleinman,	  corresponds	  no	  more	  to	  an	  essentialist	  definition	  than	  any	  other	  
medicine,	   be	   it	   shamanism,	   traditional	   medicine,	   or	   Chinese	   medicine.	   However,	   all	  
medicines	   share	   these	   features:	   "categories	   by	   which	   health	   is	   normalized	   and	   illness	  
diagnosed,	   narrative	   structures	   that	   synthesize	   complaints	   into	   culturally	   meaningful	  
syndromes,	   master	   metaphors	   ,	   idioms	   and	   other	   core	   rhetorical	   devices	   that	   authorize	  
practical	   therapeutic	   actions	   and	   the	  means	   by	  which	   their	   'efficacy'	   is	   evaluated,	   healing	  
roles	   and	   careers,	   interpersonal	   engagements	   that	   constitute	   a	   vast	   variety	  of	   therapeutic	  
relationships	  and	  modes	  of	  clinical	  interaction,	  an	  immense	  panoply	  of	  therapies,	  seamlessly	  
combining	   symbolic	   and	   practical	   operations...	  whose	   intention	   is	   to	   control	   symptoms	  or	  
their	  putative	  sources",	  	  (Janzen,	  2010:	  352).	  	  
Biomedical	  discourse	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  maintains	  its	  authority	  by	  denying	  and	  disguising	  its	  status	  
as	   a	   discourse.	   Through	   the	   assertion	   of	   medical	   objectivity	   and	   scientific	   reasoning,	   it	   implies	   a	  
direct	  access	  to	  the	  truth.	  Such	  an	  access	  has	  been	  disputed	  by	  post-­‐structural	  theory	  because	  of	  the	  
layered	   connotative	   quality	   any	   language	   invariably	   takes	   on.	  A	   post-­‐structural	   approach	   interests	  
itself	   in	   uncovering	   the	   role	   of	   language	   in	   maintaining	   social	   order	   and	   constructing	   notions	   of	  
reality,	  (Lupton,	  1994:	  17).	  No	  matter	  how	  far	  medicine	  advances	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  abilities	  to	  eradicate	  
sickness	   through	   a	   thorough	   understanding	   of	   the	   functions	   of	   the	   body,	   it	   will	   always	   remain	   a	  
discourse.	  	  
Foucault	  makes	  this	  point	   in	  the	  very	  opening	  passages	  of	  The	  Birth	  of	  the	  Clinic.	  He	  describes	  two	  
medical	  cases,	  separated	  by	  roughly	  a	  century.	  In	  an	  eighteenth	  century	  account	  of	  the	  treatment	  of	  
an	  hysteric	  who	  was	  advised	  to	  take	  ten	  to	  twelve	  baths	  every	  day,	  it	  is	  recorded	  that	  thin	  sheets	  of	  
tissue	  detached	  themselves	  from	  the	  surface	  of	  the	  patients	  skin	  and	  also	  various	  organs,	  and	  then	  




passed	   through	   the	   digestive	   system.	   The	   latter	   account	   of	   Chronic	  Meningitis	   similarly	   describes	  
thin	  veneers	  of	  tissue	  on	  the	  folds	  of	  the	  brain	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘false	  membranes’	  (Foucault,	  1973:	  x,	  
xi).	  The	  imagery	  is	  the	  similar	  but	  the	  language	  is	  different.	  The	  emphatic	  scientific	  descriptions	  used	  
in	   the	   latter	   display	   a	   ‘qualitative	   precision’,	   which	   ‘directs	   our	   gaze	   into	   a	   world	   of	   constant	  
visibility’,	  (Foucault,	  1973:	  xi).	  The	  only	  reason	  why	  the	  modern	  subject	  reads	  one	  as	  obvious	  fantasy	  
and	  the	  other	  as	  a	  description	  of	  truth,	  is	  because	  the	  reader	  is	  embedded	  in	  a	  system	  in	  which	  that	  
particular	  type	  of	  language	  denotes	  truth.	  
The	   previous	   section	   discussed	   the	   embodied	   experience	   of	   metaphor,	   particularly	   war	   imagery.	  
Beneath	   the	   pretence	   of	   scientific	   objectivity,	   medical	   language	   is	   deeply	   influenced	   by	   this	  
metaphor.	  This	  is	  evident	  in	  various	  elements	  of	  hospital	  and	  patient	  culture.	  Disease	  is	  treated	  as	  an	  
invading	   enemy,	   as	   Barbara	   Kruger	   put	   it,	   ‘the	  body	   is	   a	   battleground’,	   1989.	   The	   aptitude	  of	   the	  
enemy,	   or	   invading	   disease,	   is	   posited	   against	   that	   of	   the	   defenders	   of	   the	   threatened	   territory.	  
There	  is	  emphasis	  on	  state	  of	  the	  art	  ‘techno	  weaponry’	  medical	  machinery.	  This	  attitude	  is	  reflected	  
in	  the	  frequent	  referral	  to	  ‘mobilization’	  of	  public	  resources	  to	  ‘fight’	  a	  disease,	  (Sontag,	  1978:	  95).	  
Biomedical	  Language	  illuminates	  bodily	  maladies	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  potential	  correction.	  However,	  
while	  doing	  so,	  it	  simultaneously	  colours	  the	  body	  with	  hidden	  culturally	  specific	  judgements.	  
	   	  





Scientific	  versus	  Lived	  Experience	  of	  Sickness	  and	  the	  Legacy	  of	  Cartesian	  
Dualism	  	  
	  
Chronic	  pain	  challenges	  biomedicine’s	  underlying	  reliance	  idea	  of	  dualism,	  existing	  in	  a	  liminal	  space	  
between	  emotions	  and	  bodily	  sensations,	  	  (Kleinman,	  1994:	  169).	  
There	   is	   a	   fundamental	   fissure	   between	   the	   medical	   and	   lived	   experience	   of	   sickness.	   For	   the	  
subject,	  it	  may	  mean	  an	  inability	  to	  work	  and	  the	  related	  pressure	  of	  medical	  expenses.	  It	  may	  mean	  
being	  too	  tired	  to	  engage	  socially.	  It	  is	  often	  accompanied	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  hopelessness,	  alienation	  and	  
anger.	   However,	   from	   the	   medical	   perspective,	   the	   same	   body	   represents,	   perhaps,	   a	   certain	  
malfunctioning	   organism	   and	   the	   need	   for	   certain	   interventions	   and	   treatments.	   There	   is	   limited	  
possibility	   for	   intersection	   in	   such	   divergent	   narratives.	   This	   incompatibility	   can	   be	   simplified	   as:	  
medicine	  ‘sees’,	  the	  patient/	  subject	  ‘feels’.	  The	  impracticality	  of	  the	  relationship	  is	  evident;	  feelings	  
are	  invisible.	  
The	  underlying	  assumption	  in	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  body	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  something	  separate	  
from	   the	  mind.	  The	   subject	  hands	  over	  his	  or	  her	  body	   for	  medical	   inspection	  and	   intervention	   in	  
order	  to	  ‘fix’	  it.	  The	  subjectivity	  of	  the	  patient,	  theoretically,	  does	  not	  affect	  this	  process.	  This	  way	  of	  
thinking	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘dualism’.	  
Rene	  Descartes	  proclaimed	  ‘cognito	  ergo	  sum’,	  ‘I	  think	  therefore	  I	  am’	  in	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  in	  
response	  to	  the	  question	  ‘what	  can	  we	  know?’	  This	  responds	  to	  a	  line	  of	  thinking	  that	  purports	  that	  
‘pure	   knowledge’	   can	   only	   be	   achieved	   through	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   reason,	   disregarding	   the	  
mendacious	   data	   garnered	  by	   the	   senses.	   This	   drew	  on	   a	   tenant	   of	   Platonic	   thought	   that	   insisted	  
that	  ‘pure	  form’	  or	  ‘truth’	  existed	  in	  a	  ‘higher	  reality’	  than	  that	  accessible	  to	  the	  senses.	  What	  these	  
theories	   do,	   in	   effect,	   is	   create	   a	   hierarchy	  between	   the	   empirical	  world	   and	   the	   idea	  of	   a	   higher	  
truth	  sought	  through	  reason.	  The	  body	  was	  thought	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  former,	  the	  mind	  to	  the	  latter.	  
This	  split	  the	  self	  into	  two	  components,	  with	  the	  body	  as	  the	  mind’s	  earthly	  restraint,	  (MacLachlan,	  
2004:3).	  
The	  philosophies	  of	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  renegotiate	  the	  idea	  of	  reality	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  can	  be	  accessed	  
through	  the	  sensory	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  body.	  Rather	  than	  consciousness	  existing	  somehow	  outside	  




the	  body,	  it	  emanates	  from	  bodily	  processes.	  	  In	  this	  way	  the	  mind	  and	  the	  body	  are	  reconciled	  into	  
the	   body-­‐subject.	   Our	   subjectivity	   is	   not	   a	   hindrance	   to	   comprehending	   reality	   but	   an	   active	  
component	   in	   constituting	   reality.	   Reality	   in	   this	   sense	   is	   relative,	   personal,	   mediated.	   This	   is	  
referred	  to	  ‘being	  in	  the	  world’,	  (MacLachlan,	  2004:4).	  
While	   the	   ‘embodied’	   philosophies	   of	   Merleau-­‐Ponty	   have	   been	   undeniably	   influential,	   Dualism	  
continues	  to	  define	  the	  relationship	  between	  mind	  and	  body	  both	  in	  the	  realms	  of	  language	  and	  in	  
the	  health	   care	   system.	   Language	   is	   simply	   organised	   around	  dualistic	   ideas.	  We	   speak	   about	   our	  
bodies	  as	  something	  we	  own	  rather	  than	  something	  we	  are;	  ‘My	  body	  is	  broken’,	  not	  ‘I	  am	  broken’.	  
Whilst	  many	   of	   us	   acknowledge	   the	  mind	   as	   simply	   another	   bodily	   process,	  we	   defer	   to	   dualistic	  
thinking	  as	  a	  convenience.	  	  
One	   often	   slips	   into	   dualistic	  ways	   of	   thinking	   because	  much	   of	   our	   experience	   of	   our	   body	   does	  
seem	  to	  be	  as	  something	  separate	  from	  us.	  We	  would	  not	  know	  that	  we	  had	  kidneys,	  pancreases,	  a	  
gall	  bladder,	  unless	   someone	   told	  us.	  We	  can	  never	   see	  our	  own	  back	  without	  visual	  mechanisms	  
such	  as	  cameras	  or	  mirrors.	  How	  can	  I	  think	  of	  my	  body	  and	  mind	  as	  being	  one	  collaborative	  whole	  
when	  a	  deadly	  tumour	  could	  grow	  inside	  me	  without	  my	  mind	  being	  consciously	  aware	  of	  it?	  
Almost	  anyone	  who	  has	  had	  any	  medical	   intervention	  has	  experienced	  a	  sense	  of	  alienation	  when	  
reviewing	  their	   ‘case’	  with	   their	  doctor	  or	  nurse.	  They	  stare	  at	  an	  x-­‐ray,	  which	  they	  understand	  as	  
representing	  their	  insides,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  recognise	  it	  as	  themselves.	  	  
Paradoxically,	  it	  is	  those	  most	  immersed	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  their	  bodies,	  particularly	  those	  in	  pain,	  
who	   most	   benefit	   from	   a	   dualistic	   ways	   of	   thinking.	   Dualism	   offers	   patients	   with	   debilitating	  
conditions	  an	  avenue	  to	  exert	  a	  sense	  of	  self	  independent	  of	  their	  bodies	  which	  may	  be	  a	  source	  of	  
constant	  pain	  and	  humiliation	  for	  them.	  If	  the	  sick	  subject	   is	  to	  accept	  that	  the	  mind	  and	  body	  are	  
intermeshed,	   how	  do	   severe	   negative	   bodily	   changes	   affect	   the	   sense	   of	   self?	   (Manderson,	   2011:	  
24).	   	  Dualism	  allows	  the	  sensation	  of	  an	  un-­‐eroded	  self	  to	  the	  sick	  subject,	  (Manderson,	  2011:	  30).	  	  
Conversely,	   the	   body	   in	   this	   sense	   can	   present	   itself	   as	   a	   ‘thematic	   object’	   or	   ‘alien	   presence’,	   a	  
problem	  needing	  solving,	  (Manderson,	  2011:	  30).	  
What	  this	  unspoken	  reliance	  on	  dualistic	  thinking	  in	  modern	  medicine	  means	  is	  that	  one’s	  own	  body	  
can	  become	  increasingly	  unfamiliar	  territory.	  Within	  this	  context,	  a	  stranger	  can	  be	  the	  expert	  on	  a	  
body,	  not	  its	  owner.	  It	  is	  this	  layer	  of	  scientific	  mystification	  behind	  which	  partisan	  ideologies	  can	  so	  
effectively	  hide.	  






Chapter 2: Pain Performers, The Spectacle of Sickness	  
	  
	  It	  is	  in	  the	  world	  of	  representations	  that	  we	  manage	  our	  fear	  of	  disease,	  isolating	  it	  as	  surely	  
as	  if	  we	  had	  placed	  it	  in	  quarantine.	  But	  within	  such	  isolation,	  these	  icons	  remain	  visible	  to	  
all	  of	  us,	  proof	  that	  we	  are	  still	  whole,	  healthy,	  and	  sane;	  that	  we	  are	  not	  different,	  diseased,	  
or	  mad’	  (Gillman,	  1987:	  107).	  
This	  chapter	  investigates	  how	  the	  abject	  is	  played	  out	  through	  performance.	  Performance	  can	  refer	  
to	  acts	  design	  to	  be	  watched	  but	  also	  the	  everyday	  way	  in	  which	  we	  present	  ourselves	  to	  the	  world.	  
The	   term	   is	   used	   here	   in	   a	   very	   similar	   sense	   to	   Judith	   Butler’s	   writing	   on	   performance	   and	  
performativity	  in	  relation	  to	  gender.	  I	  have	  replaced	  the	  female	  body	  with	  the	  sick	  body.	  
Performance	  forces	  the	  unseen	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  representation.	  Physical	  and	  emotional	  pain	  need	  
to	  be	  acted	  out,	  theatrically	  and	   intimately,	  publically	  and	  privately,	  to	  draw	  others	   into	   its	  unique	  
subjectivity.	  However,	  while	  making	  bodily	  pain	  visible,	  it	  also	  demarcates	  it	  as	  abject.	  
Foucault’s	   theory	  of	   the	  Panopticon,	   a	   prison	  designed	  by	   Jeremy	  Bentham,	   is	   a	   useful	   theory	   for	  
examining	   the	   role	   of	   performance	   within	   the	  medical	   sphere.	  When	   one	   enters	   into	   the	   power	  
dynamic	   implicit	   in	   the	   doctor	   patient	   relationship,	   the	   persona	   of	   the	   patient	   becomes	   self-­‐
regulated,	   constantly	   reasserted,	   whether	   the	   authority	   figure	   is	   there	   or	   not.	   This	   idea	   will	   be	  
explored	  in	  relation	  to	  various	  ‘performances’	  of	  illness,	  from	  the	  19th	  century	  till	  today.	  
Foucault	  uses	  the	   idea	  of	  the	   ‘Panopticon’	  to	   illustrate	  his	  theory	  on	  the	  gaze.	  The	  Panopticon	   is	  a	  
circular	  prison	   in	  which	  the	   inmates	   inhabit	  the	  outer	  edge	  and	  the	  warden	  sits	   in	  the	  middle.	  The	  
edges	  are	  illuminated	  while	  the	  centre	  is	  cast	  in	  darkness.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  prisoners	  never	  know	  
when	  they	  are	  being	  watched	  and	  start	  watching	  themselves,	  self-­‐regulating.	  
	  This	   idea	   is	  equally	  applicable	   to	   the	   relationship	  between	  doctors	  and	  patients.	   Indeed	  Bentham	  
acknowledges	  how	  the	  design	  could	  be	  just	  as	  applicable	  in	  hospitals,	  and	  even	  schools.	  Subjects	  of	  
the	   health	   care	   system	   imagine	   the	   constant	   authoritarian	   medical	   gaze	   bearing	   down	   on	   them,	  
forcing	  them	  to	  constantly	  conform	  to	  the	  ‘patient’	  persona.	  The	  patient	  is	  always	  on	  the	  lower	  end	  




of	  a	  power	  dynamic,	  even	  when	  the	  other	  side	  is	  not	  present	  to	  assert	  its	  dominance,	  (MacLachlan,	  
2004:7).	  	  
The	   sense	   of	   punishment	   plays	   a	   prominent	   role	   in	   this	   allegory.	   The	   sick	   body	   is,	   or	   experiences	  
itself,	  as	  ‘illuminated’.	  Performing	  illness	  responds	  to	  the	  imaginary	  stage	  light	  cast	  on	  this	  body.	  By	  
doing	  so,	   it	  seeks	  to	   legitimise	   itself.	   It	  attempts	  to	  visualise	   its	  conditions	   in	  explanation	  of	  why	   it	  
cannot	  function	  as	  it	  is	  expected	  to.	  Performance,	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  a	  reaction	  to	  a	  fear	  of	  punishment.	  
Punishment,	  for	  a	  sick	  subject,	  could	  mean	  alienation,	  emotional	  and	  financial	  abandonment,	  being	  
fired	  from	  a	  job	  or	  being	  treated	  as	  a	  social	  abnormality.	  
The	   patient	   needs	   to	   ‘perform’	   their	   condition	   to	   their	   various	   peers	   in	   order	   to	   force	   their	  
experiences	   into	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  relatable.	  The	  audience	  are	  their	   friends,	   family,	  co-­‐workers	  and	  
the	   Panopticon	   of	   imagined	   watchers,	   (Brodwin,	   1994:	   80).	   They	   do	   this	   to	   garner	   sympathy	   or	  
provide	  explanation	  for	  their	   limited	  ability	  to	  fulfil	  expectations,	  (Good,	  Good,	  Brodwin,	  Kleinman,	  
1994:	  17).	  Because	  visual	  markers	  of	  suffering	  are	  so	  significantly	   lacking	   in	  the	  sufferer	  of	  chronic	  
pain,	   he	   or	   she	   is	   all	   the	   more	   reliant	   on	   continual	   performance	   and	   the	   limited	   expression	   of	  
language	  to	  draw	  attention	  towards	  their	  condition,	  (Good,	  Good,	  Brodwin,	  Kleinman,	  1994:	  91).	  	  
I	   have	   often	   felt	   that	   people	   expect	  me	   to	   ‘act’	   sick,	   especially	  when	   explaining	  my	   absence	   or	   a	  
particular	  behaviour	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  condition.	  In	  these	  situations,	  I	  feel	  like	  I	  am	  expected	  to	  pull	  the	  
‘pain	  face’,	  groan,	  sigh	  and	  complain	  about	  my	  ailments.	  	  If	  I	  am	  able	  to	  walk	  around	  and	  I	  sound	  and	  
look	   normal,	   how	   can	   I	   be	   sick?	   Society	   seems	   to	   like	   to	   have	   a	   visual	  mental	   appendix	   of	   what	  
certain	   illnesses	   ‘look’	   like,	   for	   instance	  the	   iconic	  baldness	  of	   the	  cancer	  patient.	   If	   such	   icons	  are	  
not	  part	  of	  your	  condition,	  you	  are	  expected	  to	  offer	  up	  alternative	  visual	  cues.	  	  
Conforming	   to	   certain	   ‘sick	   roles’	   legitimises	   the	   exemption	   from	   social	   expectations,	   both	   of	  
productivity	   and	   engagement,	   (Lupton,	   1994:	   7).	   There	   are	   various	   categories	   of	   ‘sick	   roles’.	   The	  
question,	   ‘Is	  he	  or	  she	  the	  heroic	  sufferer,	  the	  hopeless	  hypochondriac,	  or	  the	  malingerer?’	  will	  be	  
answered	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	  quality	   of	   the	   subject’s	   performance.	   	   It	   is	   up	   to	   them	   to	  prove	  
their	  status.	  Similarly	  to	  Butlerian	  gender	  performativity,	  this	  performance	  is	  reiterative,	  needing	  to	  
be	  continually	  repeated	  to	  assert	  its	  legitimacy.	  	  
The	  socially	  accepted	  ‘sick	  role’	  comes	  with	  various	  prerequisites.	  Other	  natural	  human	  qualities	  are	  
denied.	  	  The	  acceptable	  sick	  person	  is	  not	  angry	  about	  his	  or	  her	  allotment,	  but	  stoically	  accepting.	  
He	  or	  she	  is	  not	  sexual.	  That	  time	  has	  passed	  or	  is	  on	  hold	  until	  health	  returns.	  Similarly	  they	  do	  not	  




flaunt	   their	  bodies,	   they	  are	  always	  respectably	  covered.	  Above	  all,	   the	  sick	  person	  does	  not	  draw	  
attention	   to	   him	   or	   herself.	   They	   exist	   quietly	   and	   contentedly	   on	   the	   fringes	   of	   society,	   suitably	  
grateful	  when	  focus	  is	  drawn	  in	  their	  direction.	  
Pain	  never	  relates	  only	  to	  the	  sufferer.	   	  Performance	  of	  pain	  becomes	  a	  structural	  element	  in	  their	  
relationships	  with	  all	  of	  those	  around	  them,	  driven	  by	  both	  fear	  and	  desire	  to	  remain	  integrated	  in	  
the	  world	  around	  them.	  	  
By	  instantly	  articulating	  its	  difference	  from	  the	  normative,	  it	  provides	  the	  very	  boundary	  line	  behind	  
which	   it	   will	   be	   denigrated.	   This	   paradoxical	   position	   is	   examined	   below	   in	   relation	   to	   public	  
performances	  of	  pain	  from	  the	  Enlightenment	  period	  until	   the	  present,	  within	  popular	  culture	  and	  
high	  art.	  
	   	  





Sickness	  and	  Performance:	  Enlightenment	  Inclinations	  
	  
In	  Fasting	  Women,	  Living	  Skeletons	  and	  Hunger	  Artists:	  Spectacles	  of	  Body	  and	  Miracles	  at	  the	  Turn	  
of	   a	   Century,	   Sociologist	   Sigal	   Gooldin	   discusses	   the	   ‘socio-­‐symbolic’	   significance	   of	   the	   public	  
displays	  of	  the	  hunger	  artist	  in	  the	  19th	  century,	  (2003:	  28).	  Most	  significantly,	  she	  emphasises	  the	  
element	   of	   spectacle	   as	   the	   driving	   force	   behind	   these	   practices,	   (2003:	   31).	   The	   performances	  
sought	  to	  make	  the	  act	  of	  hunger	  seen.	  Gooldin	  refers	  to	  the	  ‘appeared,	  performed,	  visible,	  gazed-­‐at	  
phenomenon	  of	   fasting’,	   (2003:	  32).	  These	  semi-­‐commercialised	  performances	  evolved	  around	  the	  
spectacular	  representation	  of	  the	  body;	  the	  ‘self-­‐starving’,	  the	  ‘emaciated’	  and	  ‘the	  hungry’	  body	  at	  
a	  time	  both	  driven	  by	  the	  allure	  of	  scientific	  enquiry	  and	  nostalgic	  for	  the	  belief	  in	  miracles,	  (Gooldin,	  
2003:	  48).	  
In	  the	  middle	  ages,	  prolonged	  loss	  of	  appetite	  was	  expressed	  in	  spiritual	  terms.	  ‘Anorexia	  mirabilis’,	  
is	  the	  term	  for	  the	  medieval	  notion	  of	  a	  miraculously	  inspired	  loss	  of	  appetite,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  28).	  	  
Famous	  fasting	  women	  gained	  particular	  prominence	  during	  the	  Victorian	  era.	  Their	  public	  renown	  
was	   replaced	   by	   figures	   such	   as	   ‘living	   skeletons’	   and	   ‘hunger	   artists’	   towards	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
nineteenth	  century.	  	  
Ann	  Moore	  was	  a	  famous	  fasting	  woman	  who	  was	  known	  to	  have	  avoided	  food	  and	  drink	  for	  several	  
years.	   Her	   story	   appeared	   in	   various	   publications	   and	   her	   likeness	   was	   even	   cast	   in	   wax	   in	   the	  
Columbian	  museum	  in	  Boston,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  31).	   In	  the	  case	  of	  Sarah	  Jacob,	  a	  girl	  of	  12	   living	   in	  
Wales,	  a	  sign	  had	  to	  be	  posted	  at	  the	  train	  station	  to	  direct	  her	  many	  visitors	  to	  her	  house,	  (Gooldin,	  
2003:	  34).	  
At	   this	   time,	   two	  explanations	   competed	  with	   each	  other	   in	   terms	  of	   these	  phenomena.	   The	   first	  
was	   that	   it	   was	   a	   miracle,	   or	   spiritual	   intervention.	   This	   explanation	   harkens	   back	   to	   a	   medieval	  
preoccupation	   with	   mysticism.	   The	   second,	   espoused	   by	   the	   archetypal	   Enlightenment	   man	   of	  
science,	   insisted	   that	   these	   women	   were	   frauds	   (Gooldin,	   2003:	   33).	   These	   women,	   at	   this	   very	  
particular	  time,	  marked	  an	  uneasy	  in-­‐between	  point	  between	  sainthood	  and	  patient	  hood,	  (Gooldin,	  
2003:	  36).	  	  




‘Watchers’	  were	  often	  employed	  so	  that	  the	  woman	  was	  not	  left	  alone	  for	  any	  amount	  of	  time	  when	  
she	  may	   possibly	   eat	   or	   drink.	   Specimens	   of	   urine	  were	   routinely	   tested,	   (Gooldin,	   2003:	   34).	   Far	  
from	   imagined,	  or	   implied,	   these	  wardens	  closely	  monitored	   their	   charges.	   Journal	  articles,	  widely	  
circulated	   in	   medical	   journals,	   labelled	   these	   women	   as	   ‘imposters’,	   showing	   the	   intensity	   with	  
which	  medical	  professionals	  attempted	  to	  refute	  them,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  34).	  	  
The	  practice	  of	  ‘watching’	  seemed	  to	  respond	  to	  the	  two	  conflicting	  explanations	  mentioned	  above.	  
The	  watchers	  both	  scrutinised	  the	  woman’s	  movements	  but	  also	  marvelled	  at	  her	  abstinence.	  The	  
appeal	  of	  both	  of	  these	  types	  of	  ‘watching’	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  sheer	  numbers	  these	  performances	  
drew,	  sometimes	  hundreds	  of	  onlookers	  a	  day.	  Posters	  would	  tempt	  viewers	  to	   ‘disprove	  the	  fact’	  
and	   ‘watch	   for	   themselves’,	   (Gooldin,	   2003:	   35).	   The	   interplay	  between	  doubt	   and	  belief	   seem	   to	  
have	  been	  what	  made	  ‘watching’	  so	  appealing.	  	  
The	  following	  is	  an	  extract	  taken	  out	  of	  a	  Welsh	  News	  Paper	  in	  1870,	  on	  the	  advent	  of	  Sarah	  Jacob’s	  
death.	  Her	  death	  occurred	  after	  medical	  professionals	  were	  called	   in	   to	   ‘watch’	  her,	  ensuring	   that	  
she	   was	   not	   secretly	   taking	   in	   nourishment.	   Her	   parents	   were	   eventually	   found	   guilty	   of	  
manslaughter.	  
So	   these	   four	  skilled	  nurses	  watched	  the	  girl	   closely.	  Night	  and	  day	  did	   they	  keep	  up	   their	  
fatal	  vigil.	  The	  watching	  commenced	  at	  four	  o'clock	  in	  the	  afternoon	  of	  the	  9th	  of	  December	  
last.	  Day	  by	  day,	  and	  hour	  by	  hour,	  the	  child	  grew	  weaker	  and	  weaker,	  and	  yet	  not	  a	  morsel	  
of	   food,	   nor	   a	   drop	  of	   stimulant!	   The	  watchers	   remained	   remorselessly	   at	   their	   post;	   and	  
medical	  men	  came	  in	  and	  out	  of	  the	  dying	  girl's	  chamber,	  and	  spoke	  calmly	  and	  analytically	  
of	  her	  "altered	  appearance,"	  and	  of	  the	  "heightened	  pulse,"	  and	  of	  the	  "flushed	  face,"	  and	  of	  
the	  "peculiar	  appearance"	  of	  the	  little	  creature's	  eyes.	  She	  was	  spoken	  to	  on	  the	  14th	  by	  one	  
of	   the	  medical	  men,	   but	   "she	   did	   not	   complain."	  Not	   likely,	  with	   life	   ebbing	   away,	   as	   the	  
natural	   result	   of	   a	   five-­‐days'	   fast.	   Not	   likely,	   with	   the	   physical	   powers	   prostrate	   from	  
starvation,	   and	   the	   dreaminess	   of	   delirium	   rapidly	   setting	   in.	   She	   "did	   not	   complain,"	   and	  
they	  forgot	  she	  was	  starving.	  She	  "did	  not	  complain,"	  and	  they	  knew	  not	  that	  she	  was	  dying.	  
Well,	  on	  Thursday,	  the	  16th	  of	  December,	  the	  parents	  were	  spoken	  to.	  "Your	  daughter	  will	  
die	  if	  she	  takes	  no	  food,	  say	  the	  medical	  advisers;	  and	  still	  no	  food	  was	  forthcoming.	  Parents,	  
nurses,	   medical	   men,	   relatives	   -­‐	   all	   seemed	   influenced	   by	   the	   fatal	   fascination	   of	  
superstition,	  or	  of	  sordid	  cupidity,	  or	  of	  clumsy	  scientific	   research;	  and	  the	   little	  creature's	  
vitality	  ebbed	  away,	   slowly,	  but	   surely,	  with	   life	  and	  plenty	  within	  easy	   reach,	  and	  no	  one	  
with	  heart	  enough	  to	  give	  to	  the	  prostrate	  victim	  that	  nourishment	  which	  would	  have	  saved	  




her	  from	  death.	  But	   it	  was	  too	   late	  now.	  They	  spoke	  to	  the	   little	  sufferer	  at	  ten	  o'clock	  on	  
Friday	  morning,	  and	   "received	  no	  answer."	  The	  parents	   came	   in,	  and	   friends	  of	   the	   family	  
gathered	  around,	  and	  the	  nurses	  hovered	  about	  the	  little	  low	  bed,	  and	  all	  of	  them	  watched	  
the	  convulsive	  throes	  and	  the	  delirious	  moaning’s	  of	  the	  child	  they	  had	  killed	  between	  them.	  
Yes,	  she	  died	  at	  3	  o'clock	  in	  the	  afternoon	  of	  Friday,	  the	  17th	  of	  December	  -­‐	  just	  seven	  days	  
within	  one	  hour	  of	  the	  time	  when	  the	  fatal	  watch	  commenced,	  (Assizes	  ,1870).	  
	  
Figure	  1,	  Sarah	  Jacob,	  (1870)	  
This	  piece	  portrays	  a	  hyperbolic	  example	  of	  the	  implicit,	  dangerously	  lopsided	  power	  dynamic,	  in	  the	  
traditional	  relationship	  between	  ‘performing’	  and	  ‘watching’	  within	  a	  medial	  scenario.	  Superstitious	  
fascination	  and	  scientific	  observation	  are	  compatible	  here,	  both	  with	  each	  other	  and	  with	  a	  violently	  
oppressive	  gaze,	  in	  spite	  of	  seemingly	  diametrically	  opposed	  positions.	  	  The	  same	  dynamic	  is	  at	  play,	  
simply	  under	  different	  guises.	  This	   story	   is	  an	  allegory	  of	   the	  dangers	  of	   the	  biomedical	  approach,	  
particularly	   in	   its	   tendency	   to	   silence	   the	   patient	   by	   disregarding	   the	   subjectivity	   attached	   to	   the	  
discordant	  body.	  	  
The	   aspect	   of	   spectacle	  was	   clearer	   still	   in	   the	   19th	   century	   tradition	   of	   ‘Living	   Skeletons’.	   These	  
were	  unusually	   lean	  men	  who	  displayed	  their	  bodies	   in	  travelling	  freak	  shows,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  39).	  




These	   shows,	   ‘formally	   organized	   exhibitions	   of	   people	  with	   alleged	   and	   real	   physical,	  mental,	   or	  
behavioural	  anomalies	  for	  amusement	  and	  profit,’	  Bogdan	  in	  (Gooldin,	  2003:29).	  
The	  Living	  Skeletons	  presented	  a	  far	  more	  explicit	  example	  of	  the	  spectacle	  of	  the	  body	  than	  that	  of	  
the	  fasting	  women.	  All	  the	  spiritual	  language	  around	  the	  fasting	  women	  disappeared	  in	  this	  context.	  
The	  emphasis	  on	  secularism	  and	  the	  body	  as	  no	  more	  than	  a	  body	  seems	  evident	  both	   in	  the	  fact	  
that	  these	  were	  openly	  commercial	  ventures	  and	  that	  the	  usually	  male	  performers	  were	  often	  either	  
semi-­‐nude	  or	  dressed	  in	  body	  stockings,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  40).	  
Claude	  Seurat	  is	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  famous	  living	  skeletons.	  He	  travelled	  Europe	  in	  the1820’s	  
and	  30’s,	  even	  being	  presented	  to	  the	  British	  Royal	  family,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  40).	  Once,	  in	  Rouen,	  1500	  
people	  flocked	  to	  see	  him	  in	  one	  day.	  When	  he	  arrived	  in	  London	  in	  1925,	  he	  was	  exhibited	  in	  the	  
Pall	  Mall	  Gallery.	  Despite	   the	  half	  a	  crown	  entrance	   fee,	  which	  was	  exorbitant	  at	   the	   time,	  people	  
arrived	  in	  droves	  and	  he	  was	  soon	  a	  household	  name.	  His	  skeleton	  was	  finally	  placed	  at	  the	  museum	  
at	  the	  Royal	  College	  of	  Surgeons	  in	  London,	  (Park,	  Park,	  1991:	  1595).	  
He	  attracted	  the	  attention	  of	  two	  famous	  artists	  of	  his	  age,	  George	  Cruikshank	  and	  Francisco	  Goya,	  
who	  both	  reproduced	  his	  likeness.	  Both	  studies	  portray	  Seurat	  semi	  naked	  save	  his	  famous	  negligible	  
petticoat.	  While	   Cruikshank	   takes	   the	   semi	   scientific	   approach	   of	   portraying	   Seurat’s	   figure	   from	  
different	   vantage	   points,	   in	   order	   to	   fully	   appreciate	   the	   figure’s	   deformity,	   Goya	   focuses	   on	   the	  
sadness	  of	  the	  character,	  (Park,	  Park,	  1991:	  1595,	  1596).	  	  
	   	  








Figure	  2,	  Cruikshank.	  	  The	  Living	  Skeleton	  (1826)	  









Figure3,	  Goya,F.	  	  Claudio	  Ambrosio	  Seurat,	  (c.1826)	  
	   	  







Figure	  4,	  Claude	  Seurat,	  (c.1826)	  
The	  image	  above	  shows	  Seurat	  proudly	  showing	  off	  his	  shocking	  visage	  for	  a	  photographer.	  This	  is	  a	  
man	  who	  has	  clearly	  absorbed	  the	  curious	  gaze,	  allowed	  it	  to	  become	  part	  of	  himself.	  Every	  bit	  of	  his	  
body	  is	  twisted	  to	  best	  show	  off	  his	  famous	  skeleton.	  The	  coy	  half	  smile	  seems	  to	  denote	  pleasure.	  
He	  seems	  to	  be	  basking	  in	  the	  voyeuristic	  gaze	  cast	  upon	  him.	  
	  While	   the	   discourse	   of	   the	   divine	   had	   notably	   receded	   in	   this	   arena,	   there	   is	   still	   the	   sense	   that	  
Seurat	   excited	   a	   sense	   of	   mystery	   and	   wonder,	   perhaps	   particularly	   because	   he	   could	   not	   be	  
explained	   away	   by	   scientific	   language.	   He	   represented	   an	   example	   of	   what	   is	   external	   to	   the	  
‘natural’,	   ‘orderly’	  experience	  of	   the	  human	  body,	  an	  exhibition	  of	   the	   impossible,	   the	  bizarre	  and	  
miraculous,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  40).	  	  
While	   no	   particular	   disease	   has	   ever	   been	   identified,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   Seurat	   suffered	   from	   severe	  
skeletal	  and	  bodily	  abnormalities.	  His	  skeleton	  was	  compressed	  in	  places	  meaning	  that	  his	  heart	  was	  
significantly	   lower	   in	   the	  chest	   cavity	   than	   is	   ‘normal’.	  However	   there	   is	  no	  evidence	  on	   record	  of	  
problems	  with	  malabsorption.	  His	  emaciated	  form	  was	  more	  than	  likely	  due	  to	  very	  limited	  intake	  of	  
food,	   (Park,	   Park,	   1991:	   1594).	   It	   seems	   possible	   that	   he	   starved	   himself	   to	   better	   show	   off	   his	  
fascinatingly	  irregular	  skeleton.	  
Similarly	   ‘Hunger	  Artists’	   performed	   acts	   of	   prolonged	   starvation	   in	   cages.	   An	   unbreakable	   record	  
was	  set	  by	  an	  American	  physician	  by	  the	  name	  of	  Henry	  S.	  Tanner,	  who	  fasted	  for	  40	  days	  in	  the	  city	  




of	  New	  York	  in	  1880,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  46).	  Like	  Fasting	  Women	  and	  Living	  Skeletons,	  Hunger	  Artists	  
represented	  a	  fascination	  with	  a	  body	  poised	  between	  life	  and	  death,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  46).	  However	  
unlike	   these	  predecessors,	   the	  Hunger	  Artist	   engages	  more	  blatantly	  with	   the	  notion	  of	   suffering.	  
‘He	   had	   to	   overcome	   his	   desires	   and	  mortal	   being.	   It	   was	   this	   very	   struggle	   that	  was	   put	   on	   the	  
stage,	   just	  as	  much	  as	  the	  material	  body	  that	  was	  the	  product	  of	   it’.	  This	  aspect	  of	  the	  tradition	   is	  
beautifully	  examined	  in	  Franz	  Kafka’s	  short	  story	  The	  Hunger	  Artist,	  published	  in	  1924.	  	  
The	   story	   is	   about	   the	   fate	  of	   an	  unnamed	  Hunger	  Artist	  once	   the	  public	  passion	   for	  his	   craft	  has	  
passed.	  It	   looks	  retrospectively	  over	  his	  glory	  days	  when	  thousands	  of	  people	  used	  to	  travel	  to	  see	  
him.	  Fans	  would	  keep	  a	  constant	  vigil	  outside	  his	  cage	  to	  ensure	  he	  was	  not	  eating.	  He	  pushed	  his	  
limbs	  through	  the	  bars	  to	  be	   inspected.	  His	  only	  sadness	  was	  that	  people	  doubted	  his	  authenticity	  
and	   also	   that	   he	  was	  not	   allowed	   to	   starve	  himself	   beyond	   the	   standard	   forty	   day	  period.	  At	   this	  
point,	   in	   front	  of	  huge	   crowds,	  he	  would	  be	   led	  out	  of	  his	   specially	  decorated	   cage,	   to	  a	   specially	  
prepared	  hospital	  meal.	  He	  would	  routinely	  collapse	  on	  one	  of	  the	  girls,	  always	  selected	  to	  hold	  him	  
up	  to	  the	  public,	  and	  note	  her	  revulsion	  with	  him.	  The	  spectacle	  would	  end	  with	  the	  first	  bite	  of	  food	  
and	   a	   message	   from	   the	   event	   co-­‐ordinator,	   which	   was	   supposedly	   whispered	   in	   his	   ear	   by	   the	  
Hunger	  Artist,	  (Kafka,	  1924).	  
When	  the	  public	  interest	  in	  him	  wanes,	  he	  sells	  his	  act	  to	  a	  large	  circus	  where	  he	  is	  displayed	  outside	  
the	  main	  attraction	  tent,	  next	  to	  the	  animals.	  He	   is	   finally	  allowed	  to	  fulfil	  his	  ambition	  of	  starving	  
himself	  beyond	  the	  forty	  day	  period	  but	  now	  no	  one	  is	  interested	  enough	  to	  count	  the	  days.	  Anyone	  
intrigued	  enough	  to	  hover	  outside	  his	  cage	  is	  quickly	  shoved	  along	  by	  the	  crowd	  more	  interested	  in	  
seeing	  the	  animals.	  He	  is	  discovered	  at	  the	  point	  of	  death	  just	  because	  someone	  complained	  of	  the	  
‘empty’	  cage.	  After	  he	  is	  gone,	  a	  young	  panther	  replaces	  him,	  (Kafka,	  1924).	  
His	  life	  is	  over	  when	  he	  can	  no	  longer	  starve	  for	  an	  audience.	  
These	   figures	   may	   represent	   an	   embodied	   response	   to	   a	   moment	   of	   ‘cultural	   trauma’,	   the	  
Enlightenment	  era’s	  shift	  ‘from	  collective	  order	  to	  individualism,	  from	  Gemeinschaft	  to	  Gesellschaft,	  
(Gooldin,	  2003:43).	  These	  acts	  mark	  a	   ‘cross	  roads	   in	  history	  between	  belief	   in	  the	  miraculous	  and	  
inexplicable	   and	   the	   celebration	   of	   reason	   above	   all	   else’,	   (Gooldin,	   2003:	   38).	   They	   represent	   a	  
symbolic	  collapse	  of	  the	  miraculous	  and	  the	  mundane	  into	  one	  another,	  (Gooldin,	  2003:	  44).	  
More	   importantly,	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   argument,	   they	   represent	   a	   historically	   embedded	  
dynamic	   in	   illness	   between	   performing	   and	   watching.	   This	   time	   represents	   the	   beginning	   of	   our	  
contemporary	   approach	   to	   medicine.	   Popular	   responses	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   illness	   show	   how	   the	  




relationships	  the	  medical	  model	  set	  up	  permeated	  into	  culture.	  In	  the	  examples	  discussed	  above,	  the	  
act	  of	  watching	  the	  ill,	  the	  insistence	  that	  they	  perform	  diligently,	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  all	  its	  ghoulish	  
possibilities.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  the	  legacy	  is	  examined	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  contemporary	  high	  art.	  
	   	  





Tehching	  Hsieh,	  a	  Contemporary	  Hunger	  Artist	  
	  
Kafka’s	  story	  about	  the	  hunger	  artist	  reminds	  me	  of	  the	  work	  of	  performance	  artist	  Tehching	  Hsieh.	  
His	  ‘endurance	  performances’	  allude	  to	  the	  acknowledgement	  of	  and	  relationship	  to	  the	  ‘watchers’,	  
the	  Hunger	  Artist	  displayed.	  In	  short,	  both	  men	  severely	  limited	  their	  most	  basic	  human	  comforts	  for	  
the	  appreciation	  of	  an	  audience.	  Both	  men	  self-­‐impose	  the	  conditions	  of	  a	  prisoner.	  
Hsieh	  confined	  himself	  to	  a	  cage	  within	  his	  apartment	  from	  1978	  to	  1979.	  A	  friend	  disposed	  waste	  
and	   brought	   food	   and	   water.	   He	   did	   so	   without	   ever	   conversing	   with	   the	   artist.	   Hsieh	   was	  
completely	  cut	  off	   from	  the	  outside	  world,	  with	  no	  access	   to	  a	   telephone,	   radio	  or	   television.	  The	  
following	   year,	   he	   punched	   a	   time	   clock	   once	   per	   hour	   on	   the	  minute.	   He	   took	   a	   photograph	   of	  
himself	  every	  day.	  He	  spent	  the	  year	  between	  1981	  and	  1982	  outdoors	  in	  New	  York,	  never	  allowing	  
himself	  any	  shelter,	  equipped	  only	  with	  his	  clothes	  and	  a	  sleeping	  bag.	  	  From	  1983	  to	  1984,	  he	  was	  
tied	   to	   artist,	   Linda	   Montano,	   by	   an	   eight-­‐foot	   rope.	   They	   neither	   ever	   touched	   each	   other	   nor	  
occupied	  a	  different	   room.	  From	  1985	   to	  1986	  he	  neither	  made	  nor	   talked	  about	  art.	  He	  kept	  his	  
final	  work	  secret	  from	  1987	  to	  2000.	  Finally,	  he	  revealed	  a	  simple	  placard	  placed	  on	  an	  easel,	  reading	  
‘I	   kept	   myself	   alive’.	   Each	   work	   is	   characterised	   by	   endurance,	   depravation	   of	   stimulation,	   rest,	  
comfort	  and	  privacy.	  Each	  is	  carefully	  documented,	  (Shapiro,	  2013:	  195-­‐	  196).	  
His	   works	   are	   described	   as	   maintaining	   a	   ‘psychological	   opacity’,	   (Shapiro,	   2013:	   196).	   The	  
photographs	  that	  survive	  these	  performances	  show	  an	  expressionless,	  emotionless	  Hsieh	  in	  contrast	  
to	  the	  extremity	  of	  the	  situations	   in	  which	  he	  places	  himself.	  One	  may	  assume	  that	  such	  scenarios	  
may	   draw	   one’s	   subjectivity	   to	   the	   surface	   but	   Hsieh	   denies	   his	   audience	   any	   access	   to	   the	  
emotional	  trauma	  he	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  experiencing.	  
Hsieh	  work	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  allegories	  on	  the	  universal	  conditions	  of	  alienation,	  
meaningless	   labour,	   and	   notions	   of	   ‘home’.	   The	   performances	   have	   been	   drawn	   into	   both	   post	  
structural	   and	  Marxist	   discourses.	   They	   are	   said	   to	   take	   on	   subjects	   as	   divergent	   as	   race,	   gender,	  
immigration,	   the	   labour	   force,	  homelessness	  and	   incarceration.	  Hsieh	  himself	   is	  consistently	  vague	  
when	  asked	  to	  account	  for	  his	  work’s	  meaning,	  (Shapiro,	  2013:197-­‐198).	  This	  multitude	  of	  projected	  
meanings	   is	   possible	   because	   of	   the	   impenetrability	   of	   the	   surface	   which	   he	   so	   stoically	   and	  
unfathomably	  maintains.	  




Hsieh’s	   famous	   vacancy	   exposes	   the	   shortcomings	   of	   the	   ‘surface’.	   It	   shows	   how	   an	   image,	   or	  
images,	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  express	  the	  entirety	  of	   its	  subject.	  The	  extraordinary	  emotional	  depth	  
to	  these	  scenarios	   is	  hinted	  at	  but	  never	  presented	  for	   inspection.	   In	  this	  way,	  they	  are	  beautifully	  
frustrating.	  We	  desperately	  want	   to	  know	  how	  he	   is	   feeling,	  what	  effect	  his	   imposed	  alienation	   is	  
having	  on	  him.	  	  
Like	  the	  hunger	  artist,	  Hsieh	  is	  performing	  for	  an	  audience,	  in	  this	  case,	  it	  is	  the	  art	  world.	  He	  exploits	  
the	  paradox	  of	   the	  visually	  dependent	  acts	  of	  watching	  and	  performing	  with	  the	  unseen	  nature	  of	  
pain.	  Both	  figures	  seem	  to	  have	  something	  to	  prove,	  with	  both	   it	   is	  unclear	  what	  this	   is.	   In	  Hsieh’s	  
case,	  it	  seems	  intentionally	  ambivalent.	  	  Both	  cases	  leave	  the	  watcher	  fascinated	  by	  the	  question	  of	  
why	  anyone	  would	  do	  this	  to	  themselves.	  	  
Stepping	   back	   from	   the	   particulars	   of	   Hsieh’s	   project,	   these	   performances	   may	   seem	   like	   a	  
contemporary	  manifestation	  of	  Enlightenment	  acts	  of	  public	   suffering,	  discussed	  above.	  While	   the	  
dynamic	  may	  being	  consciously	  engaged,	  even	  questioned,	  it	  is	  still	  maintained.	  
	   	  







Figure	  5,	  Hsieh,	  T,	  	  Cage	  Piece,	  (1978-­‐9)	  
	  
Figure	  6,	  Hsieh,	  T,	  	  Time	  Clock	  Piece,	  (1980-­‐1981)	  
	   	  





Hannah	  Wilke,	  Performing	  or	  conforming?	  
	  
The	  previous	  section	  established	  the	  tradition	  of	  a	  close	  relationship	  between	  sickness	  and	  watching	  
in	  the	  public	  arena.	  Contemporary	  body	  artists	  who	  deal	  with	  illness	  can,	  arguably,	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  
this	  legacy.	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  following	  discussions	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  continuation	  of	  this	  tradition;	  
the	  displaying	  of	  bodies	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  spectacle.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  undermine,	  or	  even	  really	  critique	  
the	  body	  artists	  of	  the	  20th	  and	  21st	  century,	  but	  rather	  simply	  to	  consider	  their	  legacy	  through	  this	  
lens.	  It	  looks	  at	  the	  visual	  politics	  within	  an	  art	  historical	  context	  of	  being	  ‘seen’	  as	  possessing	  a	  sick	  
body.	  	  	  
Hannah	  Wilke	  proudly	  asserts	  her	  position	  as	  being	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  ‘normality’.	  This	  is	  a	  strategy	  of	  
resistance	   against	   a	   system	   of	   representation	   that	   would	   rather	   ignore	   her.	   Her	   work	   insistently,	  
irreverently	  rejects	  the	  ‘sick	  roles’	  that	  would	  have	  legitimised	  her	  within	  society.	  	  
Hannah	  Wilke’s	  work	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  ‘feminist	  organic	  abstraction’.	  In	  the	  1970s	  she	  began	  
to	  incorporate	  the	  vagina-­‐reminiscent	  sculptural	  forms	  she	  had	  been	  exploring	  in	  the	  1960s	  with	  her	  
own	   body.	   In	   a	   feminist	   reinvigoration	   of	   the	   traditionally	   male-­‐dominated,	   female-­‐objectifying	  
realm	   of	   sculpture,	   she	   made	   irreverent	   use	   of	   sexually	   evocative	   materials	   such	   as	   latex	   and	  
chewing	  gum	  in	  works	  that	  were	  as	  playful	  as	  they	  were	  provocative,	  (Pollock,	  2010:	  34).	  She	  makes	  
a	   spirited	  mess	  of	   patriarchal	   delineations	  between	  both	   various	  mediums,	   incorporating	  many	  at	  
once,	   and	  distinctions	  between	  high	   and	   low	  art,	   shamelessly	   re-­‐enacting	  popular	   fantasies	   about	  
the	  female	  body	  in	  the	  hallowed	  gallery	  space.	  
Wilke	  addresses	  the	  role	  of	  woman	  in	  art	  as	  ‘prisoners	  of	  an	  idealisation’	  (Frascina,	  2014).	  Insisting	  
that	   female	   bodies	   need	   not	   be	   reduced	   to	   sites	   of	   exploitation,	   but	   could	   rather	   act	   as	   sites	   of	  
subversion,	  she	  wished	  to	   ’revalue	  the	  denigrated	  cunt',	   (Naryvey,	  2002:133)	  (Frascina,	  2014).	   	   In	   I	  
object,	  Wilke	  poses	  naked	  against	  a	  boulder	  in	  two	  separate	  adjoining	  images,	  as	  if	  for	  the	  cover	  of	  a	  
book.	   The	   title	   itself	   shows	   the	   ‘creative	   ambivalence’	   of	   the	   piece.	   While	   the	   ‘I’	   stands	   for	   the	  
subjective,	   ‘object’	  necessarily	   implies	   the	  opposite.	  Together	   the	  words	   ‘I	  object’	  mean	  a	  protest,	  
contradicted	   by	   the	   seeming	   complicity	   of	   her	   body	   in	   the	   photograph.	   In	   this	   way,	   Wilke	  
acknowledges	  the	  precarious	  position	  she	  chooses	  to	  inhabit,	  stepping	  into	  the	  realm	  of	  patriarchal	  
desire	   in	   order	   to	   destabilise	   it.	   The	   angle	   of	  Wilkes	   body,	   the	   prominence	   of	   her	   genitals	   clearly	  




references	   Courbet’s	   1866	   Origin	   of	   the	   World.	   The	   painting	   was	   destined	   to	   belong	   first	   to	   a	  
collector	   of	   erotic	   imagery	   and	   later	   to	   the	   famous	   psychoanalyst	   and	   theorist,	   Jacques	   Lacan,	  
(Frascina,	  2014).	  Her	  pose	  is	  most	  reminiscent	  of	  Duchamp’s	  reimaging	  of	  the	  Courbet’s	  work	  Etant	  
Donnes,	  1946–1966.	   Importantly,	   in	  Wilke’s	   image,	  there	   is	  a	  human	  being	  attached	  to	  the	  vagina.	  
Making	   visual	   references	   to	   a	  works	   rendered	   by	   and	   owned	  by	   famously	   patriarchal	   figures,	   this	  
series	  challenges	  traditions	  of	  male	  objectifications	  of	  sexual	  parts	  of	  women's	  bodies	  rendered	  as	  
anonymous	  commodities’,	  (Frascina,	  2014).	  	  
	  
Figure	  7,	  Wilke,	  H.	  	  I	  Object,	  (1977-­‐	  1978)	  
	   	  




Her	   final	  series,	   ‘Intra-­‐Venus’,	  1992	  chronicles	   the	  demise	  of	  her	   famously	  beautiful	  body,	   through	  
the	  ravages	  of	  cancer	  and	  chemotherapy.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  8,	  Wilke,	  H.	  Intra-­‐Venus,	  Installation	  Shot	  (1995)	  





Figure	  9,	  Wilke,	  H.	  	  Intra-­‐Venus,	  (1992)	  
In	  the	  image	  above,	  Wilke	  revisits	  her	  contemplations	  of	  the	  glamorous	  female	  body	  in	  art.	  This	  time	  
around	   though,	  while	   the	  posture	   is	   reminiscent	  of	   glamour	  models	   and	   classical	  Venus	   figures	   in	  
contrapposto,	  her	  body	  is	  no	  longer	  the	  idealised,	  canonised	  female	  form.	  Her	  mottled	  skin,	  hairless	  
body	  and	  swollen	  limbs	  and	  stomach	  are	  shocking	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  radiantly	  healthy	  body	  in	  
her	  earlier	  works.	  In	  this	  work	  Wilke	  refuses	  the	  classical	  cancer	  patient’s	  role;	  silent,	  meek	  and	  post-­‐
sexual.	  Simultaneously,	  she	  addresses	  the	  instability	  of	  her	  body	  as	  a	  site	  for	  the	  projection	  of	  desire.	  
Looked	  at	  in	  its	  entirety,	  in	  some	  ways	  as	  a	  chronicle	  of	  a	  beautiful	  body,	  her	  work	  seems	  to	  say,	  ‘this	  
beauty	  is	  exquisitely	  fragile,	  death	  is	  an	  unavoidable	  reality	  and	  it	  may	  be	  just	  around	  the	  corner’.	  
However,	   I	   cannot	   help,	   when	   looking	   at	   this	   image,	   of	   being	   irresistibly	   reminded	   of	   the	   early	  
photograph	  of	  Claude	  Seurat,	   languishing	  on	  his	  chaise	   lounge,	  displaying	  his	  gorgeously	  abnormal	  
body	  for	  the	  pleasure	  of	  onlookers,	  beautifully	  dying	  for	  his	  spectators’	  pleasure.	  	  There	  is	  the	  very	  
real	   danger	   that	   these	   images	   will	   appeal	   to	   a	   ghoulish	   fascination	   with	   otherness.	   A	   fascination	  
attested	  to	  by	  Hollywood’s	  continuous	  production	  of	  visually	  consumable	  physical	  strangeness.	   	  To	  




dismiss	  this	  work	  as	  simply	  indulgently	  voyeuristic	  is	  far	  too	  simple.	  Certainly	  there	  is	  something	  of	  
the	  abject	  at	  play	  here,	  which	  allows	  itself	  to	  be	  seen	  and	  cornered	  off.	  
Wilke,	  as	  a	  site	  of	  the	  grotesque,	  is	  now	  structured	  through	  the	  constructed	  corporeality	  in	  
the	  viewer’s	  imagination.	  This	  imagined	  grotesqueness	  instils	  a	  fear	  of	  life	  rather	  than	  a	  fear	  
of	  death.	  It	  threatens	  the	  body	  with	  a	  loss	  of	  identity,	  it	  distorts	  size	  and	  shape,	  and	  above	  
all,	  it	  sets	  in	  motion	  a	  fragmentation	  of	  order,	  (Naryvey,	  2002:19).	  
In	  her	  famous	  essay	  ‘Art	  in	  America’,	  on	  female	  body	  art,	  Lucy	  Lippard	  acknowledges	  Wilke’s	  aims	  to	  
subvert	  the	  subject/object	  relationship	  of	  the	  female	  form	  in	  representation.	  However	  she	  warned	  
that,	   like	  many	   female	  artists	   in	   this	  arena,	  Wilke	  had,	   instead	  of	  avoiding	  self-­‐exploitation,	   rather	  
confused	   her	   ‘roles	   as	   beautiful	   woman	   and	   artist,	   as	   flirt	   and	   feminist’,	   resulting,	   at	   times	   in	  
‘politically	  ambiguous	  manifestations’,	  (Frascina,	  2014).	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  this	  does	  not	  only	  apply	  
to	   her	   self-­‐	   representation	   as	   a	   woman,	   but	   also,	   later	   in	   life,	   as	   a	   sick	   subject.	   It	   is	   difficult	   to	  
ascertain	   whether	   stepping	   into	   traditionally	   repressive	   forms	   of	   representation	   unsettles	   and	  
subverts	  or	  simply	  reinforces	  its	  power.	  
I	  return	  here,	  to	  the	  scheme	  of	  the	  Panaopticon.	  Perhaps	  Tehching	  Hsieh	  and	  Hannah	  Wilke	  
attempted	  to	  illuminate	  the	  darkened	  space	  of	  the	  wardens	  through	  their	  work.	  By	  drawing	  the	  
‘watchers’	  into	  their	  space	  on	  their	  terms,	  they	  complicate	  the	  power	  dynamic	  implicit	  in	  the	  
concept.	  However	  whether	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  Panopticon	  is	  peopled,	  illuminated	  or	  left	  in	  darkness,	  
the	  ideological	  structure	  that	  the	  metaphor	  outlines,	  is	  unaffected.	  The	  sick	  bodies	  remain	  brightly	  
lit,	  on	  the	  outskirts	  of	  the	  circle,	  in	  the	  space	  demarcated	  for	  them	  to	  perform	  their	  own	  abjection.	  
	  
	   	  






Chapter 3: Work from the ‘Half Light’	  
	  
This	  chapter	  introduces	  my	  own	  art	  making	  process,	  which	  is	  the	  practical	  component	  to	  this	  written	  
work.	  My	  artistic	  production	  is	  a	  reaction	  against	  the	  legacy	  of	  imagery	  surrounding	  the	  sick	  subject.	  
It	  attempts	  to	  inhabit	  and	  stretch	  out	  the	  historically	  tight	  gap	  between	  seeing	  and	  knowing	  within	  
this	  context.	  Communication	  between	  image	  and	  onlooker	  is	  not	  abandoned	  but	  rather	  the	  meaning	  
which	  is	  communicated	  is	  multifarious,	  contradictory	  and	  visceral.	  
Chapter	  1	  established	  a	   link	  between	   language,	   visual	   and	  written,	   and	   the	   containment	  of	   illness	  
within	   the	  notion	  of	   the	  abject.	   It	  destabilised	   the	  historical	   relationship	  between	  what	   is	   seen	  on	  
and	  in	  the	  body	  and	  what	  can	  be	  known	  about	  it.	  Chapter	  2	  established	  a	  legacy	  of	  how	  abjection	  is	  
‘written’	   into	   society	   through	   the	   reiterative	   process	   of	   performing	   itself.	   It	   also	   explores	   an	  
ingrained	   tendency	   in	   sick	   subjects	   to	   feel	   the	   responsibility	   to	   perform	   their	   own	   abjection.	   This	  
chapter	   outlines	   an	   alternative	   symbolic	   space	   from	  which	   abjection	   can	  be	   expressed	   artistically.	  
The	   works	   of	   William	   Burroughs	   and	   Lygia	   Clark	   offer	   unconventional	   approaches	   to	   the	   use	   of	  
language	  which	  meaningfully	  renegotiates	  how	  the	  communication	  of	  pain	  can	  function.	  	  	  
I	  will	  relate	  these	  practices	  to	  the	  philosophies	  of	  art	  therapy,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  bio-­‐psychological	  model	  
which	   specifically	   defines	   itself	   against	   the	   biomedical	   model.	   These	   discussions	   will	   provide	   the	  
psychological	  and	  theoretical	  framework	  through	  which	  my	  own	  practice	  can	  be	  understood.	  
	   	  





Alternative	  Discourses	  to	  the	  ‘Biomedical	  Model’	  
	  
‘Imagination	  is	  the	  natural	  correlate	  for	  pain’,	  (Scarry,	  1987:161,	  162).	  
The	  Biomedical	  approach	  is	  antithetical	  to	  the	  imagination.	  One	  insists	  on	  clarity	  and	  certainty,	  the	  
other	   on	   infinite	   possibility.	   How	   then,	   can	   pain,	   as	   a	   medical	   irregularity,	   be	   treated	   within	   the	  
playgrounds	  of	  the	  imagination?	  
Pain	  is	  unique	  amongst	  bodily	  sensations	  because	  it	  has	  no	  object	  in	  the	  world	  external	  to	  the	  body,	  
(Scarry,	  1987:161,	  162).	  ‘…	  Desire	  is	  desire	  of	  x,	  fear	  is	  fear	  of	  y,	  hunger	  is	  hunger	  for	  z;	  but	  pain	  is	  
not	   ‘of’	   or	   ‘for’	   anything-­‐	   it	   is	   itself	   alone’,	   (Scarry,	   1987:161,	   162).	   Similarly	   and	   inversely,	  
imagination	   is	   definable	   as	   all	   object	   without	   specific	   sensation.	   (Scarry,	   1987:	   162).	   There	   is	   no	  
particular	   bodily	   feeling	   that	   accompanies	   imagination;	   rather	   the	   objects	   that	   the	   imagination	  
conjures	  up	  may	  induce	  certain	  feelings.	  Imagination	  can	  provide	  ‘objects’	  onto	  which	  pain	  can	  hook	  
itself.	  For	  this	  reason,	  they	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  ‘natural	  correlates’.	  	  
The	  late	  twentieth,	  and	  early	  twenty	  first	  century,	  have	  been	  marked	  by	  emerging	  discourses	  which	  
recognise	  the	  potential	  for	  models	  of	  healing	  which	  are	  imaginative	  rather	  than	  simply	  mechanical,	  
(Lupton,	  1994:	  56).	  Biomedical	  claims	  of	  scientific	  objectivity	  and	  political	  neutrality	  are	  increasingly	  
challenged.	  Foucault’s	  argument,	  outlined	  in	  chapter	  1,	  highlights	  the	  bio-­‐medical	  model’s	  denial	  of	  
its	   position	   as	   a	   discourse,	   the	   conflation	   between	   seeing	   and	   understanding	   and	   the	   inherently	  
lopsided	   power	   dynamic	   between	   doctor	   and	   patient.	   The	   ‘bio-­‐psychological’	   model	   has	   been	  
designed	  around	  addressing	  these	  concerns.	  	  
Arthur	  Kleinman,	  Harvard	  psychiatrist	  and	  anthropologist,	   is	  a	  particularly	  prolific	  champion	  of	   the	  
‘biopsychological	  model’.	  Kleinman	  insists	  that	  ‘bio-­‐medical	  model’	  is	  inherently	  inefficient	  because	  
of	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  ‘biological	  reductionism’	  (1962:	  6).	  He	  insists	  that,	  with	  the	  symptoms-­‐based	  
modern	  western	  approach,	  the	  patient	  is	  significant	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  science	  (Kleinman,	  1962:	  52).	  	  
Biomedicine,	  which	  only	  considers	  the	  biological	  dimension	  of	  suffering,	  arguably	  only	  addresses	  a	  
fraction	  of	  the	  problem.	  He	  demonstrates	  how	  a	  disturbance	  in	  the	  body	  is	  experienced	  far	  beyond	  
itself	  by	  distinguishing	  the	  meaning	  making	  processes	  on	  various	  strata’s	  of	  experience,	  (Kleinman,	  




1962:	   4-­‐6).	   These	   spaces	   are	   shown	   to	   be	   vastly	   divergent,	   almost	   unrelated,	   by	   being	   assigned	  
different	  titles.	  	  
‘Illness’	  is	  the	  patient’s	  lived	  experience	  of	  his	  or	  her	  symptoms.	  It	  is	  both	  personal	  and	  cultural.	  Only	  
the	   patient	   really	   appreciates	   the	   daily	   complications	   and	   indignities	   that	   accompany	   their	  
symptoms.	   However,	   the	   patient	   also	   learns	   how	   to	   experience	   and	   communicate	   his	   or	   her	  
suffering	  according	  to	  cultural	  norms.	  This	  is	  evidenced	  by	  the	  cultural	  specificity	  of	  certain	  gestures	  
and	  expressions	  that	  regularly	  accompany	  bodily	  complaints,	  (Kleinman,	  1962:	  10-­‐11).	  In	  Nigeria,	  	  a	  
headache	  is	  described	  as	  ants	  crawling	  through	  one’s	  skull,	  while	  in	  the	  West	  the	  head	  is	  described	  
as	  ‘splitting’	  or	  ‘throbbing’,	  (Kleinman,	  1962:15,	  16).	  
‘Disease’	  is	  how	  ‘illness’	  is	  recreated	  by	  Western	  medical	  practices.	  The	  layering	  implicit	  in	  the	  idea	  
of	   ‘illness’,	   is	   replaced	   by	   the	   sole	   concern	   with	   the	   functioning	   of	   the	   body.	   ‘Disease’	   is	   what	  
medical	  practitioners	  are	  trained	  to	  isolate	  from	  the	  mess	  of	  information	  each	  client	  presents,	  within	  
the	  parameters	  of	   their	  particular	   specialisation	   (Kleinman,	  1962:	  6).	   	  Under	   this	  model,	  body	  and	  
disease	  become	  ‘its’,	  separate	  from	  the	  subject.	  
	  ‘Sickness’	   refers	   to	   the	   political,	   social	   and	   economical	   way	   disorders	   are	   understood	   (Kleinman,	  
1962:	  6).	  An	  epidemic	  may	  be	  constructed	  as	  the	  evidence	  of	  some	  failing	   in	  society.	  Terms	   like	   ‘a	  
plague’	  infer	  ideas	  of	  punishment	  for	  social	  evils.	  
Within	  the	  sphere	  of	  ‘disease’,	  the	  psychological	  effects	  of	  illness	  are	  also	  often	  overlooked.	  The	  bio-­‐
medical	  model	  does	  not	  consider	  behavioural	  and	  social	  disorders	  that	  can	  result	  from	  long	  periods	  
of	  pain,	  (Kleinman,	  1962:	  7,57).	  Many	  illnesses	  lead	  to	  demoralising	  and	  humiliating	  bodily	  disorders.	  
One	  may	  lose	  control	  over	  one’s	  digestive	  processes;	  one	  may	  be	  visually	  disfigured	  or	  perhaps	  be	  
too	  exhausted	  to	  perform	  the	  everyday	  expectations	  they	  used	  to	  fulfil.	  A	  mourning	  period	  for	  the	  
body	  as	  it	  used	  to	  be,	  may	  be	  necessary,	  (Kleinman,	  1962:	  46-­‐8).	  	  Certain	  conditions	  lead	  inevitably	  
to	   social	  exclusion,	  either	  because	  of	  physical	   restrictions	  or	   stigma.	  An	   integrated	  appreciation	  of	  
the	  patient’s	  personal	  life,	  culture	  and	  symptoms	  is	  necessary	  to	  break	  the	  cycle	  of	  helplessness	  that	  
the	  bio-­‐medical	  model	  promotes.	  
Kleinman	  promotes	  the	  ‘biopsychological’	  model	  which	  reconstructs	  disease	  as	  the	  ‘embodiment	  of	  
the	  symbolic	  network	   linking	  body,	  self	  and	  society	  (Kleinman,	  1962:	  6).	  He	  emphasises	  the	  role	  of	  
storytelling	  as	  a	  form	  of	  treatment,	  (Kleinman,	  1962:	  26).	  Storytelling	  presupposes	  a	  more	  mediated	  
interaction	   between	   doctor	   and	   patient,	   undermining	   the	   potential	   for	   ‘aloof	   scientific	   hubris’,	  
(Kleinman,	  1962:	  228).	  Storytelling	  bridges	   the	  gulf	   that	  dualism	  sets	  up	  between	  self	  and	  body.	   It	  




can	  allow	  for	  a	  degree	  of	  creative	  distance	  from	  the	  painful	  experience	  that	  promotes	  the	  sensation	  
of	   containment,	   (Kleinman,	  1962:	  49).	   It	   gives	   shape	   to	  pain,	   constructs	   it	   in	   terms	  of	  a	  biography	  
that	  is	  meaningful	  to	  the	  patient	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  personal,	  cultural	  and	  social	  ideologies,	  (Kleinman,	  
1962:	  49)	  (Good,	  Good,	  Brodwin,	  Kleinman,	  1994:	  31).	  	  
Art	   Therapy	   is	   an	   excellent	   example	   of	   how	   the	   bio-­‐psychological	   model	   can	   be	   translated	   into	  
practice.	  Art	  Therapy	  rejects	  grand	  narratives	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘objective	  truth’	  in	  favour	  of	  multiple,	  
layered,	   fractured,	   contingent	   stories.	   Fact	   is	   no	   more	   meaningful	   than	   fictions,	   disciplines	   and	  
cultures	   are	   treated	  without	   hierarchy	   and	   history	   is	   variable	   and	   re-­‐creatable,	   (Alter-­‐Muri,	   Klein,	  
2011	  82).	  It	  privileges	  dialogue	  and	  engagement	  over	  final	  product,	  (Alter-­‐Muri,	  Klein,	  2011:	  82).	  	  
In	   the	   biomedical	   model,	   the	   body	   of	   the	   subject	   is	   the	   ‘passive	   tablet	   on	   which	   the	   disorder	   is	  
inscribed’,	  Susan	  Bordo,	  1993	  in	  (Lane,	  1975).	  In	  art	  therapy,	  both	  subject	  and	  body	  are	  imbued	  with	  
agency	   in	   the	  act	  of	  creating.	  The	  therapist’s	  main	  role	   is	   to	  aid	  and	  encourage	  their	  clients	   to	  tell	  
their	  stories,	   (Alter-­‐Muri,	  Klein,	  2011:	  85).	   In	  this	  way	  patient	  and	  therapist	  do	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  
traditional	   doctor	   patient	   dynamic	   in	   which	   one	   interprets	   the	   other	   from	   a	   position	   of	   superior	  
knowledge	   and	   power.	   The	   artistic	   outcomes	   of	   an	   art	   therapy	   session	   are	   better	   understood	   as	  
imaginative	  play	  rather	  than	  manifestations	  of	  pathology,	  (Alter-­‐Muri,	  Klein,	  2011:	  84).	  
The	  artists	  discussed	  in	  the	  following	  sections	  are	  British	  beat	  generation	  writer	  William	  Burroughs	  
and	  Latin	  American,	  body	  and	  performance	  artist,	  Lygia	  Clark.	  These	  artists	  were	  not	  art	  therapists	  
or	  art	  therapy	  patients.	  Rather	  they	  display	  a	  philosophical	  affinity	  with	  the	  tenants	  of	  art	  therapy.	  
Both	  artists	  reject	  the	  cerebral	  formalised	  use	  of	  language	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  emotive	  bodily	  one.	  Both	  
present	  an	  artistic	   ‘surface’	  which	  acts	  as	  a	  meeting	  place	  where	  multiple	  subjectivities	  are	  free	  to	  
express	   their	   internal	   experiences.	   Both	   use	   metaphorical	   language.	   This	   language	   is	   particularly	  
powerful	   because	   it	   cannot	   be	   entirely	   interpreted.	   The	   metaphors	   are	   personal	   and	   specific	   in	  
contrast	  to	  the	  totalising	  examples	  discussed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  work	  of	  Susan	  Sontag.	  	  
	  
	   	  





William	  Burroughs,	  Word	  as	  Virus	  
	  
The	   impulse	   to	   contextualise	  my	  water	   colour	   and	   pen	   drawings	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   famous	  murder,	  
heroin	   junkie	   and	   literary	   genius,	   William	   Burroughs	   may	   seem	   strange.	   However	   his	   irreverent	  
absurdist	  use	  of	  language	  emotionally	  correlates	  to	  what	  I	  am	  trying	  to	  achieve	  through	  drawing.	  A	  
sense	  of	  a	  story	  manages	  to	  emerge	  despite	  only	  the	  loosest	  reference	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  syntax.	  	  These	  
‘stories’	  are	  never	  linear.	  It	  is	  impossible	  to	  retell	  them	  in	  your	  own	  words.	  The	  subject	  of	  the	  story	  is	  
the	  particular	  emotive,	  bodily	  use	  of	   language,	  over	  and	  above	   the	   characters	  and	  occurrences	   to	  
which	  his	  words	  so	  precariously	  relate.	  
For	  Burroughs,	  language	  is	  not	  only	  a	  bridge	  over	  the	  impossible	  gulf	  between	  self	  and	  other,	  but	  an	  
addictive,	  degenerating	  and	  restrictive	  necessity	  which	   inscribes	  us	  with	  the	  agendas	  of	  others.	   	   In	  
his	  writing,	  language	  is	  more	  significant	  for	  what	  it	  obscures	  and	  hides	  as	  for	  what	  it	  communicates,	  
(Breu,	  2011:	  203).	  	  
In	  Nova	  Express,	  Burroughs	  wrote	   ‘Word	  begets	   image	  and	   image	   is	  virus’	   (Breu,	  2011:	  48).	   Like	  a	  
virus,	   language	   reorganises	   who	   we	   are	   from	   the	   inside.	   While	   promising	   to	   provide	   access	   to	  
‘reality’,	  what	  it	  offers	  instead	  is	  a	  manipulated	  lens	  that	  controls	  how	  and	  what	  we	  ‘see’.	  ‘Reality	  is	  
apparent	  because	  you	  live	  and	  believe	  in	  it.	  What	  you	  call	  ‘reality’	  is	  a	  complex	  network	  of	  necessary	  
formulae…	  association	   lines	  of	  word	  and	   image	  presenting	  a	  pre-­‐recorded	  word	  and	   image	   track’,	  
Burroughs	  in	  (Breu,	  2011:	  204).	  
Similarly	   he	   compares	   language	   with	   ‘junk’.	   Language/	   Junk	   is	   the	   ‘ultimate	   commodity,	   a	   super	  
addictive	  drug	  that	   interacts	  directly	  with	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  body,	  reshaping	  and	  reorganising	   it	  
on	  a	  microcellular	  level’,(Breu,	  2011:	  210).	  	  
Providing	  a	  contemporary	  voice	  to	  the	  writings	  of	  Foucault,	  he	  described	  it	  as,	  ‘a	  viral	  yet	  necessary	  
imposition	   on	  material	   life,	   a	   system	   of	   social	   control	   structuring	   our	   very	   conception	   of	   reality’,	  
(Breu,	  2011:	  204).	  Foucault	  believed	  that	  language	  creates	  rather	  than	  reflects	  the	  way	  we	  think	  and	  
live.	  Burroughs	  pushes	  this	  idea	  to	  a	  hyperbolic	  and	  absurd	  place,	  with	  descriptions	  of	  bodies	  which	  
absorb	  other	  bodies	  in	  moments	  of	  pure	  need	  for	  Language/Junk,	  (Kahn,	  2001:295).	  




Burroughs	  novels	   are	  written	   ‘as	  much	   against	   language	   as	   inevitably	  within	  or	   through	   it’,	   (Breu,	  
2011:	  48).	   In	   this	  way	  he	   ‘fights	  back’	  against	   language	  and	   thereby	  constitutes	  a	  new	  reality.	  The	  
traditional	  dynamic	  between	  signifier	  and	  signified	  is	  destabilised,	  very	  often	  there	  is	  a	  proliferation	  
of	  the	  former	  with	  only	  the	  vaguest	  sense	  of	  the	   latter.	  There	   is	  an	   impression	  both	  of	  excess	  and	  
terrible	  lack.	  The	  rush	  and	  tumble	  of	  words	  are	  dissonantly	  lonely	  in	  their	  defiant	  opacity.	  	  
Burroughs	   demonstrated	   his	   irreverence	   to	   language	   through	   the	   ‘cut	   up	   technique’,	   which	   he	  
developed	  along	  with	  painter	  Brian	  Gysin.	  	  They	  cut	  up	  newspapers,	  Homer	  and	  the	  Bible,	  creating	  
poems	  out	  of	  the	  rearranged	  pieces.	  This	  process	  allowed	  for	  a	  new	  outlet	  for	  the	  ‘rapid-­‐	  fire,	  free	  
associating’	  use	  of	   language	  that	  Burroughs	  strived	  for,	   (Grauerholz,	  1998:	  120).	   Importantly,	  none	  
of	  the	  words	  or	  phrasing	  were	  his	  own.	  Through	  these	  practices,	  new	  words	  emerged	  and	  meanings	  
changed	  and	  mingled	  with	  each	  other	  in	  unexpected	  ways.	  Language	  is	  turned	  against	  itself	  through	  
this	  process	  of	  simultaneous	  destruction	  and	  creation.	  
This	  technique	  was	  to	   inform	  most	  of	  his	   later	  work,	  namely	  the	   ‘Cut-­‐up	  trilogy’	  comprising	  of	  The	  
Soft	  Machine,	  The	  Ticket	  That	  Exploded	  and	  Nova	  Express,	  1961-­‐	  1968.	  In	  these	  works	  he	  revisited,	  
destroyed	  and	  reconfigured	  everything	  he	  had	  written	  before.	  	  
This	   process	  meant	   ‘turning	   in’	   on	   himself	   and	   his	   practice,	   already	   so	   inherently	   and	   structurally	  
self-­‐reflexive,	  (Grauerholz,	  1998:	  179).	  Emphatically,	  it	  reflected	  his	  experience	  of	  a	  long	  addiction	  to	  
heroin.	  Drugs	  can	  both	  devastate	  one’s	  body	  and	  create	  altered	  states	  in	  which	  the	  body	  appears	  to	  
morph	   into	   extraordinary	   new	   configurations.	   Language	   and	   body	   become	   unstable	   amorphous	  
entities.	  The	  writing	  reflects	  not	  only	  the	  disjointed	  reality	  of	  a	  drug	  trip	  but	  also	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  
body	  that	  is	  ‘fragmented,	  perforated	  and	  reformed’	  (Breu,	  2011:	  206).	  
The	  following	  extract	   from	  The	  Soft	  Machine,	  1961	   is	  an	  example	  of	   the	  slippery	   linguistic	  mess	  of	  
banality	  and	  terror,	  perversion	  and	  poetry	  that	  this	  technique	  generated.	  
‘What	  do	  you	  get	  out	  of	  all	  of	  this?’	  I	  ask	  bluntly.	  
‘	  A	  smell	  I	  always	  get	  when	  their	  eyes	  pop	  out’-­‐	  The	  boy	  looked	  at	  me	  his	  mouth	  a	  little	  open	  
showing	  	  the	  whitest	  teeth	  this	  Private	  Eye	  ever	  saw-­‐	  naval	  uniform	  buttoned	  in	  the	  wrong	  
holes	   quilted	   with	   sea	   mist	   and	   powder	   smoke,	   smell	   of	   chlorine,	   rum	   and	   mouldy	  
jockstraps-­‐	   and	   probably	   a	   narcotics	   agent	   is	   hiding	   in	   the	   spare	   stateroom	   that	   is	   always	  
locked-­‐	  There	  are	  stairs	  to	  the	  attic	  room	  he	  looked	  out	  of	  and	  his	  mother	  moving	  around-­‐	  
dead	  she	  was	  they	  say-­‐	  dead-­‐	  with	  such	  hair	  too-­‐	  red.	  




‘Where	  do	  you	  feel	  it?’	  I	  prodded.	  
‘All	  over,’	  he	  said,	  eyes	  empty	  and	  banal	  as	   sunlight-­‐	   ‘like	  hair	   sprouting	  all	  over	  me’	  –	  He	  
squirmed	  and	  giggled	  and	  creamed	  his	  dry	  goods’,	  Burroughs	  in	  (Grauerholz,	  1998:191).	  
One’s	  imagination	  fills	  in	  meaning	  where	  the	  writer	  has	  refused	  to	  provide	  it.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  conscious	  
decision,	   it	   is	   a	   reflex	   of	   the	   imagination.	   The	   dream-­‐like	   engagement	   and	   disengagement	   with	  
images	   and	   ideas	   invite	   projection.	   In	   this	   way,	   the	   writing	   is	   incredibly	   invasive.	   Personal	  
associations,	   preoccupations,	   memories	   flow	   into	   the	   spaces	   left	   open	   by	   the	   unstable	   narrative	  
sped	  on	  by	  the	  hypnotic	  often	  musical	  rhythm.	  
The	  writing	  is	  sometimes	  gentle	  and	  beautiful,	  sometime	  prosaic	  and	  crude;	  a	  torrent	  of	  words,	  only	  
some	   of	   which	   can	   be	   read	   in	   relation	   to	   each	   other.	   	   In	   this	   ‘symbolic	   breakdown,	   the	   familiar	  
becomes	   strange,	   and	   the	   un-­‐coded	   stuff	   we	   consume	   becomes	   visible	   at	   the	   end	   of	   our	   forks’,	  
Burroughs	  in	  (Breu,	  2011:	  204).	  This	  ‘un-­‐coded	  stuff’	   is	  language	  itself.	  In	  the	  rip	  tide	  of	  Burroughs’	  
writing,	  language	  fails	  in	  its	  operations	  and	  becomes	  a	  strange	  thing	  to	  be	  looked	  at.	  
The	  following	  extract	  from	  Naked	  Lunch	  represents	  the	  reconfigured	  strangeness	  of	  Burroughs	  use	  
of	   language.	   It	   entirely	   denies	   the	   possibility	   of	   cerebral	   interpretation.	   Rather	   brain	   and	   body	  
become	  indistinguishable	  in	  the	  process	  of	  ingesting	  his	  writing.	  
The	  word	   is	   divided	   into	   units	  which	   be	   all	   in	   one	   piece	   and	   should	   be	   so	   taken,	   but	   the	  
pieces	  can	  be	  had	  in	  any	  order	  being	  tied	  up	  back	  and	  forth,	  in	  and	  out	  fore	  and	  aft	  like	  an	  
innaresting	  (sic)	  sex	  arrangement.	  This	  book	  spill	  off	  the	  page	  in	  all	  directions,	  kaleidoscope	  
of	   vistas,	   medley	   of	   tunes	   and	   street	   noises,	   farts	   and	   riot	   yips	   and	   the	   slamming	   steel	  
shutters	   of	   commerce,	   raged	   squawk	   of	   the	   displaced	   bull	   head,	   prophetic	  mutterings	   of	  
brujo	   in	  nutmeg	  trances,	  snapping	  necks	  and	  screaming	  mandrakes,	  sigh	  of	  orgasm,	  heroin	  
silent	  as	  dawn	  in	  the	  thirsty	  cells,	  Radio	  City	  screaming	   like	  a	  berserk	  tobacco	  auction,	  and	  
flutes	  of	  Ramadan	  fanning	  the	  sick	  junkie	  like	  a	  gentle	  lush	  worker	  in	  the	  grey	  subway	  dawn	  
feeling	  with	  delicate	  fingers	  for	  the	  green	  folding	  crackle…	  
This	   is	   Revelation	   and	  Prophecy	  of	  what	   I	   can	  pick	  up	  without	   FM	  on	  my	  1920	   crystal	   set	  
with	  antennae	  of	  jissom…Gentle	  	  reader,	  we	  see	  God	  through	  our	  arseholes	  in	  the	  flash	  bulb	  
of	   orgasm…	   through	   these	   orifices	   transmute	   your	   body.	   The	   way	   OUT	   is	   the	   way	   IN….	  
Burroughs	  quoted	  in	  (Grauerholz,	  1998:173).	  




The	   words	   attach,	   slip	   past	   and	   intersect	   both	   each	   other,	   and	   meaning,	   in	   a	   current	   that	   is	  
sometimes	  poetically	  smooth,	  sometimes	  disjointed,	  stunted	  and	  chaotic.	  Structural	  narration	  gives	  
way	  to	  drug–like	  mania,	  a	  bodily	  gush	  and	  flow.	  Language	  here,	  is	  in	  the	  process	  of	  being	  digested	  or	  
injected	  into	  our	  veins.	  
	   	  





Lygia	  Clark,	  Ritual	  without	  Myth	  
	  
There	  is	  a	  strange	  correlation	  between	  the	  work	  of	  William	  Burroughs	  and	  that	  of	  Lygia	  Clark.	  While	  
Burroughs	   ‘digests’	   language	   and	   meaning	   in	   written	   form,	   Clark	   does	   so	   with	   the	   language	   of	  
representation.	  	  
The	  Brazilian	  artist’s	  career	  demonstrates	  an	  increasing	  use	  of	  ‘instability’	  as	  a	  structural	  element	  in	  
her	  work.	  She	  embraced	  a	  state	  of	  perpetual	  ‘precariousness’,	  (Dezeuze,	  2003:	  227).	  In	  practice	  this	  
means	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  artwork,	  it’s	  very	  material,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  it	  acts	  on	  the	  experiences,	  
even	  the	  bodies	  of	  both	  artist	  and	  spectator,	  is	  in	  a	  constant	  state	  of	  intentional	  flux,	  each	  element	  
imprinting	  on	  the	  other	  without	  hierarchy.	  Her	  oeuvre	  places	  emphasis	  on	  incompleteness.	   It	   is	  up	  
to	  the	  viewer	  to	  ‘complete’	  or	  activate	  the	  work	  through	  engagement,	  (Morgan,	  2003:	  17,	  18).	  	  	  
Burroughs’	   fluency	   in	   ‘precariousness’,	   especially	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   body,	   developed	   through	   his	  
experiences	  as	  a	   junkie.	  For	  Clark,	   familiarity	  with	  volatility,	  uncertainty	  and	  ‘precariousness’	  come	  
from	   the	   external	   world.	   	   Brazilians	   lived	   through	   extreme	   economic	   fluctuations,	   major	   social	  
upheavals	   and	   brutal	   military	   dictatorships	   during	   the	   twentieth	   and	   twenty	   first	   centuries,	  
(Dezeuze,	   2003:	   227).	  Despite	   her	   turbulent	   context,	   or	  maybe	  because	  of	   it,	   Clark	   has	   said	   ‘I	   am	  
better	  off	  within	  myself’,(	  Lygia	  Clark	  MoMA	  Interview,2014).	  She	  retreated	  into	  art	  making.	  	  
Clark	   insisted	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   art	   outside	   the	   traditional	   notions	   of	   production	   and	   display,	  
(Morgan,	  2003:	  13).	  Representational	  language	  is	  infected	  with	  implicit	  power	  relationships.	  Spaces	  
associated	  with	  art,	  be	  it	  gallery,	  museum	  or	  learning	  institution,	  create	  an	  ideological	  and	  physical	  
distance	  between	  viewer	  and	  artwork	  which	  seem	  static,	  aloof	  and	   impenetrable.	  Her	  works	  were	  
not	   articulated	   as	   an	   end	   product,	   the	   accumulative	   final	   stage	   of	   an	   artist’s	   vision,	   but	   rather	   a	  
spring	  board	  for	  the	  viewer’s	  personal	  psychological	  response	  to	  the	  work,	  (Morgan,	  2003:	  13).	  	  
Her	   work	   has	   been	   described	   as	   allowing	   for	   ‘ritual	   without	   myth’	   (Morgan,	   2003:	   12).	   In	   her	  
manifesto,	  published	  in	  1983,	  she	  proclaimed	  to	  ‘reject	  representative	  space	  and	  the	  work	  as	  passive	  
contemplation’,	   (Morgan,	   2003:	   17).	   ‘Ritual’	   refers	   to	   the	   physical	   engagement	  with	   the	   artworks.	  
Clark’s	   pieces	   invite	   touch.	   Desires	   and	   fears	   are	   released	   in	   an	   entirely	   subjective	   engagement	  
between	  participant	  and	  piece.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  work	  is	  potentially	  therapeutic.	  ‘Myth’	  can	  mean	  any	  




implicit	   expectation	  or	   idea	   about	   a	   practice	   or	   person.	   For	   instance,	   in	   Clark’s	   case,	   ‘myth’	   could	  
imply	  the	  traditional	  role	  of	  the	  artwork	  as	  not	  being	  touched,	  the	  idea	  that	  its	  principle	  purpose	  is	  
to	  be	  looked	  at	  and	  the	  idea	  that	  art	  only	  happens	  in	  a	  gallery.	  
Both	  Burroughs	  and	  Clark	  manipulate	  traditional	   language	  as	  a	  means	  to	  enter	   into	  and	  even	  alter	  
the	  spectator’s	  subjectivity.	  While	  Burroughs’s	  project	  is	  distinctly	  nihilistic,	  Clark’s	  work	  is	  intended	  
to	   be	   healing.	   She	   believed	   in	   the	   ‘transformative	   effects	   of	   art’,	   (Morgan,	   2003:	   13).	   	   This	  
transformation	  acts	  on	  both	  artist	  and	  spectator	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  them,	  (Morgan,	  2003:	  
16).	  Like	  the	  art	   therapist,	  Clark	  acts	  as	  a	   ‘mediator’	   rather	   than	  creator	  of	   the	  artistic	  experience,	  
(Morgan,	  2003:	  12).	  For	  this	  reason	   it	   is	  more	  appropriate	  to	  describe	  those	  who	  interact	  with	  her	  
work	   with	   the	   inclusive	   egalitarian	   term,	   ‘participants’	   rather	   than	   the	   implicitly	   hierarchical	  
standard,	  ‘viewer’.	  	  
In	  2014,	  I	  visited	  the	  retrospective	  exhibition	  of	  her	  life’s	  work	  at	  the	  Museum	  of	  Modern	  Art	  in	  New	  
York.	  At	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  principle	  exhibition	  space	  there	  was	  a	   large	  mat	  for	  sitting	  on,	  scattered	  
with	  several	  objects.	  I	  sat	  for	  a	  long	  while	  with	  a	  middle	  aged	  man	  whom	  I	  did	  not	  know,	  or	  share	  a	  
word	  with,	  squashing	  and	  releasing	  a	  plastic	  bag	  full	  of	  water,	  seeing	  how	  it	  responded	  to	  having	  a	  
large	  stone	  placed	  on	  it,	  passing	  it	  from	  one	  to	  the	  other.	  	  
These	   ‘propositions’	   or	   ‘relational	   objects’	   resemble	   Winnicott’s	   ideas	   of	   transitional	   objects,	  
(Morgan,	  2003:	  39).	  Her	  chosen	  objects	  were	  always	  common	  place,	  string,	  pebbles,	  stockings	  and	  
so	   on.	   They	  were	   activated	   as	  meaningful	   artworks	   only	   by	   the	   ‘spectator-­‐manipulator’,	   (Morgan,	  
2003:	  37).	   	  As	  within	  traditional	  therapeutic	  practices,	  the	  transitional	  object	  can	  stand	  for	  the	  lost	  
mother’s	   breast	   or	   any	   other	   body	   part	   signifying	   loss,	   pain	   or	   desire,	   (Morgan,	   2003:	   39).	   The	  
person	   manipulating	   the	   object	   could	   release	   repressed	   emotions	   through	   engagement	   with	   the	  
object	  through	  an	  emotionally	  charged	  symbolic	  process.	  
Her	  1973	  work,	  Baba	  Antropofágica,	  for	  example,	  involves	  one	  person	  lying	  down	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  a	  
group	  of	  kneeling	  people	  who	  slowly	  unwind	  spools	  of	  thread	  contained	  in	  their	  mouths,	  letting	  the	  
spit	  coated	  coils	  fall	  on	  the	  prone	  body	  and	  then	  lifting	  the	  seething	  mass	  together.	  (Dezeuze	  ,2013:	  
243)	  
Clarke’s	   interest	   in	   art	   therapeutic	   techniques	   coincided	   with	   a	   general	   criticism	   of	   biomedical	  
psychiatric	   practices	   involving	   confinement	   and	   force.	   The	   traditional	   straight	   jacket	   symbolically	  
represents	  the	  imposition	  of	  will	  through	  the	  physical	  power	  of	  a	  person	  or	  persons,	  institution	  and	  
ideology	  onto	  a	  subject.	  Clark	  designed	  Camisa	  de	  forca	  or	  Straight	  Jacket	  to	  subvert	  this.	  Complex	  




systems	  of	  nets	  and	  weights	  were	  intended	  to	  promote	  a	  heightened	  experience	  of	  the	  body	  rather	  
than	  a	  frightening	  constricted	  one,	  (Lygia	  Clark	  MoMA	  Interview,2014).	  
	  
Figure	  1,	  Camisa	  de	  forca,	  (c.1969)	  
	  	  
She	  argued	  that	  many	  of	  her	  contemporary	  ‘body	  artists’	  simply	  replaced	  the	  traditional	  art	  object	  
with	  their	  own	  bodies.	  Artists	  such	  as	  Hsieh	  and	  Wilke,	  could	  arguably	  be	  used	  as	  examples	  of	  this	  
statement.	  Comparatively,	  Clark’s	  work	  seeks	  to	  fundamentally	  destabilise	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	  artist’s	  art	  work	  and	  the	  viewer.	  	  Her	  works	  emulate,	  but	  do	  not	  strictly	  resemble,	  bodily	  
interiors.	  
The	  work	  insists	  on	  being	  played	  with.	  It	  may	  be	  joyful	  or	  traumatic	  depending	  on	  the	  individuality	  of	  
each	  participant.	  They	  are	  the	  barest	  playgrounds	  in	  which	  meaning	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  generated.	  




The	   lack	  of	   symbolic,	  narrative	  or	   theoretical	   structures	  encourage	   the	  participants	   to	   ‘insert	   their	  
own	   myths’	   (Lygia	   Clark	   MoMA	   Interview,2014).	   In	   keeping	   with	   Kleinman’s	   emphasis	   on	  
storytelling,	  these	  processes	  are	  empowering	  and	  infinite	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  renegotiate	  and	  recreate	  
bodily	  experiences	  within	  the	  specific	  personal	  and	  cultural	  needs	  of	  those	  who	  choose	  to	  play.	  	  
	   	  





Introducing	  the	  ‘half-­‐light’	  
	  
William	   Burroughs	   and	   Lygia	   Clark	   present	   very	   different	   solutions	   to	   the	   artistic	   challenge	   of	  
representing	   pain	   in	   a	   language	   which	   is	   non-­‐restrictive	   in	   interpretation,	   that	   tells	   a	   sensory	  
experiential	   story,	   rather	   than	   a	   literal	   one.	   Their	   works	   do	   not	   ‘communicate’	   in	   the	   traditional	  
sense.	  	  They	  refuse	  to	  ‘perform’.	  Words	  and	  images	  are	  not	  attached	  definitively	  to	  a	  single	  referent.	  
Signification	  is	  partial	  and	  dispersed.	  Here	  I	  wish	  to	  re-­‐imagine	  these	  practices	  within	  the	  metaphor	  
of	  a	  ‘half-­‐light’	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  discussion	  of	  my	  practical	  work.	  
	  Disease	  is	  often	  invisible	  and	  inexplicable.	  It	  does	  not	  always	  present	  itself	  as	  something	  which	  can	  
be	  seen,	  labelled,	  understood.	  Medical	  language‘…	  is	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  syntactical	  reorganization	  
of	  disease	   in	  which	   the	   limits	  of	   the	   visible	   and	   invisible	   follow	  a	  new	  pattern;	   the	  abyss	  beneath	  
illness,	  which	  was	   the	   illness	   itself,	  has	  emerged	   into	   the	   light	  of	   language’,	   (Foucault,	  1973:	  242).	  
The	   ‘abyss’	   represents	   the	   place	  where	   language	   cannot	   go.	   Ill-­‐fitting	   diagnoses	   and	   labels	   lightly	  
plaster	   over	   this	   void,	   offering	   a	   partial	   and	  uneasy	   sense	  of	   safety	   from	   this	   darkness.	  Disease	   is	  
given	   legitimacy	   within	   society	   only	   when	   it	   presents	   a	   surface	   on	   which	   light	   can	   fall.	   It	   must	  
present	  itself	  visually	  for	  classification	  so	  that	  it	  can	  be	  integrated	  into	  society’s	  conception	  of	  itself	  
and	  its	  boundaries.	  	  
My	   work	   seeks	   to	   inhabit	   the	   shadowy	   place	   between	   the	   abyss	   and	   language.	   My	   introduction	  
touched	   on	   my	   frustration	   with	   the	   symbolic	   implications	   of	   this	   ‘surface’.	   Is	   retreating	   into	  
abjection,	   and	   the	   isolation	   it	   allows,	  a	  way	  of	  hiding	  away	   from	   the	  prodding,	  poking,	   classifying,	  
reclassifying	  and	  control	  exercised	  on	  the	  surface?	  Or	  can	  it	  be	  a	  space	  of	  resilience?	  If	  abjection	  is	  
the	   social	   psychological	   construction	   of	   demarcating	   that	  which	   is	   unwanted	   from	   itself,	   how	   can	  
this	   be	   a	   healing	   space	   to	   inhabit	   artistically?	   If	   the	   abyss	   represents	   the	   place	   where	   language	  
cannot	  function,	  how	  can	  this	  be	  a	  position	  from	  which	  my	  work	  speaks?	  	  
Medical	  language	  marks	  the	  body	  in	  pain	  	  out	  as	  ‘abject’.	  Paradoxically,	  the	  body	  is	  doubly	  inscribed	  
as	  such	   if	   it	  does	  not	  present	   itself	   for	  classification.	  Not	  only	   is	   it	   irregular,	  but	  also	  unknown	  and	  
menacing.	  This	  doubly	  abject	   figure	   is	  that	  of	  the	  monster	  which	   lurks	   in	  the	  darkness.	   In	  terms	  of	  
the	  metaphor	  of	  the	  abyss,	  perhaps	  it	   is	  necessary	  to	  operate	  with	  in	  a	  ‘half-­‐light’.	  This	  opens	  up	  a	  
symbolic	  space	  which	   is	  neither	  entirely	  confined	  by	  the	  strictures	  of	   language	  nor	  cut	  off	   from	  all	  




communication	  in	  the	  depths	  of	  this	  abyss.	  The	  half-­‐light	  then,	  is	  a	  ‘half-­‐	  language’.	  It	  tells	  a	  partial	  
story,	  communicates	  only	  up	  to	  a	  point	  while	  insisting	  on	  privacy	  within	  its	  subjectivity.	  
When	   the	   connections	   between	   words	   or	   images	   and	   meaning	   become	   unstable,	   the	   potential	  
combinations	  between	  each	  become	  limitless.	  Unconfined	  by	  the	  laws	  of	  language,	  imagination	  can	  
produce	   effusions	   of	   image	   and	   idea	   that	   reflect	   an	   internal	   reality	   that	   is	   conventionally	  
inexpressible.	   In	   the	   imaginative	  product,	   issuing	   from	   the	  half	   light	   of	   the	   entrance	  of	   the	   abyss,	  
communication,	   through	   image	   or	   word,	   has	   been	   fundamentally	   undermined.	   A	   sense	   of	  
experience	  may	  be	  discernible,	  through	  the	  choice	  of	  imagery	  and	  use	  of	  materials,	  but	  the	  specifics	  
will	  be	  entirely	  ungraspable.	  	  
	   	  





My	  Practice,	  Re-­‐enchanting	  and	  Re-­‐engaging	  
	  
…in	  isolation,	  pain	  ‘intends	  nothing;	  it	  is	  wholly	  passive;	  it	  is	  ‘suffered’	  rather	  than	  willed	  or	  
directed.	  To	  be	  more	  precise,	  one	  can	  say	  that	  pain	  only	  becomes	  an	  intentional	  state	  once	  
it	   is	   brought	   into	   relation	   with	   the	   objectifying	   power	   of	   the	   imagination;	   through	   that	  
relation,	  pain	  will	  be	  transformed	  from	  a	  wholly	  passive	  and	  helpless	  occurrence	  into	  a	  self-­‐
modifying	  and,	  when	  successful,	  self-­‐eliminating	  one,	  (Scarry,	  1987:	  164).	  
	  My	   struggle	   with	   the	   various	   doctors	   and	   institutions	   with	   whom	   I	   interacted	   while	   seeking	  
diagnosis	  and	  treatment,	  was	  in	  many	  ways,	  a	  struggle	  with	  language	  itself.	  My	  bodily	  irregularities	  
refused	   to	   conform	   to	   classification.	   To	   exist	   outside	   language	   results	   in	   terrible	   uncertainty	   and	  
loneliness.	  Outside	  language	  stretches	  the	  abyss	  of	  abjection.	  
Abjection	   is	   at	   once	  hyper	   visible	   and	  unseeable.	   It	   is	   hypervisible	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  proliferation	  of	  
images	   of	   otherness,	   behavioural,	   medical,	   cultural	   that	   represent	   that	   which	   is	   not	   normal.	  
Paradoxically	   the	  abject	   is	   so	   threatening	  because	   it	   looms,	  unseen	  and	   insidious,	  on	   the	  edges	  of	  
experience.	   The	   former	   is	   indubitably	   a	   response	   to	   the	   fear	   of	   the	   latter.	   Images	   of	   horrific	  
otherness	  are	  thrilling	  because	  they	  illuminate	  momentarily	  a	  small	  reprehensive	  vignette	  of	  the	  vast	  
unknowable	  horror	  we	  sense	  is	  out	  there.	  
After	  many	  years	  I	  was	  finally	  ‘made	  sense	  of’	  with	  a	  dual	  diagnosis,	  Pelvic	  Pain	  and	  Celiac	  Disease.	  
These	  terms	  provide	  all	   the	  comfort	  that	  operating	   inside	   language	  can	  bring.	   I	   felt	   like	   I	  had	  been	  
accepted	  back	  into	  the	  fold.	  However,	  depending	  on	  the	  specialist,	  chronic	  pain	  can	  be	  either	  a	  final	  
diagnosis	   or	   simply	   a	   symptom	  of	   something	   else.	   The	   stability	   these	   terms	   offer	   is	   always	   under	  
threat,	   always	   at	   the	   risk	   of	   being	   dismissed	   or	   replaced,	   constantly	   reinvented	   in	   diagnostic	  
language	   in	  terms	  of	  partial,	  misinterpreted	  or	  all	  encompassing	  explanation.	  Language	  here	   is	   the	  
solid	  ground	  beneath	  one’s	  feet,	  which	  may,	  at	  any	  moment,	  begin	  to	  bubble	  and	  burn,	  or	  turn	  to	  
quick	  sand	  and	  swallow	  one	  up.	  
The	  ‘half-­‐light’	  is	  the	  in-­‐between	  space,	  before	  being	  re-­‐embraced	  by	  language.	  Meaning	  is	  only	  ever	  
partially	  shared.	  Imagery,	  when	  definable	  is	  ambiguous,	  lines	  outline	  nothingness	  in	  equal	  measure	  
to	  somethingness.	   	  Unrestricted	  by	  the	  signifying	   laws	  of	   language	  yet	  not	  yet	   immersed	   in	   the	  all	  
absorbing	  nothingness	  of	  complete	  abjection,	  this	  space	  can	  be	  a	  playground	  for	  the	  imagination.	  	  




Work	  from	  the	  ‘half-­‐light’	  is	  an	  invitation	  to	  interpret,	  to	  identify,	  though	  inevitably	  abstractly.	  This	  
‘invitation’	  materialises	   through	   the	   indefinite,	   unanchored	   use	   of	   imagery	   and	   line.	   Like	   Clarke’s	  
playful	  objects,	  this	  allows	  any	  viewer	  to	  emotionally	  imprint	  themselves	  onto	  my	  images.	  	  
The	  body,	  before	  being	  inscribed	  by	  language,	  does	  not	  make	  sense.	  Communication	  is	  not	  neat.	  The	  
pre-­‐language	  of	  the	  body	  gurgles,	  squelches	  and	  oozes	  like	  a	  piece	  of	  Burroughs’	  prose.	  There	  is	  no	  
reason	  why	  this	  should	  be	  ugly	  though	  language	  has	  created	  an	  aura	  of	  shame	  and	  silliness	  around	  
these	  aspects	  of	  the	  body.	  Language	  sits	  on	  the	  surface,	  like	  badly	  applied	  make	  up.	  
My	  experience	  of	  my	  body	  became	  ‘disenchanted’.	  Everything	  experienced	  became	  reducible.	  Every	  
element	  of	  my	  life	  was	  documented,	  explained	  away.	  I	  was	  not	  ‘struggling	  with	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  
life	  in	  a	  body	  which	  I	  could	  not	  control’,	  I	  was	  ‘Depressed’.	  Before	  I	  was	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  Celiac,	  I	  
found	   myself	   dumped	   in	   the	   overcrowded	   and	   incredibly	   vague	   category	   of	   ‘Irritable	   Bowel	  
Syndrome’.	   The	   sense	   of	   the	   unknown	   was	   quickly	   methodically	   dispelled	   by	   proliferations	   of	  
unstable	   scientific	   explanations,	   (Barnett,	   2014:	   22).	   A	   sense	   of	   mystery	   has	   no	   place	   in	   this	  
paradigm.	  
I	  like	  to	  see	  my	  work	  as	  a	  process	  of	  re-­‐enchantment.	  Re-­‐engaging	  a	  sense	  of	  mystery	  seems	  to	  me,	  
paradoxically,	  to	  facilitate	  the	  reclamation	  of	  my	  body	  from	  the	  prosaic	  all-­‐seeing	  realms	  of	  science.	  
The	   irregularities	   that	  my	   body	   and	   self	   constantly	   presented,	   were	   systematically	   sheared	   off	   in	  
order	  to	  reach	  the	  point	  where	  I	  could	  make	  sense	  within	  medical	  language.	  My	  practice	  has	  been,	  in	  
part,	  to	  lovingly	  re-­‐gather	  these	  ‘differences’,	  allow	  them	  to	  speak,	  see	  what	  they	  say.	  	  
This	   reclamation	   is,	   in	   part,	   an	   attempt	   to	   rediscover	   a	   sense	   of	   bodily	   unity	  which	   is	   threatened	  
through	  the	  literal	  and	  figurative	  dissecting	  of	  medical	  processes.	  The	  body	  becomes	  experienced	  as	  
a	  set	  of	  systems	  rather	  than	  a	  unified	  whole,	  (Barnett,	  2014:	  27).	  
In	  terms	  of	   the	  Bio-­‐psychological	  Model	  of	  healing,	  storytelling	  can	  help	  restore	  a	  sense	  of	  unity.	   I	  
wrote	  the	  following	  short	  stories	  making	  use	  of	  imagery	  generated	  during	  art	  therapy	  sessions.	  They	  
attempt	  to	  express	  my	  subjective	  pain	  in	  a	  ‘re-­‐enchanted’	  symbolic	  language.	  	  
Art	  Therapy	  works	  by	  tapping	  directly	  into	  your	  subconscious	  through	  a	  process	  of	  automatic	  image	  
making.	  Out	  of	  my	  subconscious	  trouped	  creatures,	  creature	  after	  creature,	  Noah’s	  ark	   in	   reverse.	  
The	  creatures	  were	  mystical,	  mundane,	  vulnerable,	   threatening,	   silly	  and	  sometimes	  sinister.	  They	  
came	  to	  represent	  me,	  my	  mother,	  my	  father,	  my	  brother,	  my	  lovers,	  or	  more	  abstractly,	  my	  fears,	  
my	  desires,	  bits	  of	  me	  that	  I	  had	  kept	  repressed.	  




These	  creatures	  began	  to	  enact	  scenarios	  that	  metaphorically	  represented	  aspects	  of	  my	  life.	  They	  
provided	   a	   lexicon	   of	   symbolic	   images	  which	   comprise	   a	   personal,	   psychological	  mythology.	   They	  
were	  creation	  myths,	  coming	  of	  age	  sagas,	  personal	  parables	  and	  allegorical	  misadventures	   in	  self-­‐
discovery.	  	  	  
Directing	  the	  wild	  animals	  from	  my	  imagination	  into	  clear	  narrations	  is	  an	  act	  of	  agency	  and	  
reclamation	  in	  response	  to	  the	  passivity	  imposed	  by	  chronic	  physical	  pain.	  The	  ‘objectifying	  power	  of	  
the	  imagination’	  allows	  pain	  to	  act	  in	  a	  ‘self-­‐modifying’	  and	  even	  ‘self-­‐eliminating’	  capacity,	  (Scarry,	  
1987:	  164).	  The	  Farmer	  and	  the	  Apocalypse,	  The	  Lighthouse	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  World	  and	  The	  




	   	  





The	  Farmer	  and	  the	  Apocalypse	  	  
The	  new	  cockerel	  was	  born	  under	  a	  strange	  star.	  Within	  a	  week	  all	  the	  chickens	  were	  pregnant.	  Six	  
months	   later	   there	  were	  more	  chickens	  than	  the	  farmer	  knew	  how	  to	  deal	  with.	  Too	  many	  for	  his	  
humble	  needs,	  too	  many	  for	  the	  dinner	  plates	  of	  the	  small	  neighbouring	  desert	  town,	  too	  many	  for	  
any	  imaginable	  use	  of	  chicken	  for	  every	  person	  he	  had	  ever	  met	  and	  their	  families.	  Too	  many	  for	  the	  
small	   coop	   behind	   the	   house,	   too	   many	   for	   the	   precarious	   extended	   barbed	   wire	   contraption	  
assembled	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  original.	  Too	  many	   for	   the	  kitchen	  and	  bedroom	  and	  bathroom.	  
Too	  many.	  
In	  his	  backyard,	  the	  farmer	  re-­‐assembled	  an	  ancient	  and	  gigantic	   	  oil	  tanker	  to	  house	  the	  chickens.	  
The	  various	  bits	  had	  been	  picked	  up	  from	  all	  the	  scrapyards	  in	  truckable	  distance.	  Here	  and	  there,	  he	  
improvised.	  At	  night,	  when	  he	  closed	  the	  iron	  door,	  the	  farm	  was	  chickenless.	  
The	  small	  TV	  and	  the	  dusty	  week	  old	  newspapers	  told	  of	  flood	  after	  flood.	  ‘From	  a	  distance	  one	  can	  
see	  it	  all	  clearly,’	  he	  said	  to	  himself.	  At	  night	  he	  dreamt	  of	  monstrous	  bodies	  of	  holy	  wet	  vengeance.	  
	  
The	  Lighthouse	  at	  the	  End	  of	  the	  World.	  
Lighthouse	  keepers	  had	   long	  ago	  become	  obsolete.	  Nobody	   really	  believed	   that	  anything	  ominous	  
was	  going	  to	  appear	  from	  out	  of	  the	  great	  darkness	  beyond	  the	  ‘edge’.	  However	  a	  few	  superstitious	  
weirdos	  were	  still	  known	  to	  be	  posted	  in	  lighthouses	  along	  the	  edge	  of	  the	  abyss,	  forever	  gazing	  out	  
into	  nothingness.	  Towns	  and	  cities	  were	  located	  far	  inland	  due	  largely	  to	  the	  belief	  that	  living	  near	  
the	  edge	  unhinged	  people,	   that	   somehow	   the	  boundary	  pulled	  one	  hopelessly	   towards	   it,	   enticed	  
one	  to	  throw	  themselves	  into	  the	  black	  infinity.	  The	  great	  deep	  dark,	  never	  a	  star,	  a	  mist	  or	  a	  bird.	  
One	  day	  a	  lighthouse	  keeper	  of	  great	  great	  age,	  after	  decades	  of	  looking,	  deciphered,	  or	  thought,	  or	  
imagined	  he	  saw	  a	  grey-­‐white-­‐silver	  blur	  in	  the	  middle	  distance.	  The	  kind	  of	  smudge	  or	  haze	  an	  old	  
cornea	  can	  create	  in	  contrast	  to	  uniform	  black,	  the	  kind	  of	  trick	  the	  eye	  can	  play	  when	  one	  looks	  too	  
long	   and	   too	   hard.	   Also	   the	   kind	   of	   impression	   given	   by	   many	   things,	   flying	   together,	   not	   yet	  
decipherable.	  
The	  shock	  of	  the	  sudden	  something	  stopped	  the	  old	  man’s	  heart.	  	  







Last	  night	  a	  monkey	  stole	  my	  head.	  I	  recognised	  him	  from	  a	  drawing	  I	  had	  done	  a	  while	  ago.	  He	  had	  
no	  place	   in	   this	   particular	   drawing	  which	  was	   a	   brainstorm	   for	   a	   story	   about	   a	  witch,	   a	   cat	   and	   a	  
clock.	  But	   there	  he	  was,	  with	  his	  menacing	  yellow	  face	  and	  pink	  bandy	  body.	  And	  there	  again	   last	  
night.	   Recently	   I	   was	   reading	   Italo	   Calvino’s	   If	   on	   a	   winter’s	   night	   a	   traveller.	   In	   a	   short	   story,	   a	  
character	  experiences	  vertigo	  when	  she	  arrives	  at	  the	  edge	  of	  what	  the	  writer	  has	  written,	  which	  she	  
describes	  as	  a	  terrible	  void	  which	  suddenly	  sprung	  up	  before	  her,	  (Calvino,1981:82).	  Luckily	  for	  her,	  
the	  writer	  writes	  a	  bridge	  over	  the	  void,	  the	  story	  continues	  to	  unfold.	  	  
But	  what	  happens	  to	  characters	  an	  artist	  or	  writer	   invents,	  maybe	  entertains	  for	  a	  while,	  and	  then	  
forgets	  about.	  Do	  they	  experience	  the	  same	  sense	  of	  being	  on	  the	  edge	  of	  a	  void	  or	  nothingness?	  
And	  what	   happens	  when	   a	   particularly	   resilient	   character,	   for	   instance	   a	  menacing	   pink	  monkey,	  
finds	  his	  way	  back	  from	  the	  edge	  to	  take	  revenge	  on	  the	  creator	  which	  abandoned	  him?	  
	   	  





Initially,	   I	   intended	   to	   illustrate	   these	   stories	   in	   continuation	  with	   the	   final	   project	  of	  my	  Honours	  
year	  which	  also	   focused	  on	  the	  healing	  power	  of	   imaginative	  storytelling	   in	   the	  treatment	  of	  pain.	  
The	   series	   Piglet	   and	   the	   Terrible	   Adventure	   follows	   a	   small	   unassuming	   piglet	   character	   on	   a	  
‘journey’	   through	   the	   body.	   The	   stages	   of	   this	   journey	   represent	   different	   body	   parts	   depicted	   as	  
vast	   threatening	   landscapes.	   	   They	   metaphorically	   represent	   various	   bodily	   afflictions	   associated	  
with	  my	  illness.	  This	  process	  was	  at	  the	  time	  cathartic	  and	  restorative.	  The	  book	  allowed	  me	  to	  re-­‐
interpret	  ugly	  everyday	  indignities	  into	  something	  beautiful	  and	  mysterious.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Piglet	  and	  the	  Terrible	  adventure,	  (2013)	  
	  
	  





Figure	  3,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Neurosis,	  (2013)	  
	  
I	  quickly	  realised	  that	  literal	  renderings	  of	  The	  Farmer	  and	  the	  Apocalypse,	  The	  Lighthouse	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  world	  and	  The	  Monkey,	  were	  no	  longer	  meaningful.	  After	  a	  few	  aborted	  efforts	  to	  ‘illustrate’	  
these	   stories,	   I	   realised	   that	   I	   was	   finding	   the	   restrictions	   of	   narrative	   invasive.	   Rather,	   I	   became	  
interested	  in	  illustrating	  what	  was	  conceptually	  and	  emotionally	  apparent	  in	  each.	  The	  stories	  each	  
deal	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  the	  unknown,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  symbolic	  language	  I	  have	  been	  using,	  the	  abyss	  
of	  abjection.	  They	  respond	  to	  this	  threat	  alternatively	  with	  humour,	  fear	  and	  even	  desire.	  The	  stories	  
ceased	  being	  frameworks	  that	  I	  needed	  to	  fill	  but	  rather	  points	  in	  a	  creative	  process.	  My	  work	  slowly	  
became	  looser	  both	  in	  symbolic	  readability	  and	  style.	  
During	  the	  first	  year	  of	  my	  Masters,	  I	  produced	  dense	  pen	  drawings	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  Piglet	  series	  
though	  less	  easily	  ‘readable’.	  Some	  drawings	  were	  simply	  careful	  re-­‐renderings	  of	  messy	  works	  I	  had	  
created	  in	  art	  therapy	  sessions.	  Others	  were	  imaginative	  interactions	  with	  the	  characters	  that	  most	  








Figure	  4,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Untitled,	  (2013)	  
	  
Figure	  5,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Tummy	  Guernica,	  (2013)	  





Figure	  6,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Skype	  (2013)	  
	  
Figure	  7,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Bad	  Elephant,	  	  (2013)	  




In	   retrospect,	   and	   in	  art	   therapeutic	   terms,	   I	   now	   recognise	   that	   these	   tight	   lines	  and	   ‘illustrative’	  
imagery	  reflect	  a	  neurosis	  and	  need	  for	  control,	  both	  psychologically	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  my	  art	  making	  
process.	  	  
Increasingly,	  I	  have	  come	  to	  find	  partiality	  and	  instability	  a	  more	  meaningful	  model	  for	  storytelling.	  
My	   later	  work	  speaks	   from	  the	   ‘half-­‐light’	  with	  more	  confidence,	   less	  need	  to	  be	  affirmed	  or	  even	  
understood.	   In	   formal	   terms,	   the	   technique	   developed	   a	   synchronicity	  with	   the	   sense	   of	   insecure	  
variability	  that	  I	  was	  trying	  to	  express.	  The	  ephemeral	  forms	  and	  loose	  use	  of	  watercolours	  describe	  
a	  sense	  of	  bodily	  and	  social	  instability	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  tightly	  controlled	  pen	  drawings	  never	  could.	  
The	   earlier	   work	   also	   corresponds	   with	   a	   time	   of	   prolonged	   bodily	   difficulties	   in	   that	   strange	   in	  
between	  space	  before	  diagnosis.	  Unwilling	  to	  ‘perform’	  my	  pain,	  I	  isolated	  myself.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  
the	  imagery	  I	  generated	  at	  the	  time,	  which	  is	  obstinately	  difficult	  to	  access	  in	  any	  way,	  save	  for	  the	  
most	  abstractly	  emotional	  resonances.	  The	  imagery	  speaks	  loudly	  but	  in	  a	  language	  shared	  by	  one,	  a	  
defiant	   oxymoron.	   My	   frequent	   use	   of	   my	   own	   hand	   writing	   as	   a	   visual	   element	   promises	  
communication	  and	  then	  denies	  it.	  Only	  very	  few	  words	  are	  discernible	  in	  these	  messy	  scrawls.	  They	  
seem	  to	  say	  ‘there	  is	  so	  much	  going	  on	  here	  but	  I	  refuse	  to	  share	  any	  of	  it	  with	  you!’	  
	   	  





Figure	  8,	  Baumann,	  M.Untitled	  (2014)	  
	  
Figure	  9,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Untitled,	  (2014)	  





Figure	  10,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Humunculous,	  (2014)	  
	  
Figure	  11,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  Untitled	  (2014)	   	  







Figure	  12,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  Untitled	  (2015)	  
	  
This	   phase	   was	   not	   destined	   to	   survive	   long.	   One	   has	   a	   responsibility	   to	   ‘be	   part	   of	   the	   world’.	  
Language	   is	  not	   intended	  for	  one.	  Getting	  better,	  getting	  diagnosed,	   isolating	   less,	  my	  work	  began	  
tentatively	   to	   communicate.	   These	   later	  works	   includes	   imagery	   relating	   to	   the	   circus,	   show	   girls,	  
early	  pornography	  and	  photographs	  of	  myself	  in	  which	  I	  am	  clearly	  performing	  or	  failing	  to	  perform	  
a	   role.	   These	   works	   are	   not	   ‘easily	   translatable’,	   they	   do	   not	   offer	   up	   any	   literal	   explanation	   of	  
themselves,	  and	  yet	   they	  communicate	  quite	  clearly	  a	   sense	  of	   the	  performative	  which	   is	   in	   some	  
state	   of	   rupture;	   desperately	   over-­‐acted,	   half-­‐hearted,	   lonely,	   exhausted,	   or	   unalluring	   despite	   all	  









Figure	  13,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  Untitled	  (2016)	  
	  
Figure	  14,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  Untitled	  (2016)	  
	  





Figure	  15,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  Untitled	  (2016)	  
	  
Figure	  16,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  Untitled	  (2016)	  
	  





Figure	  17,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  Untitled	  (2016)	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  a	  final	  presentation,	  a	  set	  of	  booklets,	  each	  reflecting	  a	  different	  theme	  from	  my	  thesis,	  
seems	   the	  natural	  accumlation	  of	   this	  process.	  Books	   imply	   intimacy,	  process	  and	  narrative	   rather	  
than	  the	  spectacle	  and	   finality	  of	  a	  curated	  exhibition.	  The	  theory	  and	  practice	  of	   this	  process	  has	  
been	  experientially	  inseparable.	  The	  booklet	  format	  allows	  me	  to	  represent	  this	  through	  the	  use	  of	  
quotes	  and	  ideas	  as	  text	  which	  dissolve	  into	  emotive	  imagery.	  
These	   books	   are	   titled:	  my	   story	  with	   celiac	   disease	   and	   chronic	   pain;	   pain	   and	   society;	   pain	   and	  
performance;	  art	  as	  therapy	  and	  storytelling	  as	  healing.	  
	   	  





Figure	  18,	  Baumann,	  M.	  My	  Story	  with	  Celiac	  Disease	  and	  Chronic	  Pain,	  cover	  (2016)	  
	  Figure	  19,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Pain	  and	  Society,	  cover	  (2016)	  
Figure	  20,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  Pain	  and	  Performance,	  cover	  (2016)	  





	  	  	   	  
	  
Figure	  21,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  Art	  as	  Therapy,	  cover,	  (2016)	  
Figure	  22,	  Baumann,	  M.	  Storytelling	  as	  Healing,	  cover,	  (2016)	  
	  
	  





Figure	  23,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  art	  as	  therapy,	  layout	  9,	  (2016)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  24,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  art	  as	  therapy,	  layout	  6,	  (2016)	   	  





Figure	  25,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  my	  story	  with	  celiac	  disease	  and	  chronic	  pain,	  	  layout	  3,	  (2016)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  26,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  art	  as	  therapy,	  layout	  4,	  	  (2016)	  






Figure	  27,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  pain	  and	  society,	  layout	  2,	  	  (2016)	  
	  
Figure	  28,	  Baumann,	  M.	  art	  as	  therapy,	  layout	  8,	  (2016)	  	  





Figure	  29,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  pain	  and	  society,	  layout	  12,	  (2016)	  
	  
	  	  
Figure	  30,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  pain	  and	  performance,	  layout	  6,	  	  (2016)	  





Figure	  31,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  pain	  and	  performance,	  layout	  8,	  (2016)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  32,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  pain	  and	  performance,	  layout	  3,	  (2016)	  





Figure	  33,	  Baumann,	  M.	  storytelling	  as	  healing,	  layout	  3,	  	  (2016)	  
	  
	  
Figure	  34,	  Baumann,	  M.	  	  storytelling	  as	  healing,	  layout	  8,	  (2016)	  




My	  work	   experiments	   are	  with	   a	   ‘re-­‐enchanted’	   visual	   language	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   sick	   body.	   The	  
images	   are	   ‘ritual	   without	   myth’,	   signs	   without	   stable	   referent,	   talking	   without	   describing	   or	  
instructing.	  They	  offer	  nothing	  more	  than	  the	  edges	  of	  a	  feeling,	  or	  perhaps	  at	  most,	  the	  feeling	  and	  
renegotiation	  of	  the	  sense	  of	  an	  ‘edge’.	  
	   	  








This	   thesis,	   as	   a	   constant	   presence	   in	  my	   experience	   of	   life	   over	   the	   last	   few	   years,	   has	   been	   an	  
illustration	  and	  embodiment	  of	  the	  all-­‐consuming	  multidimensional	  nature	  of	  illness	  to	  which	  I	  have	  
been	  referring	  to	  throughout	  my	  writing.	  It	  expounds	  on	  subjects	  to	  which	  I	  am	  instinctively	  drawn	  
but	  also	  which	  I	  am	  most	  eager	  to	  avoid.	  	  
As	  someone	  completely	  immersed	  in	  an	  unusual	  bodily	  relationship	  to	  the	  world,	  I	  doubt	  that	  I	  could	  
have	  spent	  three	  years	  meaningfully	  engaging	  with	  any	  other	  subject.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  reading	  
and	  writing	  necessitated	  by	  this	  work	  has	  been	  unusually	  painful	  for	  an	  academic	  pursuit.	  People	  in	  
pain	  tend	  to	  find	  ways	  to	  escape	  their	  bodily	  dilemmas.	  In	  my	  experience,	  this	  manifested	  in	  strange	  
repetitive	   and	   compulsive	   habits	  which	   kept	  my	   focus	   distracted	   from	   the	   constant	   bodily	   pull	   to	  
submersion	   in	   pain.	   This	   writing,	   and	   its	   practical	   counterpart,	   has	   been	   a	   constant	   process	   of	  
engagement	  and	  disengagement,	  fascination	  and	  repulsion,	  intrigue	  and	  aversion.	  	  
The	   time	   it	   has	   taken	   to	   write	   has	   also	   been	   perforated	   by	   medical	   problems	   that	   have	   directly	  
affected	  my	  ability	  to	  both	  draw	  and	  write.	  My	  diagnosis	  of	  Interstitial	  Cystitis	  was	  reverted	  to	  that	  
of	  ‘Chronic	  Pelvic	  Pain’,	  the	  one	  leading	  naturally	  into	  the	  other.	  This	  process	  may	  be	  symptomatic	  of	  
endometriosis.	   This	   has	   meant	   constant	   revision	   of	   medications.	   Pain	   medication,	   particularly	  
seriously	   redefines	   how	   one’s	   body	   relates	   to	   the	   world.	   For	   many	   months	   I	   was	   disorientated,	  
excessively	   clumsy,	   prone	   to	   lose	   track	   of	   conversations	   and	   even	  my	   own	   thoughts.	   I	   could	   not	  
concentrate	  or	  read	  even	  recreationally.	  Adjusting	  these	  doses	  to	  a	   level	  which	  has	  allowed	  me	  to	  
function,	  while	  keeping	  the	  pain	  manageable,	  has	  been	  an	  on-­‐going	  process	  which	  has	  certainly	  not	  
concluded.	  
During	  this	   time	   I	  have	  suffered	  terrible	  guilt	  about	  my	   inability	   to	   ‘perform’	  as	  expected.	  This	  has	  
been	  both	  self-­‐afflicted	  and	  imposed	  from	  the	  outside.	  Reporting	  on	  a	  period	  of	  inactivity,	  which	  are	  
frequent	   both	   with	   chronic	   pain	   conditions	   and	   autoimmune	   diseases,	   is	   often	   met	   with	   open	  
frustration,	  spoken	  and	  unspoken	  expressions	  of	   ‘what,	  again?’	  The	  sense	  of	   ‘fault’	   is	  constant	  and	  
invasive.	   	   I	  have	  often	   felt	   like	   I	  am	  reporting	  on	  a	  hangover	  or	   some	  other	  self-­‐inflicted	  shameful	  
condition.	  I	  felt	  like	  a	  child	  who	  constantly	  knocked	  over	  precious	  things.	  For	  instance,	  I	  was	  accused	  




of	  faking	  a	  doctor’s	  letter	  explaining	  my	  chronic	  pelvic	  pain	  condition.	  The	  accusation	  of	  ‘faking’	  has	  
been	  discussed	   in	  both	  chapter	  1	  and	  2	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  need	  for	  performance	   in	  making	  oneself	  
socially	  viable.	  This	  type	  of	  accusation	  both	  emphasises	  the	  need	  for	  more	  convincing	  performance	  
and	   expresses	   the	   constant	   potential	   for	   performative	   failure.	   It	   invalidates	   an	   all-­‐encompassing	  
subjective	   experience.	   Such	   an	   accusation	   is	   the	   constant	   fear	   and	   source	   of	   anxiety	   for	   anyone	  
suffering	  an	  ‘invisible’	  and	  chronic	  condition.	  The	  words	  are	  there,	  spoken	  by	  loved	  ones,	  colleagues	  
and	  superiors,	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  the	  sufferer	  long	  before	  they	  are	  or	  are	  not	  uttered.	  	  
These	   reflections	   make	   use	   of	   my	   own	   experience	   as	   a	   case	   study	   for	   my	   theoretical	   argument.	  
Biomedical	  medicine	   is	   reliant	   on	   a	   constructed	   binary	   between	   health	   and	   illness,	   normality	   and	  
abjection.	  This	  binary	   is	   simultaneously	  disguised	  and	  naturalised	  by	   the	  notion	   that	  medicine	   is	  a	  
science	   and	   not	   a	   discourse.	   For	   instance,	   the	   maintenance	   of	   a	   functioning	   capitalist	   society	   is	  
subconsciously	   and	   communally	  maintained	   by	   a	   dependable	  work	   force	  which	   stigmatises	   illness	  
and	   the	   lack	   of	   performativity	   it	   signifies.	   	   A	   culture	  of	   shame	  has	   been	   created	   around	   the	  body	  
which	  cannot	  ‘contribute	  to	  society’.	  Specific	  agendas	  and	  corrupt	  ideologies	  interwoven	  within	  the	  
biomedical	  narrative	  are	  safely	  hidden	  behind	  the	  façade	  of	  ‘scientific	  objectivity’.	  
Part	   of	   this	   scientific	   fallacy	   is	   that	   the	   visual	   is	   a	   direct	   reflection	   of	   reality.	   Since	   the	   scientific	  
discoveries	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  period,	  the	  visual	  has	  become	  the	  most	  celebrated	  and	  dominant	  
diagnostic	  tool.	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  binary	  implicit	  in	  biomedical	  thinking,	  is	  significantly	  maintained	  
through	  visual	  representation.	  This	  emphasis	  is	  problematic	  on	  several	  levels.	  A	  single	  visual	  can	  be	  
interpreted	   in	   many	   different	   ways,	   different	   specialists	   have	   different	   ways	   of	   looking.	   Many	  
conditions	  are	  short	  on	  visual	  cues,	  in	  some	  they	  are	  non-­‐existent.	  Sufferers	  of	  bodily	  maladies	  are	  
expected	  to	  ‘look	  ill’	  to	  justify	  their	  inactivity.	  
Chronic	   pain	   challenges	   the	   presumptions	   of	   biomedicine	   by	   existing	   entirely	   in	   the	   subjective,	  
directly	  inexpressible	  in	  visual	  form.	  Its	  subjects	  often	  look	  entirely	  normal.	  	  
Performance	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  person	  in	  pain	  to	  keep	  making	  sense	  within	  a	  community	  invested	  
in	   biomedical	   binaries.	   Paradoxically,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   define	   oneself	   as	   outside	   normality,	   as	  
‘abject’,	  to	  translate	  meaningfully	  within	  the	  ‘normal’.	  	  	  
My	  practical	  work	  experiments	  with	  ways	  to	  exist	  outside	  biomedical	  constructions	  of	  illness.	  Using	  a	  
visual	  medium	  to	  destabilise	   the	  assumptions	  around	   the	  scope	  of	   the	  visual,	   I	  have	  created	  work	  
based	   on	   the	   principles	   of	   instability.	   Communication	   is	   that	   of	   feeling	   before	   it	   has	   been	  
reorganised	   by	   the	  mechanisms	   of	   language.	   As	   a	   creature,	   in	  many	  ways,	   brought	   into	   being	   by	  




language,	   and	   expressing	   itself	   through	   language,	   this	   claim	   may	   be	   overly	   ambitious.	   It	   does	  
however,	  preside	  as	  an	  inherently	  unreachable	  artistic	  aspiration.	  Metaphorically,	  my	  work,	  inhabits	  
a	   ‘half-­‐light’,	   wishing	   to	   be	   ‘seen’,	   to	   communicate	  my	   experience,	   refusing	   to	   be	   illuminated	   by	  
scientific	  or	  social	  scrutiny.	  	  
Theory,	   experience	   and	   practice	   interdependently	   tell	   the	   same	   story.	   Language	   is	   our	   principle	  
recourse	   to	   each	   other	   and	   the	   world.	   Language	   insists	   that	   we	   be	   translatable.	   Biomedicine	  
translates	  us	  as	  either	  normal	  or	  abject.	  	  For	  many,	  this	  means	  inventing	  themselves	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  
binary.	  This	  is	  a	  creative	  construct,	  albeit	  reiterative	  and	  subconscious.	  	  Inhabiting	  this	  creative	  space	  
can	  be	  both	  healing	  and	  defiant	  when	  entered	  into	  with	  self-­‐consciousness	  and	  self-­‐preservation.	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